Lloyd v. Kramer

22 Citing cases

  1. King v. King

    46 F.4th 1259 (11th Cir. 2022)   Cited 3 times

    See OCGA §§ 23-2-53 ("Suppression of a material fact which a party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case."); 51-6-2 (a) ("Willful misrepresentation of a material fact, made to induce another to act, upon which such person acts to his injury, will give him a right of action."); 51-6-2 (b) ("In all cases of deceit, knowledge of the falsehood constitutes an essential element of the tort."); Windjammer Assoc. v. Hodge , 246 Ga. 85, 86, 269 S.E.2d 1 (1980) (holding that a fraudulent-concealment claim requires proof that the defendant knew of the alleged falsity); see also Lloyd v. Kramer , 233 Ga. App. 372, 374 (1)-(2), 503 S.E.2d 632 (1998) (holding that, because the evidence could support a finding that the defendant-podiatrist knowingly made material misrepresentations to the plaintiff-patient, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff's claims for both fraud and breach of fiduciary duty); Garcia v. Unique Realty & Prop. Mgmt. Co., Inc. , 205 Ga. App. 876, 878 (2), 424 S.E.2d 14 (1992) (holding that "the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to [the] appellees on [a] claim for breach of fiduciary duty" because the "appellees cannot be held liable for failing to disclose what they did not know and could not have foretold").Id. at 375, 503 S.E.2d 632 (emphasis added).

  2. Estate of William J. Shannon v. Ahmed

    304 Ga. App. 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit was not required to provide an expert affidavit for her wrongful death claims premised on fraud and battery, because those claims were intentional torts and not negligence

    Id., citing OCGA § 9-11-9 (b). A claim for medical battery also arises when a patient's consent to a procedure is obtained by "fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts" in obtaining that consent. OCGA § 31-9-6 (d); Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 375 ( 503 SE2d 632) (1998). Finally, "[a] conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful end or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means."

  3. Doe v. Saint Joseph's Catholic Church

    870 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. 2022)   Cited 18 times

    See OCGA §§ 23-2-53 ("Suppression of a material fact which a party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case."); 51-6-2 (a) ("Willful misrepresentation of a material fact, made to induce another to act, upon which such person acts to his injury, will give him a right of action."); 51-6-2 (b) ("In all cases of deceit, knowledge of the falsehood constitutes an essential element of the tort."); Windjammer Assoc. v. Hodge , 246 Ga. 85, 86, 269 S.E.2d 1 (1980) (holding that a fraudulent-concealment claim requires proof that the defendant knew of the alleged falsity); see also Lloyd v. Kramer , 233 Ga. App. 372, 374 (1)-(2), 503 S.E.2d 632 (1998) (holding that, because the evidence could support a finding that the defendant-podiatrist knowingly made material misrepresentations to the plaintiff-patient, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff's claims for both fraud and breach of fiduciary duty); Garcia v. Unique Realty & Prop. Mgmt. Co., Inc. , 205 Ga. App. 876, 878 (2), 424 S.E.2d 14 (1992) (holding that "the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to [the] appellees on [a] claim for breach of fiduciary duty" because the "appellees cannot be held liable for failing to disclose what they did not know and could not have foretold"). In sum, aside from the respondeat-superior claim, each of Doe's claims against the Church turns on whether the Church knew or had reason to know that Father Edwards presented a danger to Doe. Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority, the fact that Doe knew he had been sexually abused by Father Edwards

  4. Cardio TVP Surgical Associates, P.C. v. Gillis

    272 Ga. 404 (Ga. 2000)   Cited 8 times

    Id. at (b) (2). See also Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 375 ( 503 S.E.2d 632) (1998). Gillis contends that the consent he gave did not negate his claim for battery because the form did not reflect that any part of the surgical procedure would be performed by a physician's assistant.

  5. Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland

    272 Ga. 296 (Ga. 2000)   Cited 38 times
    In Albany, the Supreme Court declined to apply the informed consent statute to the facts of that case, in which a physician's drug use was at issue in a patient's suit alleging professional negligence, battery and fraudulent concealment of illegal cocaine use.

    ]" (Emphasis supplied.) Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 375 (1) ( 503 S.E.2d 632) (1998). The dispositive issue in this case is whether Dr. Trulock's failure to disclose his use of and addiction to cocaine was a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact which invalidated Mr. Cleveland's consent to undergo the recommended surgical procedure.

  6. Ferguson v. Kennestone Hosp.

    899 S.E.2d 357 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)

    As such, Kennestone did not establish as a matter of law that it was entitled to judgement on the battery claim. See id. (trial court erred in granting summary judgment where wife testified that she believed her husband’s signature on a release was a forgery); see also Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 375 (1), 503 S.E.2d 632 (1998) ("In light of the inconsistencies between the testimony of [the patient and doctor] regarding alleged misrepresentations relating to [the patient’s] consent, [the doctor] did not establish as a matter of law that he was entitled to judgment on the battery claim."). Judgment affirmed in part, reversed ‘in part.

  7. Holmes v. Lyons

    815 S.E.2d 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 4 times

    A claim for medical battery arises when a patient's consent to a procedure is obtained by "fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts" in obtaining that consent. OCGA § 31-9-6 (d) ; Lloyd v. Kramer , 233 Ga.App. 372, 375 (1), 503 S.E.2d 632 (1998). 3.

  8. Johnson v. Johnson

    323 Ga. App. 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 9 times
    Noting that "[a]lthough OCGA § 9-11-9.1 does not apply [to a claim based on intentional conduct] and, as a result, [the plaintiff] was not required to attach an expert affidavit to his medical fraud complaint, this does not mean that expert testimony will not be necessary for a jury to find in his favor"

    (Citation omitted). Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga.App. 372, 373(1), 503 S.E.2d 632 (1998). This is such a case.

  9. Hearn v. Dollar Rent a Car, Inc.

    315 Ga. App. 164 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 9 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Issues of fact therefore exist with regard to whether Michaud made any misrepresentation to the claims adjuster. See Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga.App. 372, 375(1), 503 S.E.2d 632 (1998) (party not entitled to summary judgment; issue of fact remained on whether alleged misrepresentation made to obtain written consent); McReynolds v. Krebs, 307 Ga.App. 330, 336(4), 705 S.E.2d 214 (2010) (settlement agreements must fulfill same requirements for enforceability as other contracts); Dyer v. Honea, 252 Ga.App. 735, 739(3)(a), 557 S.E.2d 20 (2001) (outlining remedies available for fraudulent inducement to enter into contract). Questions of fact also exist regarding the reasonableness of the claims adjuster's reliance on any alleged misrepresentations by Michaud.

  10. Long v. Natarajan

    291 Ga. App. 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 4 times
    In Long, the court held that the plaintiff's family practitioner could not testify as an expert against the defendant surgeon because the family practitioner's affidavit did not provide sufficient information for the court to determine whether the testimony was the product of reliable principles and methods or whether the witness applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24–7–702(b).

    Because her deposition is not in the record, this argument presents no basis for reversal.Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 375 (1) ( 503 SE2d 632) (1998); see OCGA § 31-9-6 (d). See All Fleet, supra at 678 (1).