Summary
holding that police officer's transfer from the Detective Bureau to the Patrol Division was not an adverse employment action, even though he was deprived of working on major criminal investigations, because his dissatisfaction with his new responsibilities did not amount to a material harm
Summary of this case from Muldrow v. City of St. LouisOpinion
No. 09-1559.
Submitted: January 11, 2010.
Filed: January 19, 2010.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Michael J. Fagras, Lampin Kell, St. Peters, MO, for Appellant.
Burton D. Garland, Jr., Ogletree Deakins, St. Louis, MO, for Appellees.
[UNPUBLISHED]
Ronald Lloyd appeals the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of St. Charles (his employer) and the City's mayor and police chief in this action in which Lloyd alleges he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights in support of the mayor's opponent during the 2007 mayoral election.
The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Following careful de novo review of the record, see Kincaid v. City of Omaha, 378 F.3d 799, 803-04 (8th Cir. 2004) (setting forth the standard of review), we agree with the district court that the two actions the employer took against Lloyd (a shift transfer and an internal investigation into his use of work hours for coaching high school football while on duty) did not constitute adverse employment actions because the shift transfer did not result in a "significant change in working conditions," Shockency v. Ramsey County, 493 F.3d 941, 948 (8th Cir. 2007), and the internal investigation did not result in any discipline, see Altonen v. City of Minneapolis, 487 F.3d 554, 560 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Internal investigations are not adverse employment actions when they do not result in any change in [the] form or condition to the employee's employment."). We also agree with the district court that Lloyd failed to establish a causal connection between the exercise of his First Amendment rights and the two allegedly adverse employment actions.
Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court's thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
We deny as moot the appellees' motion to strike portions of Lloyd's Reply Brief and Supplemental Appendix.