Opinion
24A-PO-116
08-26-2024
L.N., Appellant-Petitioner v. Indiana Department of Corrections, Appellee-Respondent
APPELLANT PRO SE L.N. Bunker Hill, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Miami Superior Court The Honorable Jacob D. Winkler, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 52D02-2311-PO-1036
APPELLANT PRO SE L.N. Bunker Hill, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MATHIAS, JUDGE.
[¶ 1] L.N. is an inmate at the Miami Correctional Facility of the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). L.N. petitioned the trial court for an order of protection on her behalf and against the DOC. The trial court denied L.N.'s petition without a hearing on the ground that the DOC is not a "person" against whom an order for protection may be entered. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶ 2] On November 15, 2023, L.N. filed her petition for an order of protection against the DOC. According to her petition, L.N. has been diagnosed as "gender dysphoric," and DOC officials have "subjected her to . . . repeated[,] prohibited acts of harassment[]" due to her diagnosis. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 15. L.N. did not name any specific DOC officials as respondents to her petition and instead requested that the order for protection be entered only against the DOC itself.
[¶ 3] The trial court denied L.N.'s petition the same day and without a hearing. According to the trial court, the DOC "is not a 'person' for purposes of the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act." Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 4. L.N. filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court also denied.
[¶ 4] This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶ 5] L.N. appeals the trial court's denial of her petition for an order for protection. The only issue in this appeal is the meaning of the statutory term "person" under the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act. We review such questions of law de novo. E.g., Bojko v. Anonymous Physician, 232 N.E.3d 1155, 1158 (Ind. 2024).
[¶ 6] Indiana Code section 34-26-5-2(b) (2023) states: "A person who is or has been subjected to harassment may file a petition for an order for protection against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner." (Emphasis added.) As we have previously acknowledged: "'person' is not specially defined within the Act." S.B. v. Seymour Cmty. Schs., 97 N.E.3d 288, 294 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), trans. denied. Accordingly, to understand that term within the Act, we may "look to Indiana Code Chapter 1-1-4, which provides generally applicable statutory definitions." Id. And Indiana Code section 1-1-4-5(a)(17) states that "'[p]erson' extends to bodies politic and corporate."
[¶ 7] The default rule in Indiana is that a state agency is not a body politic or corporate. In re Burk, 66 Ind.App. 435, 118 N.E. 540, 542 (1918). If our General Assembly intends otherwise for a specific entity, it may say so. E.g., I.C. § 4-30-1-2 (stating that the State Lottery Commission is "a separate body politic and corporate from state government"). The DOC is a state agency that our General Assembly has not set apart from state government. See I.C. § 11-82-1. It is therefore not a "person" under the Act.
[¶ 8] In her brief on appeal, L.N. cites various definitions of "person" throughout the Indiana Code, which definitions might arguably capture the DOC. See Appellant's Br. at 7 (citing I.C. §§ 2-2.2-1-14, 2-7-1-12, 36-1-2-12). But each of the provisions cited by L.N. is expressly limited to the title, article, or chapter in which that provision resides, and none of those provisions are applicable to the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act.
She also cites to federal law, but that has no application here.
[¶ 9] L.N. also relies on our opinion in S.B. In S.B., the Seymour Community Schools petitioned for an order of protection on behalf of its employees and students and against a father who had been standing outside of one of the schools with an assault rifle. The trial court entered the order for protection, and we affirmed. S.B., 97 N.E.3d at 297. In relevant part, we held that the school corporation had standing under I.C. § 1-1-4-5(a)(17) and the criminal definitions of "stalking" to petition for the order for protection. Id. at 292-95.
[¶ 10] Our analysis in S.B. is based on standing to petition for an order for protection. Our opinion does not address or consider whether that same analysis ought to apply to respondents in such proceedings, which is how L.N. attempts to apply it. We therefore conclude that our holding in S.B. is not relevant here.
[¶ 11] For all of these reasons, we agree with the trial court that the DOC is not a "person" under the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of L.N.'s petition for an order for protection.
[¶ 12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.