Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0515-11T1
04-18-2013
L.L.G., appellant pro se. Respondent has not filed a brief.
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Simonelli and Koblitz.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FV-14-000275-12.
L.L.G., appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff L.L.G. appeals from the September 21, 2011 dismissal of her domestic violence complaint and temporary restraining order (TRO), filed pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial judge did not allow plaintiff to testify.
Plaintiff's complaint, filed on September 15, 2011, after court hours with the municipal court, alleged the predicate act of harassment, in that she claimed her former husband "sent a letter to her employer that contained fraudulent information that she reported was damaging her career. She also reported to [the municipal court judge] that she received a threatening e-mail from the defendant stating that [plaintiff] would die." Additionally, plaintiff reported a history of physical and sexual abuse dating from 1999.
At trial, the judge stated that plaintiff's complaint regarding the letter sent to her employer had been litigated before him on June 24, 2011 and this subsequent complaint was an attempt to relitigate the matter. Plaintiff interposed, "It was new information." The judge responded, "You know what, I'm talking now. Okay?" and proceeded to comment that "the additional information . . . that the victim would die was added to obtain the restraining order." The judge read the content of the threatening e-mail into the record:
"Why did you file another false allegation with the Somerset County [Division of Youth
and Family Services (Division)]? The judge
put in the court order for you not to continue doing this. You're still hurting your own kids, and your recent stalking of the [Division] worker from Warren County, Lisa B. And you were supposed to go to a therapist once a week form (sic), and then be assessed." And then it concludes, "You will die for this."
On June 29, 2012, the Governor signed into law A-3101, which reorganizes the Department of Children and Families. The reorganization includes the renaming of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services as the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. L. 2012, c. 16, eff. June 29, 2012.
The judge then asked defendant if he wrote all but the last sentence, to which defendant responded "Yes, Your Honor." Defendant also presented a court order from the parties' matrimonial case indicating that he was given legal and physical custody of the parties' three children, with plaintiff receiving supervised parenting time. The order further cautions plaintiff that should she make unsubstantiated allegations of physical and sexual abuse in the future, sanctions will be imposed. The trial judge quoted at length from the matrimonial judge's decision reflected in this order, finding, based on expert testimony as well as testimony from a Division manager, that plaintiff had made a total of over 100 false complaints to the State Police, East Hanover Police Department and the Division. The matrimonial judge accepted the testimony that plaintiff is unable to modify her behavior "due to overriding passive aggressive, and overtly paranoid personality dynamics."
Based on defendant's testimony and the prior records, the judge found that the e-mail did not contain the last sentence and that, even if it had, plaintiff was not entitled to a domestic violence restraining order as defendant needed protection from plaintiff and not the other way around. The judge also opined that "appropriate sanctions can, and should be brought against [plaintiff] for this inappropriate use of the domestic violence law."
A judge may issue a final restraining order (FRO) if the judge finds that: the plaintiff and the defendant have a relationship bringing the conduct within the Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d); the defendant committed an act designated as domestic violence, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a); and the "'restraining order is necessary . . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b).'" J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 475-76 (2011) (quoting Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 126-27 (App. Div. 2006).
Plaintiff asked to speak several times at trial and complained that "I haven't . . . been afforded the chance to speak today." The judge stated, "No, we're done. You may appeal if you wish."
Two hours later, plaintiff sought a stay of the dismissal of the restraining order. At that time she claimed to have amended her complaint to allege numerous other incidents, some of which occurred after the June hearing before the judge. The judge denied the requested stay.
Plaintiff has provided documents purporting to be a September 20, 2011 "modification" sheet relating various incidents from earlier that month.
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Plaintiff raises the following issue on appeal:
APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL. APPELLANT WAS NOT PERMITTED TO SPEAK, CALL WITNESSES OR RESPOND. LEGISLATURE DEEMS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE A SERIOUS CRIME. DUE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT/VICTIM THE RIGHT TO PRESENT THE CASE, A REMAND IS NECESSARY.
The right of both parties to a full and fair domestic violence hearing is not open to dispute. J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 481 (2011). This does not preclude the court in the appropriate circumstance from limiting the filing of frivolous matters. As we have indicated, in the appropriate case a pro se litigant can be enjoined from filing successive complaints after the court has concluded the claimed relief was frivolous. Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter, 333 N.J. Super. 385, 387 (App. Div. 2000), subsequent civil proceeding, No. A-3301-04 (App. Div. Oct. 25, 2005). "We held that in certain circumstances, due process is not impaired by enjoining litigation[,] when other available sanctions, such as monetary penalties, proved unsuccessful as a deterrent." See Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 49 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Rosenblum, supra, 333 N.J. Super. at 391-92).
In domestic violence cases, the courts must be particularly vigilant to safeguard the rights of plaintiffs and defendants. See Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 124 (App. Div. 2005) (discussing that although the growing number of domestic violence cases may burden the court system, a certain degree of formality is necessary to ensure that parties are afforded procedural safeguards). The Legislature recognized the serious problem of interfamily violence and endeavored to construct a system that would deal with such disputes in a fair and efficient manner, openly accessible to those who represent themselves without lawyers, regardless of the level of their education or whatever limitations they might suffer from due to psychiatric or physical limitations. See Assemb. 3219, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (allowing domestic violence victims to testify via closed circuit television). We agree with the trial judge that this system should not be abused by a litigant seeking to harass another party by filing repetitive frivolous claims. However, a procedure where only one side is permitted to testify does not comport with due process. See J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 481.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION