Opinion
C.A. No. 01C-02-231
Date Submitted: September 19, 2002
Date Decided: October 3, 2002
UPON DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL. DENIED
Barry M. Willoughby, Esquire, William W. Bowser, Esquire, and Adria B. Martinelli, Esquire, Young, Conaway, Stargatt Taylor, LLP, Wilmington. Attorneys for Defendant.
Laurence V. Cronin Esquire, and Roger D. Anderson, Esquire, Smith, Katzenstein Furlow, LLP, Wilmington. Attorneys for Plaintiff.
ORDER
This 3rd day of October 2002 upon review of the record below, it appears to the Court that:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Before the Court is an application filed by Defendant Artesian Water Company, Inc. ("Artesian") for an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware from this Court's August 29, 2002 Memorandum Opinion and Order which denied Artesian's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to its arguments that 19 Del. C. ¶ 2365(1) does not provide for a jury trial, and (2) does not allow punitive damages.
Franklin D. Lloyd ("Lloyd") was hired by Artesian as a Utility Person on March 7, 1988. He suffered on the job injuries in both 1992 and 1996. Lloyd saw his doctor regarding back pain at the end of 1999 and early 2000. He went to Artesian's Human Resources Department to file a workers' compensation claim for an exacerbation of his 1996 injury and Artesian could not locate his 1996 records. Lloyd became upset and complained to his co-workers.
On September 13, 2000, Lloyd met with Patti Riale ("Riale") and Justine Joska ("Joska"), Human Resources representatives. Artesian alleges that Lloyd became enraged at this meeting and yelled profanities at Riale, acting in an unprofessional and intimidating manner. Lloyd contends that Riale was upset yelling profanities at him. He admits that angry words were exchanged but contends that he only started yelling after Riale did and that apologies were exchanged prior to the conclusion of the meeting. Additionally, in a memo that Riale prepared after the meeting, she failed to mention that Lloyd used profane language or that she was intimidated by him. She only noted that Lloyd was upset by the conversation in which she confronted him for allegedly complaining to his co-workers about the loss of his 1996 records. On September 15, 2000, Riale fired Lloyd. Artesian contends that Lloyd was fired for and was told that he was fired for inappropriate behavior. Lloyd contends that Riale would not inform him of the reason for his termination. He further alleges that he later telephoned Artesian's President, Dian Taylor, who informed Lloyd that he was fired due to an insurance matter that he would not drop.
On February 23, 2001, Lloyd filed suit claiming that he was terminated as a result of his attempts to claim workers' compensation benefits in violation of 19 Del. C. ¶ 2365 and on December 6, 2001, he amended his Complaint to add a count for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that Artesian violated the covenant by manufacturing false grounds for discharge. Additionally, Lloyd requested a jury trial and punitive damages.
On March 18, 2002 Artesian filed a motion for summary judgment on both counts. Artesian also sought summary judgment on Lloyd's claim for punitive damages and to strike his request for a jury trial under 19 Del. C. ¶ 2365. In its August 29, 2002, Opinion, this court denied Artesian's Motion for Summary Judgment, and found that under 19 Del. C. ¶ 2365, Lloyd was entitled to a jury trial, and that punitive damages were permissible citing Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., C.A. No. 96C-07-028, 1998 WL 960773 (Del.Super. Oct. 16, 1998). Artesian now seeks certification of an interlocutory appeal of this Court's denial of Artesian's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to its determination that 19 Del. C. ¶ 2365 affords a jury trial and punitive damages. Artesian argues that the Court incorrectly interpreted the statute on these issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order for an interlocutory decision of this Court to be certified for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42, the decision must 1) determine a substantial issue, 2) establish a legal right, and 3) satisfy one or more of the five alternative criteria set out in subpart (b) to Supreme Court Rule 42.
ANALYSIS
Both parties agree that the portion of the Court's order denying Artesian's motion for summary judgment with respect to Lloyd's right to a jury trial and his right to seek punitive damages under 19 Del. C. ¶ 2365 determine a substantial issue and establish a legal right. The right to a jury trial, or lack thereof, raises a substantial issue and establishes a legal right. Millman v. Millman, 359 A.2d 158, 159 (Del. 1976). Recovery of punitive damages has been determined to be a legal right in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Abramowicz, 386 A.2d 670, 671 (Del. 1978).
However, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42(b Artesian must also demonstrate that the order meets one or more of the additional criteria set forth at Rule 42(b)(i) -(v). Of those five possible criteria, Artesian asserts that Rule 42(b)(i)applies. That provision refers to Rule 41 for the requirements of accepting a certification. Pursuant to Rule 41(b), "[c]ertification will be accepted in the exercise of the discretion of the Court only where there exist important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination by this Court of the questions certified." [Emphasis added.] Rule 41 also provides examples which illustrate reasons for accepting certification. At least two of these examples are relevant in this instance: "(i) Original question of law. The question of law is of first instance in this State; . . . . (iii) Unsettled question. The question of law relates to the constitutionality, construction or application of a statute of this State which has not been, but should be, settled by the Court."
Artesian argues that the issues of 19 Del. C. ¶ 2365 not providing for a jury trial, nor allowing punitive damages, have not previously been addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court and relate to application of the statute which should be settled by that Court. However, Artesian has failed to show any important and urgent reason that would justify an immediate determination by the Supreme Court of the questions certified. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dann, 783 A.2d 124 (Del. 2001) (stating that it is preferable for trial courts to decide in the first instance all questions of law, including new and challenging legal questions.).
Trial is presently scheduled to begin on March 24, 2003. Trial has been rescheduled one time at Defendant's request. It is reasonable to expect that a motion for a stay will be filed if the interlocutory appeal is granted. It is also reasonable to expect appeals to be filed by Artesian if Lloyd prevails at trial. Both issues may be resolved on appeal after trial. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, the Supreme Court should not be asked to review this case twice, when a single appeal would suffice. Id. (finding that rarely will a certification question necessitate deviation from the normal appellate process available, as the Supreme Court of Delaware would prefer to have the benefit of the reasoning and analysis of the trial court.).
For the forgoing reasons Defendant's application for entry of an order certifying an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.