Opinion
00-CV-12436-MEL
January 12, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Local 507 and two American Airlines aircraft mechanics, Robert Avola (the President of Local 507) and Louis Rigueur, sue the Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO ("TWU"), to set aside elections, held on April 7, 2000, and July 21, 2000, which transferred Local 507's mechanic members to another TWU Local. The plaintiffs allege that the elections violated federal labor laws and the TWU Constitution.
Specifically, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (2000); the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (2000); and, the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141-97 (2000).
The plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction restoring Local 507's lost membership. The motion is denied.
I.
The TWU is a labor organization that represents, among others, airline mechanics (Title I employees) and facilities and automotive mechanics (Title II employees) who work for American Airlines. Local 507 is, and has been, a subunit of the TWU, comprised of American Airlines workers at Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, including Title I and II employees.
In 1998, the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association ("AMFA") undertook aggressive organizing efforts to draw away members from the TWU. Part of AMFA's appeal to workers lay in its organization by craft rather than by geographic location. In response to this threat, in January, 1999, the TWU authorized local "self-determination" elections which allowed mechanics interested in organizing themselves by craft rather than by location to do so while remaining within the TWU.
In the summer of 1999, the Title I and, separately, Title II employees in Boston petitioned to separate from Local 507 and to join a nascent New York mechanics' Local, to be called Local 562, by using the "self-determination" election process.
Although Avola took some actions to persuade Local 507 members not to leave, he supported the "self-determination" elections during 1999 because he believed that the separation measures would be defeated. The Boston "self-determination" elections were authorized on February 14, 2000.
By mailed ballot in March, 2000, Local 507's Title I employees voted, 50-31, to join Local 562 in New York. The Title I employee vote was certified by the International Administrative Committee ("IAC") of the TWU, a committee consisting of the President, Secretary-Treasurer, and Executive Vice President. In June, 2000, the Title II mechanics also voted, 22-7, to join Local 562 in New York. The IAC certified the Title II employee vote on July 21, 2000.
In March, 2000, the IAC also declared a "hiatus" or "moratorium" on all "self-determination" elections except for those that had already been approved. Only Local 507 in Boston and a Local in San Francisco had been authorized to hold elections at the time of the moratorium.
Also in March, 2000, the members of Local 569 in Raleigh, North Carolina petitioned to hold a "self-determination" election. In a March 22, 2000 letter, the IAC denied Local 569's application for elections to allow its airline mechanics to join Local 563. The letter reads in relevant part:
After careful review, the [IAC] has concluded that these requests do not fall within the structure of Self-determination, which was intended to allow a Title Group to leave a given Local for the express purpose of creating a new Local, and not to transfer from one Local to another.
Avola Aff., Ex. 3(3).
The plaintiffs filed an internal appeal of the IAC's decisions to allow "self-determination" elections for Title I and for Title II mechanics. Those appeals are scheduled to be heard on February 6, 2001, at the regular meeting of the appellate body, the International Executive Council ("IEC").
II.
Preliminary injunctive relief may be granted only upon a showing by the plaintiff that:
(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) there exists, absent the injunction, a significant risk of irreparable harm;
(3) the balance of hardships tilts in its favor; and,
(4) granting the injunction will not negatively affect the public interest.TEC Eng'g Corp. v. Budget Molders Supply, Inc., 82 F.3d 542, 544 (1st Cir. 1996).
Although the plaintiffs have made claims which raise questions of substance, as indicated below, they have failed to establish any of the prerequisites for preliminary relief.
A. Likelihood of Success
The plaintiffs contend, first, that the TWU Constitution did not authorize the IAC to hold the "self-determination" elections to split Local 507, second, that the IAC acted in bad faith, and third, that even if the TWU Constitution provided the IAC such authority, the longstanding policy of the IAC has been to use such elections only to create new Locals, rather than to transfer members between existing Locals. The record to date does not support these claims.
1. The TWU Constitution
The TWU Constitution contains no provision which, in so many words, specifies the power of the IAC to hold "self-determination" elections. The parties split on the implications of this absence.
The plaintiffs argue that because the TWU Constitution does not specifically authorize the precise type of election in dispute here, the IAC exceeded its power when it authorized the Local 507 "self-determination" elections. For support, the plaintiffs rely on a number of provisions within the many Articles of the TWU Constitution that discuss in some detail the extensive powers of the various TWU committees and officers. For example, the plaintiffs point out the provisions of Article IX of the TWU Constitution which authorize the IAC to establish standard accounting practices for Locals (§ 2) and for semiannual audits of Locals (§ 3). This detail, the plaintiffs contend, demonstrates that the drafters of the TWU Constitution carefully constructed the foundational document to grant power only in specific situations. It follows, the plaintiffs argue, that where no specific power is given, there is none.
The TWU contends that rather than limiting the TWU's officers and committees to specific or affirmative grants of power, its constitution establishes the significant authority the TWU has over its Locals. It emphasizes that Article XIV of the Constitution grants broad powers over Locals to the TWU's committees, the IEC and the IAC. That Article provides, in relevant part:
Section 1. Ten or more persons eligible for membership in the International Union shall constitute a Local Union upon receipt of a charter from the international Secretary-Treasurer under the terms herein provided.
Section 2. Upon approval of the charter application by the [IAC], the International Secretary-Treasurer shall issue to the applications a Local Union charter which shall contain such provisions as the International union may require. . . . The grant of such charter shall be subject to the subsequent approval of the [IEC].
Section 3. No Local Union shall be dissolved, except with the approval of the [IEC]. . . .
Section 13. The [IEC] shall determine the policy on affiliations of Local Unions, and shall have the power to require any Local union to comply with such policy. No Local Union shall enter into any affiliation outside such policy, except with the prior approval of the [IEC].
Section 14. No Local Union shall create a fund or trust, separate and distinct from the funds of the Local Union, without the prior approval of the [IAC].
These provisions, the TWU argues, make clear that Locals "remain creatures of the International." Def.'s Mem. in Support of Def.'s Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 11. The TWU asserts that an "International Union has plenary authority to govern itself. Its authority may only be limited by external law or by voluntarily imposed restrictions." Def.'s Mem. in Support of Def.'s Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 13 (citing Fulk v. United Transp. Union, 160 F.3d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1998)).
The plaintiffs respond that such a construction of the TWU Constitution is "patently unreasonable" and therefore should not be upheld. Local No. 48, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., et al. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., et al., 920 F.2d 1047, 1052 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a labor organization's "interpretation of its own governing documents" will be upheld "unless that interpretation is patently unreasonable").
There is a presumption in favor of a labor organization's interpretation of its own constitution and the First Circuit has ruled that:
judges should refrain from second-guessing labor organizations in respect to plausible interpretations of union constitutions. . . . we will uphold [a labor organization's] interpretation of its own governing documents unless that interpretation is patently unreasonable.Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1052 (citations omitted). Moreover, as the First Circuit ruled in a later, and fairly recent case, "in the absence of bad faith, a labor organization's interpretation of internal union documents puts an end to judicial scrutiny so long as the interpretation is `facially sufficient' or grounded in `arguable authority.'" Dow v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 1 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
The TWU's construction of its own constitution is not "patently unreasonable" and therefore it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will succeed on the merits. Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1052. The TWU Constitution grants broad powers over Locals to both the IEC and the IAC. For example, the TWU Constitution provides in Article V, Section 1, that the International President, a member of the IAC, "shall interpret the meaning and application of the provisions of this Constitution." Further, Article VIII, Section 2, declares that the IEC "shall be the supreme authority in the International Union." Combined, these two provisions indicate that ultimate power lies in the TWU national leadership rather than in the Local leadership.
While it is always arguable, as the plaintiffs assert, that the absence of an affirmative grant of power prohibits that power, the TWU's construction is not "patently unreasonable." Indeed, it is altogether rational and accordingly entitled to enforcement.
2. The Significance of the Local 569 Letter
On March 22, 2000, the IAC responded by letter to the application of Local 569 in Raleigh, North Carolina, for "self-determination" elections to allow its airline mechanics to join Local 563. In contrast to its action on February 14, 2000, regarding Local 507, the IAC denied the Local 569 application. The letter reads:
After careful review, the [IAC] has concluded that these requests do not fall within the structure of Self-determination, which was intended to allow a Title Group to leave a given Local for the express purpose of creating a new Local, and not to transfer from one Local to another.Avola Aff., Ex. 3(3).
The plaintiffs make two arguments based on this letter. First, to trump the "patently unreasonable" standard of deference to labor organizations' interpretations of their governance documents, they allege that the IAC acted in bad faith. Second, they contend that even if the TWU Constitution authorized the "self-determination" elections, the IAC nevertheless had a policy against holding such elections to transfer members between existing Locals.
i. Alleged Bad Faith by the IAC
The plaintiffs argue that the IAC impermissibly discriminated against Local 507 when it authorized Local 507 to hold its "self-determination" elections while simultaneously denying the application of Local 569 in Raleigh, North Carolina, to hold such an election. The plaintiffs contend that there is no explanation for the contrasting decisions reached by the IAC, and that because Local 507 suffered injury from the IAC decision to allow "self-determination" elections in Boston, the IAC discriminated against the plaintiffs.
The TWU contends the difference between its treatment of Local 507's and Local 569's petitions was caused by the change in circumstances between February 14, 2000, on which it approved the Local 507 petition, and March 22, 2000, on which it denied the Local 569 petition. According to the affidavit of James Little, International Representative for the TWU and System Coordinator for collective bargaining with American Airlines, by March 22, 2000, the TWU had agreed to open negotiations with American Airlines and, believing that in the circumstances unity within the TWU was indispensable, the IAC had decided "to declare a hiatus on all self determination elections except in those cases where petitions for elections had already been approved." Little Aff. ¶ 22. The reasons for this moratorium on "self-determination" elections were "to allow Locals to begin focusing on preparation for negotiations with full assurance as to who they were representing" and to avoid internal turmoil that might weaken its bargaining position with American Airlines. Little Aff. ¶ 22. Local 507's petition for "self-determination" elections was approved on February 14, 2000, shortly before the March, 2000 moratorium was declared. In contrast, the moratorium came before Local 569's petition, which explains the IAC's denial.
The First Circuit's test for determining bad faith by union officials is whether officials act "contrary to the international's best interests, out of self-interest, or in an unconscionable or outrageous way." Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1054-55. Maintaining a unified front in collective bargaining agreement negotiations was certainly in the best interests of the TWU, and the plaintiffs do not allege that any TWU official acted in his own self-interest. Nor, in the circumstances, can the IAC's decision to allow the "self-determination" elections in Boston but not in Raleigh be termed either "unconscionable or outrageous."
ii. Alleged Violation of Longstanding IAC Policy
The plaintiffs next argue that even if the TWU Constitution authorized the "self-determination" elections, the IAC nevertheless had a policy against holding such elections to transfer members between existing Locals. The plaintiffs contend that the March 22, 2000 letter memorializes the governing IAC policy which they claim was violated by the TWU when the IAC authorized "self-determination" elections in Boston for Title I and II mechanics.
The TWU responds that although the letter to Local 569 outlines IAC policy as of late March, 2000, it does not accurately reflect the longstanding policy of the IAC before that date. Instead, the letter reflects changing circumstances within the TWU as it prepared for the upcoming collective bargaining negotiations with American Airlines. As with its defense to the plaintiffs' allegations of bad faith, the TWU argues that it imposed a hiatus on "self-determination" elections because it did not wish to have an unsettled group of Locals during the important negotiations with American Airlines. Because Local 507's petition had been approved before the March, 2000 moratorium on "self-determination" elections, the TWU explains, it was allowed to move forward even though Local 569 was not.
The TWU points to its long history of splitting Locals, often, but not always, to create new Locals. For example, in 1968, Local 512 (Chicago) was split to create Local 521 (Detroit and Cleveland). In 1994, Tampa members of Local 514 transferred to pre-existing Local 568 (Miami). Local 507 itself has been split in the past, creating Local 540, consisting of dispatchers who were once part of Local 507. With this history as a guide to the interpretation of its Constitution, the TWU concludes that its decisions were authorized when it allowed Title I and II members of Local 507 to leave it and join Local 562.
The historical practices of a labor organization are significant in the interpretation of its Constitution. The First Circuit has held that this type of past practice evidence:
may often be illuminating and should be considered. After all, evidence that a union decision follows established custom might serve to strengthen the decision's inherent reasonableness and, by like token, evidence that a union decision constitutes a radical break from uniform past practice might undermine its seeming plausibility.
Dow, 1 F.3d at 59. Thus, while not binding, since a labor organization may of course change its policies under appropriate circumstances, a union's past practices do demonstrate the developed meaning between the members of the union. Such is the case here.
The TWU has long held to a policy that allows the TWU to split and merge Locals at its discretion. See Kerrigan Aff. ¶¶ 35-42. The March 22, 2000 letter sent by the IAC to Local 569 does indicate a policy change by the IAC. Nonetheless, the TWU has presented a rational explanation for this change, the moratorium, sufficient to render it unlikely that the plaintiffs will be able to establish a claim of discrimination.
B. Irreparable Harm
The plaintiffs allege a number of injuries. First, they allege a loss of dues as a result of the transfer of Title I and II members to Local 562, totaling $4,000 a month. Related to this injury are the additional expenses Boston mechanics now incur traveling to New York to participate as members of Local 562. Second, they assert that Local 507 is no longer a participant in the collective bargaining agreement negotiations for Title I and Title II employees with American Airlines. Third, they contend that Local 507 can no longer participate in certain TWU meetings with the same clout. For example, Avola claims he cannot vote on issues affecting Title I and Title II employees at President's Council meetings and all of the plaintiffs say that they are no longer invited to maintenance standards meetings for Title I and Title II employees.
The TWU argues that the plaintiffs do not accurately depict the effects of the reorganization. To begin with, the TWU asserts that it, the TWU, negotiates collective bargaining agreements, not any Local, and that Local 507 has never independently been represented at a collective bargaining agreement negotiation. Second, the TWU contends that Local 507's position has not been damaged. The TWU points out that the President of Local 507 can still vote as a member of the President's Council, even if a vote involves only Title I and Title II employees.
The plaintiffs have only shown monetary damages, which do not constitute irreparable harm. Foxboro Co. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 805 F.2d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 1986). To begin with, the TWU itself has always conducted all collective bargaining agreement negotiations. No Local has any authority to do so. Therefore, in that regard, Local 507 remains in the same situation today as it was before the elections. Avola, Rigueur, and all other mechanics also remain unaffected because they are represented by the TWU. Moreover, at President's Council meetings, all Local presidents may vote on all issues, with the reasonable qualification that votes by presidents of Locals who will not be affected by the issue at hand are discouraged (but not barred). In fact, Avola actually continues to attend President's Council meetings. Finally, the maintenance standards meetings are attended by mechanics from Boston and Avola and Rigueur could attend if they so chose. In sum, the plaintiffs have not established that they are suffering from an irreparable injury. This conclusion is supported by the significant delay of about six months between the certification of the elections splitting Local 507 and the commencement of this lawsuit.
The most tangible injuries that the plaintiffs have shown are Local 507's loss of $4,000 a month in dues as a result of the transfer of Title I and II members to Local 562, and the additional expenses that Boston Title I and Title II employees incur traveling to New York to participate in Local 562 hearings and meetings. However, the loss of money or an increase in expenses does not constitute an injury that cannot be made whole through the award of damages after trial.
C. The Balance of Hardships
In the case at hand, both sides will be negatively affected by an adverse ruling. The plaintiffs wish to recoup what amounts to a significant amount of Local 507's monthly dues; the TWU wishes to prevent disarray during a critical moment of negotiations with American Airlines for a new collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiffs have not shown that the balance is in their favor.
D. Public Policy
Public policy concerns weigh in favor of denying the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief. First, there is a public interest in allowing labor organizations to practice democratic self-government. The root cause of this dispute is the majority vote of Title I and Title II airline employees seeking to reorganize themselves. Their vote should not be casually overridden. Moreover, as indicated above, there is a strong public policy against courts interfering with the internal affairs of labor organizations. The law requires that Labor unions be allowed to interpret their own governance documents without heavy judicial oversight.
Finally, it would be inappropriate for the Court to act because, using the internal mechanisms of the TWU, Local 507 has filed an appeal which is slated to be heard by the IEC on February 6. 2001. The preliminary relief sought here would be premature.
III.
The TWU has raised the absence of Local 562 from these proceedings as a potential bar to relief because Local 562 may be an indispensable party within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 19.
Because the plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction is denied, there is no need to join Local 562 at this time. In further proceedings, however, Local 562 may wish to move to intervene or may be joined as directed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 19, 20. or 24.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction is denied.
It is so ordered.