Opinion
No. 2020-03747 Index Nos. 611476/17 601017/18
03-01-2023
Sette & Apoznanski, Westbury, NY (Patricia McDonagh of counsel), for appellant. Massimo & Panetta, P.C., Mineola, NY (Nicholas J. Massimo of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.
Sette & Apoznanski, Westbury, NY (Patricia McDonagh of counsel), for appellant.
Massimo & Panetta, P.C., Mineola, NY (Nicholas J. Massimo of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.
BETSY BARROS, J.P., VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, WILLIAM G. FORD, BARRY E. WARHIT, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In related actions to recover damages for personal injuries, which were joined for discovery and trial, Jennifer Eicholz-Lucchetti, sued in Action No. 1 as Jennifer Eicholz and the plaintiff in Action No. 2, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jack L. Libert, J.), entered February 27, 2020. The order, insofar as appealed from, in effect, denied the cross-motion of Jennifer Eicholz-Lucchetti for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims in Action No. 1 insofar as asserted against her.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the cross-motion of Jennifer Eicholz-Lucchetti for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims in Action No. 1 insofar as asserted against her is granted.
These related actions arise from a multi-vehicle collision that occurred on March 7, 2017, on Merrick Road near its intersection with Wantagh Avenue in Nassau County. A vehicle operated by Brian Conklin, sued in Action No. 2 as Brian T. Conklin, came into contact with the back of a vehicle operated by Juan Miguel Lizares, which had been traveling in the eastbound direction on Merrick Road. The Lizares vehicle was pushed across a double yellow line into oncoming traffic traveling westbound on Merrick Road, where it collided with a vehicle operated by Jennifer Eicholz-Lucchetti, sued in Action No. 1 as Jennifer Eicholz, and then struck a vehicle operated by Katrina Gick.
Juan Miguel Lizares and J.L., an infant by her mother and natural guardian, Corcelie Lizares, commenced an action against, among others, Conklin and Eicholz-Lucchetti, as well as Katrina Gick and Jeffrey Gick (hereinafter together the Gick defendants) (hereinafter Action No. 1). Eicholz-Lucchetti thereafter commenced a separate action against, among others, Conklin and Juan Miguel Lizares (hereinafter Action No. 2). The Supreme Court joined the two actions for discovery and trial. In Action No. 1, Eicholz-Lucchetti cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against her, contending that the emergency doctrine relieved her of any liability for the accident. The plaintiffs in Action No. 1 and the Gick defendants opposed the cross-motion. By order entered February 27, 2020, the court, inter alia, in effect, denied the cross-motion. Eicholz-Lucchetti appeals.
Pursuant to the emergency doctrine, "those faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance, not of their own making, that leaves them with little or no time for reflection or reasonably causes them to be so disturbed that they are compelled to make a quick decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, may not be negligent if their actions are reasonable and prudent in the context of the emergency" (Tarnavska v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 106 A.D.3d 1079, 1079 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 322, 327; Selig v Diez, 180 A.D.3d 832, 833). "Under appropriate circumstances, the existence of an emergency, as well as the reasonableness of the actor's response to it, may be determined as a matter of law" (Wu Kai Ming v Grossman, 133 A.D.3d 742; see Wade v Knight Transp., Inc., 151 A.D.3d 1107, 1109-1110; Majid v New York City Tr. Auth., 128 A.D.3d 648, 649). "A driver is not obligated to anticipate that a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction will cross over into oncoming traffic, and such an event constitutes a classic emergency situation, thus implicating the emergency doctrine" (Vargas v Akbar, 123 A.D.3d 1017, 1019; see Grasso v Nassau County, 180 A.D.3d 1008, 1010).
Here, in support of her cross-motion, Eicholz-Lucchetti submitted transcripts of deposition testimony establishing, inter alia, that the Lizares vehicle was propelled into oncoming traffic and collided with Eicholz-Lucchetti's vehicle within one second of the Conklin vehicle coming into contact with the rear of the Lizares vehicle. Eicholz-Lucchetti's submissions were sufficient to establish, prima facie, that she was confronted with an emergency not of her making, leaving her virtually no opportunity to avoid a collision (see Pappas v New York City Tr. Auth., 208 A.D.3d 890, 891-892; Vargas v Akbar, 123 A.D.3d at 1019). In opposition, the plaintiffs in Action No. 1 and the Gick defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Grasso v Nassau County, 180 A.D.3d at 1010).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Eicholz-Lucchetti's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims in Action No. 1 insofar as asserted against her.
BARROS, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, FORD and WARHIT, JJ., concur.