Lobzun v. U.S.

29 Citing cases

  1. Klimashevsky v. Drug Enf't Admin.

    No. 23-1543 (7th Cir. Jan. 8, 2024)   Cited 2 times

    The due process analysis is case-specific. See, e.g., Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005); Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 2000). Still, a few general principles guide our inquiry.

  2. United States v. Croskey

    626 F. App'x 655 (8th Cir. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    In a motion to set aside, Croskey may challenge whether the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) provided adequate notice of the administrative forfeitures, but cannot challenge the merits of the administrative forfeiture actions. See Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (federal courts have jurisdiction to review whether notice provided in administrative forfeiture action afforded claimant constitutional due process, and if notice failed to comport with due process, forfeiture action is void); Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1196 (11th Cir. 2005) (court lacked jurisdiction to review merits of administrative or nonjudicial forfeiture, and instead review was limited to determining whether agency followed proper procedural safeguards). The government's motion to supplement the record is granted.

  3. Gates v. City of Chicago

    623 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2010)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that Plaintiffs' restitution claims were properly dismissed as moot, but that the grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the due process "notice" and "procedures" issues was in error

    On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the City was not entitled to summary judgment on the due process claims because the City did not provide meaningful notice of its inventory and property return procedures, and because the City failed to provide adequate procedures for the return of their money. The plaintiffs also challenge the dismissal of their restitution claims and the refusal to certify a restitution class, arguing that the named plaintiffs retained an economic interest in class certification. Our review of all of the issues is de novo. Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (we review de novo whether the government's notice procedures complied with due process); Everroadv. Scott Truck Systems, Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2010) (we review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment). A.

  4. United States v. Carrizoza

    CR 14-02095-TUC-RCC(EJM) (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2016)

    "Absent exceptional circumstances, written notice of forfeiture by certified mail to the claimant's residence satisfies due process, even if the claimant does not receive actual notice." Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). "If the notice fails to comport with the requirements of due process, the underlying forfeiture is void."

  5. United States v. Robledo

    CAUSE NO. 3:11-CR-76(4)-RLM (N.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2014)

    "The federal government is authorized to forfeit 'all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance' as well as 'all proceeds traceable to such an exchange.'" Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)). For property valued at $500,000 or less, like the property at issue here, the government must comply with the notice procedures set forth in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607-1609.

  6. In re Seizure of $143,265.78 From Comerica

    616 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. Mich. 2009)   Cited 11 times

    Although this has not been raised by the parties, notice also must satisfy the requirements of Constitutional due process. See United States v. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763, 766 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005). "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."

  7. Hernandez v. Albuquerque

    CV 08-0160 RB/WPL (D.N.M. Nov. 12, 2008)   Cited 1 times

    The government is not, however, required to make "heroic efforts." Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170; see also Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, written notice of forfeiture by certified mail to the claimant's residence satisfies due process, even if the claimant does not receive actual notice."). Hernandez contends that the mailed notice was insufficient because he was incarcerated in the El Paso County Jail on the reentry charge when the notice was received by his sister at her home.

  8. Turner v. Attorney General of U.S.

    579 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Ind. 2008)   Cited 4 times
    In Turner v. Attorney General of the United States, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (N.D. Ind. 2008), In Turner, the claimant brought a pro se prisoner suit against the United States Attorney General seeking the return of funds seized from him by the State of Indiana while state criminal charges pended against him and were later transferred to the FBI for forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881.

    Section 1607 provides that notice of the seizure of the currency and the intention to forfeit the currency must be "published for at least three successive weeks" and that "[w]ritten notice of seizure together with information on the applicable procedures shall be sent to each party who appears to have an interest in the seized [currency]." 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75(a) (setting forth the requirements of published notice). If no claim is filed within the applicable limitations period, the property is declared administratively forfeited and title transfers to the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1609; see also Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 506-07 (7th Cir. 2005). Once the property is administratively forfeited, the district court is divested of jurisdiction to review the merits of the forfeiture.

  9. People v. $224,060.89 United States Currency

    No. A115272 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2008)

    Respondent appears to concede that appellants were not personally served with notice of the intended forfeiture proceeding, a claim form, and filing and service instructions as required by section 11488.4(c). In reliance on Dusenbery v. United States (2002) 534 U.S. 161 (Dusenbery) and Lobzun v. U.S. (7th Cir. 2005) 422 F.3d 503 (Lobzun), respondent argues that it “reasonably believed that service upon Nelson, who asserted he was [appellants’] attorney, was reasonable and sufficient,” and thereby comported with due process standards. Respondent takes its argument even further and states, with no citation to authority, appellants “received adequate de factoactual notice through both . . . Gelhaus and their own attorney, . . . Nelson.

  10. Dibble v. Quinn

    793 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2015)   Cited 68 times
    In Dibble, however, we rejected as moot a similar claim for reinstatement. By the time that case reached us, plaintiffs' six-year terms would have expired even apart from House Bill 1698. 793 F.3d at 807.

    We review de novo dismissals under both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56. E.g., Vinson v. Vermilion County, 776 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir.2015) (motion to dismiss); Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d 673, 679–80 (7th Cir.2015) (summary judgment). The issues here are pure questions of law: whether plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected property interest in their six-year terms as arbitrators, see Cole v. Milwaukee Area Technical College Dist., 634 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir.2011) ; if so, whether the legislative process that produced Public Act 97–18 satisfied federal due process requirements, see Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir.2005) ; and if not, whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that their actions violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights, see Chasensky v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088, 1093–95 (7th Cir.2014). Because the result is the same despite the differences between Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56, we have based our decision in both appeals on plaintiffs' complaints alone, accepting as true all factual allegations in the complaints (which are virtually identical) and drawing from the allegations all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor.