Opinion
E082793
02-07-2024
L.M., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Daniel L. Vinson for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, and Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Sean P. Crandell, Judge. Super. Ct. No. RIJ101025 Petition denied.
Daniel L. Vinson for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, and Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
RAPHAEL J.
The juvenile court terminated family reunification services for petitioner L.M. (mother) and set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. She seeks an extraordinary writ, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the court's conclusion that returning her children to her posed a risk of detriment to them. We deny the petition.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
This dependency concerns mother's children E.J. (born 2007) and I.M. (born 2010). In June 2022, the department received referrals alleging mother was suffering from severe mental health issues, had unstable or nonexistent housing, had a history of abusing substances, and generally neglected her children. Specifically, the referral alleged mother and her children were living out of her car, that the children were not eating or attending school, and that mother suffered from paranoid delusions, including believing that "God talks to her and God tells her what to do." Mother allegedly made the children fast for three to seven days, and made them walk outside their grandmother's home with their hands raised, praying.
The department attempted to contact mother multiple times over the next month with limited success. The social worker first tried to call, but mother was reluctant to talk and insisted the social worker was an imposter. Mother then called the department and offered to meet, but she refused to let the social worker speak to her children. When they did meet near a motel the family was staying in, mother again insisted the social worker was an imposter even though the social worker presented county identification. Mother called the police to verify the social worker's identity, and when police arrived and confirmed the social worker's identity, mother argued with the responding officers.
Mother agreed to speak after the police left. However, she "would not answer questions directly and would make a statement about a past event, decline to provide details, and then would move onto another subject." Mother denied all the allegations, said the children had attended a charter school before the summer break, and would be attending a new school in the fall. However, mother refused to share the name of the new school. Mother admitted to a prior criminal history but refused to speak about any substance use or mental health history. Mother admitted the family primarily lived inside her car, but sometimes used shelters or motels. Mother refused to reach out to family members for help.
Mother then allowed the social worker to speak to the children, but only while she was present. She frequently interrupted their answers, and the children often looked to her before answering. The children said they wanted to fast and were not forced to, and said they attended school but could not remember the name or the last day they attended. Mother told the children not to answer any questions about their religious practices. She also refused to drug test and later failed to show for another offered drug test.
The department received another referral on August 22. This referral alleged mother had been living with her children in a homeless shelter since June, that her housing voucher was going to expire, and that she was making no effort to find housing. In addition, the referral alleged mother kept her children with her at all times, that they were never seen playing outside, that they did not attend school, and that they could be seen up as late as 4:00 A.M. looking out windows. The children also did not speak to shelter staff at all.
Two days later, the department contacted mother about another drug test and the new referral. Mother insisted she had answered all relevant questions-despite being reminded that she never drug tested and never answered questions about her substance use history or mental health-and accused the social worker of harassing her. She also refused to answer where the children were attending school.
The department received another referral on August 30, making many of the same allegations as the August 22 referral. However, the referral also made some new allegations, including that mother was lying about the children attending a charter school, that the children lack social skills and that they speak a gibberish language to each other. In addition, the referral alleged mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and that mother told the children that shelter staff work for the devil and have been preying on her for decades.
On September 2, 2022 the department went to the shelter to speak to shelter staff. The staff said the children stay in their room all day. They also alleged that when confronted about the children not attending school, mother told staff that the children attend school at "Satan's playground." Shelter staff also repeated the allegation that mother made the children raise their hands and rebuke the devil outside in the heat. The staff explained that mother was "combative, incoherent, and would make bizarre statements to staff when trying to exorcise demons out of them."
When the department attempted to meet with mother and shelter staff to address these concerns, mother refused to speak to the social worker with shelter staff present. Once the staff left, mother told the social worker the staff were liars and had tried to poison her and the children multiple times. Mother admitted that the children walk around with their arms up and "'if' they rebuke others for being the Anti-Christ, there is no law stating that they cannot practice their religious beliefs." Mother admitted that she had depression and anxiety and received disability payments for a mental disability. She also admitted to hearing voices, and that she had been prescribed psychotropic medication but had stopped taking it in 2020. She insisted she had a right not to take medication.
Mother eventually agreed to let the social worker speak to the children, but not before coaching them for 10 minutes by telling them not to answer questions about where they go to school, insisting the social worker was trying to deceive them, telling them they could "'plead the 5th'" and otherwise reminding them that "'[y]ou know what to say.'" Even still, mother stood only feet away during questioning and interrupted often. The children did not make eye contact with the social worker, refused to answer questions about their school or what happens when they raise their hands, and denied that mother did anything that did not make sense. The children showed the social worker test books and said they were "in testing," but the last entry on the workbooks was from August 22, over a week before.
On September 8, the department filed a dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The next day the department learned mother had left the shelter in the middle of the night with her children and belongings.
The court held an initial hearing on September 26, at which mother was not present. The court continued the matter four days. On September 28 the department obtained protective custody warrants for the children and filed an amended petition recommending the children be detained. The department also informed the court that it did not know where mother or the children were.
The court held the detention hearing on September 29, without mother or the children present. It issued a bench warrant for mother, ordered the children detained, and set supervised visitation for twice a week. The department contacted mother later that day by telephone, informed her about the court proceedings, and gave her information about her assigned social worker. Mother refused to give the department information about her whereabouts because she believed the social worker could be lying about her identity. As of October 17, over two weeks later, the department still did not know where mother and the children were.
The court held a jurisdiction hearing on October 20. Mother and the children were present. Mother requested the court continue the hearing so she could contest jurisdiction, and the court obliged. The court also recalled the bench warrant and protective custody warrants and authorized psychiatric and psychological evaluations for mother.
Later that day, mother called the social worker 23 times, and would not allow the social worker to speak. The next day the department placed the children in foster care.
On October 26, the department provided mother with services referrals. However, mother refused to drug test.
The court eventually held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on December 1, with mother present. The court found the allegations in the then current version of the petition true and ordered family reunification services for mother. The court ordered mother to undergo a full psychiatric evaluation and ordered the department to construct a case plan to include parenting classes, counseling, and a psychological evaluation. Later that month the department placed the children with their maternal aunt.
Mother's psychological evaluation happened in February 2023. The evaluator made probable diagnoses for schizophrenia and amphetamine use disorder. He also noted a history of major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. The evaluator stated that "[l]ike many individuals with chronic paranoid and schizophrenia, [mother] is resistive to sharing her world and is not on the appropriate medications." In the evaluator's opinion her "failure to accept the necessity for these medications and appropriate mental health treatment . . . makes her injurious emotionally to her children." He believed mother was "gravely disabled" and noted that the Social Security Administration must agree because mother is on disability benefits. Finally, he expressed concern that "[h]er inability to share with me that she has a severe mental disorder honestly and directly is part of the problem," that this "problem does not seem to be resolved by her attending parenting classes or other activities," and therefore he doubted whether "these services will be of benefit over the long-term." Mother also received a psychiatric evaluation where she was diagnosed with depressive disorder. The psychiatrist recommended antidepressant treatment and stated "[i]t is my clinical opinion with medical degree of certainty that if [mother] were to remain on her recommended course of treatment and counseling therapy, she will have less chance of psychiatric decompensation."
On February 6, the department made mother's visits with the children unsupervised. But on February 20, the caregiver complained to the department that since visits became unsupervised "mother had been calling excessively numerous times throughout the day, and demanding the children answer whenever she calls." The department advised mother that she could only call twice a day and never after 10 P.M. However, the caregiver remained concerned about mother's visits. After each visit the caregiver reported the children were quiet and distant, that she continued to call more than twice a day, that she questions them constantly, and that she yells at them if they do not check in every few hours. Mother also cut one of the children's hair despite the child saying he did not want her to. When confronted with these concerns, mother told the department that "because she is the mother she can do what she wants" with her children.
The department returned to supervised visits, but mother's behavior remained concerning. Mother continued to "constantly question" the children, insisted on phone visits every day at the same time for the full allotted 20 minutes, and [would] not reschedule, shorten the calls, or skip a call even over the children's objections. The children told the caregiver mother makes them uncomfortable and that they wanted fewer and/or shorter visits.
Between May and November 2023, mother visited the children every other week and called twice a week. The children said the visits went "ok/alright" but noted that mother can be inflexible. As an example, mother insisted on holding visits outdoors despite the children complaining about the heat, and she refused to reschedule to a time when the weather was cooler or to meet indoors. Mother also continued to insist on phone call visits going forward as scheduled and for the full time, often over the children's objections. On at least one occasion mother also tried to have the supervising caregiver leave to get the group food, and mother got agitated when both the caregiver and the children told her that was impossible because the caregiver needed to supervise the children at all times. Despite this explanation, mother did not seem to understand why the children could not be separated from the caregiver. After the visit mother emailed the department, again expressing confusion about why the children had to stay close to the caregiver.
After this incident, the children told the department they wanted to go down to one phone call a week, and that they did not want to otherwise increase visitation or to move to unsupervised visitation. Indeed, both children said the visits were too long and that they would not feel comfortable alone with mother. Both children said they did not see any change in mother's behavior and that they felt she was the same as when they left her care.
Throughout the dependency mother participated in psychiatric treatment and counseling, with progress "as expected." She also consistently tested negative for drugs. However mother continued to deny having mental health issues and refused to take any medication. Mother's psychiatrist informed the department that they would not prescribe medication if mother refused to take it. They also informed the department that they would not schedule another psychiatric evaluation until mother took medication.
Mother filed a section 388 petition in September 2023, arguing her children should be returned because she had completed her case plan, stayed sober, and participated in therapy.
In November 2023, the department recommended terminating reunification services for mother. It reiterated this recommendation in December 2023. The department reported mother "made minimal progress towards meeting her case plan service objectives and responsibilities." The department acknowledged mother completed parenting classes, participated in counseling, tested negative in her drug testing, and completed both a psychological and psychiatric evaluation. However mother did not "exhibit[] any behavioral changes" and had "no insight into her own lack of progress, mental health concerns, or how her behavior [a]ffects her children." Mother continued to refuse psychotropic medication and generally made little progress in addressing the issues that brought her to the department's attention. Moreover, the children said they did not wish to reunify, and wanted to reduce visitation to once a month and phone calls only on their request.
In December 2023, the court held a hearing on mother's section 388 petition and a contested 12-month status review hearing. On the section 388 petition, Mother told the court that she completed all case plan services, and she alleged that her psychological and psychiatric evaluations did not recommend medication. She also presented a letter from the Social Security Administration stating she was no longer mentally disabled. Minors' counsel and the department argued mother had at best shown changing, not changed, circumstances, and recommended denying the section 388 petition. The department also argued that mother had not completed her case plan services because she refused to take medication and had not undergone a psychiatric evaluation with that medication.
The court denied the section 388 petition, agreeing that mother had shown "at most, changing circumstances." The court noted that both the psychological evaluation and psychiatric evaluation recommended medication and that there was reference to "psychiatric decompensation" if she did not take such medication. In the court's opinion, "some of the behavior and conduct . . . tends to suggest that exactly that is occurring." It also found that based on the children's own statements that they did not wish to reunify, it was not in their best interests to return them to mother's care.
The court then proceeded directly to the 12-month status review hearing and considered whether to terminate reunification services. The court found that mother likely would have benefited from taking medication, and that her refusal to do so made continuing services imprudent. The court therefore terminated mother's reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating her services and setting a section 366.26 hearing because she complied with her case plan and there was no evidence of risk of detriment to the children. We are not persuaded.
A. Termination of Services
"We review an order terminating reunification services to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence." (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688.) "In making this determination, we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders." (Id. at pp. 688-689.) "[A]ll conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact." (In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564.)
When a court removes a child who is at least three years old from the physical custody of their parents, the court must order reunification services for at least 12 months from the dispositional hearing, but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care, unless the child is returned to the parent's home. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) After 12 months, the court must hold a permanency hearing, where it "shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to their parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1).)
"The standard for showing detriment is 'a fairly high one. It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.' [Citation.] Rather, the risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child's physical or emotional well-being." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th1394, 1400.) "In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court must consider the extent to which the parent participated in reunification services," and "efforts or progress the parent has made toward eliminating the conditions that led to the child's out-of-home placement." (Ibid.)
"Though usually the case, a parent's compliance with the case plan is not a guarantee the child will be returned to the parent." (In re Jacob P. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 819, 830.) Indeed, courts considering whether to terminate reunification services can consider a wealth of other factors. Most importantly for our purposes, these factors include "properly supported psychological evaluations which indicate return to a parent would be detrimental to a minor," "limited awareness by a parent of the emotional and physical needs of a child," and "the manner in which the parent has conducted himself or herself in relation to a minor in the past." (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that returning the children to mother's care represented a substantial risk of detriment to them. The children were removed from mother mainly due to her erratic behavior. Mother prevented the children from interacting with others or attending school and required them to fast for several days at a time. In the year since removal, mother has not shown that she understands the problems with her actions, nor has she shown any willingness to change. While mother has completed most components of her case plan, she continues to show little insight into her own mental health issues, the necessity of treatment for those issues, and the effect those issues have on the children. Throughout the dependency mother harassed both social workers and the children's caregiver with excessive phone calls; insisted on holding visits according to a rigid schedule, often against the children's wishes; and has generally shown no understanding that her behavior is inappropriate and at times delusional. Visitation has been continually scaled back throughout the dependency because mother's behavior made the children uncomfortable.
Even if we agreed that mother's behavior has improved somewhat, she still does not understand that her behavior was and remains inappropriate, as well as harmful to the emotional well-being of her children. This is exemplified by her refusal to accept any medication for her mental health issues despite two evaluators suggesting such medication was necessary. This refusal makes clear that mother does not understand the severity of her mental health issues and has no intention of addressing them beyond doing the counseling required by her case plan. Moreover, this refusal means mother has not substantially complied with her case plan. By refusing recommended treatment, mother not only failed to address the concerns which brought her to the department's attention, she prevented the relevant evaluators from doing any further psychological and or psychiatric evaluations.
Given mother's overall failure to improve, there is substantial evidence to support that mother failed to make significant progress in addressing the issues which gave rise to this dependency, and therefore that returning the children to her care risked serious emotional detriment to her children.
B. Substantial Probability of Return
If the court does not return the child at the twelve-month review hearing, "[t]he court shall continue the case only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or legal guardian." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) To conclude that there is a substantial probability of return, the court must find (1) consistent visitation, (2) that the parent "has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child's removal," and (3) the parent "has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of their treatment plan and to provide for the child's safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).)
Like the detriment finding, we review the juvenile court's finding that there is no substantial probability of return and decision to terminate reunification services for substantial evidence. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.)
For many of the same reasons stated above, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that there was no substantial probability of return. Though mother maintained contact with the children, she has failed to demonstrate significant progress in resolving the problems that led to dependency, and has failed to demonstrate that she could provide for the well-being of the children. As discussed above, mother does not appreciate the severity of her mental health issues and has not demonstrated an understanding that her behavior harms her children. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's conclusion that there was no substantial probability of return even with six more months of reunification services.
DISPOSITION
We deny the writ petition.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. MILLER J.