Livonia Drive-In Theatre v. Livonia

15 Citing cases

  1. Shelby Township Police & Fire Retirement Board v. Shelby Township

    438 Mich. 247 (Mich. 1991)   Cited 10 times

    Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and only appropriate where there is a clear legal duty bearing upon the defendant and a clear legal right by the plaintiff to discharge that duty. Livonia Drive-In Theater Co v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438, 446; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961); Oakland Co Bd of Co Road Comm v State Hwy Comm, 79 Mich. App. 505, 509; 261 N.W.2d 329 (1977). Maintaining a level of "actuarial integrity" in accordance with 1937 PA 345 will require the contribution of funds adequate to cover pensions earned by active members for services to be performed in the current year and earned by active members for services already performed, and actual pensions paid to the retirees.

  2. Teasel v. Dep't of Mental Health

    419 Mich. 390 (Mich. 1984)   Cited 48 times
    Concluding that the plaintiff, who had been hospitalized by court order, had a clear, legal right derived from the mental health code on the basis that the defendant had a clear legal duty to determine whether the plaintiff was suitable for release or a person requiring treatment as defined by law and that the plaintiff did not seek to control the defendant's discretion, but to "compel [the defendant] to make an informed judgment"

    Whether the remedy awarded is termed a writ of mandamus or a mandatory injunction, the decision to issue that relief is discretionary with the trial court. Donovan v Guy, 344 Mich. 187, 192; 73 N.W.2d 471 (1955) (mandamus is a discretionary writ); DeYoung v State Land Office Board, 316 Mich. 61, 66; 24 N.W.2d 424 (1946) (a writ of mandamus is a writ of grace and not a writ of right); Livonia Drive-In Theater Co v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438, 446; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961) (the remedy of mandamus is discretionary and such a writ will issue against public officials only to compel the enforcement of a clear legal duty); Steggles v National Discount Corp, 326 Mich. 44, 50; 39 N.W.2d 237; 15 ALR2d 208 (1949) (mandatory injunction is largely a matter of discretion of the trial court). See, generally, 52 Am Jur 2d, Mandamus, §§ 31-42; 42 Am Jur 2d, Injunctions, §§ 24-38; 55 CJS, Mandamus, § 9; 43 CJS, Injunctions, § 14.

  3. Schwartz v. Secretary of State

    393 Mich. 42 (Mich. 1974)   Cited 18 times
    In Schwartz, supra at 50, n 5, our Supreme Court expressed its displeasure with the plaintiff's waiting seven weeks after the questioned legislation was approved to file his complaint, commenting, "Waiting until the 11th hour to challenge some aspect of the electoral process has served as grounds for denying relief."

    CONCLUSION. Mandamus is not issued as matter of right but is a discretionary writ, Geib v Kent Circuit Judge, 311 Mich. 631, 636; 19 N.W.2d 124 (1945); Donovan v Guy, 344 Mich. 187, 192; 73 N.W.2d 471 (1955); and Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438, 446; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). The plaintiff has not made a case for the exercise of our discretion to grant the writ of mandamus by proving that the Legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority.

  4. Livonia Hotel v. City of Livonia

    259 Mich. App. 116 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 18 times
    Recognizing binding nature of Korash on this issue

    As the parties acknowledge, the charter grants broad veto power to the mayor. In Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961), the Supreme Court, interpreting the Livonia Charter, found that the mayor had veto power over not just legislation, but also over administrative matters decided by the city council. In that case, the plaintiff challenged the right of the mayor to veto a decision of the city council involving the issuance of a license to operate a drive-in theatre on industrially zoned property.

  5. Harbor Telegraph 2103, LLC v. Oakland County Board of Commissioners

    253 Mich. App. 40 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 8 times
    In Harbor Telegraph, this Court stated that "[t]he clear and unambiguous language of MCL 45.561 inescapably leads to our conclusion that the county executive possessed the authority to veto the board of commissioners' detachment resolution...."

    Third, even were we to accept an all-encompassing definition of "proceeding" within MCL 117.8, we would find that the last sentence of § 8 did not apply to this case because the detachment resolution technically had not been adopted in light of the county executive's veto and the board's subsequent failure to override the veto. MCL 45.561(2); Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438, 445; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961) (observing that "no valid resolution" existed after "the exercise of the veto power by the mayor, and the failure of the common council to override such action"). We lastly note regarding the issue of the county executive's veto authority that we fail to detect any "absurdity" resulting from our enforcement of the plain and unambiguous legislative vesting of a broad veto power in the county executive within the optional unified county form of government act, as chosen by the voters of Oakland County.

  6. Schweitzer v. Polygraph Examiners

    77 Mich. App. 749 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 6 times

    "Mandamus is a discretionary writ and will issue against a public official only to compel the enforcement of a clear legal duty. Livonia Drive-In Theater v. Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). Ordinarily the act requested must be of a ministerial nature.

  7. Pilarowski v. Brown

    257 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 8 times

    Similarly, in Lundberg v Corrections Commission, 57 Mich. App. 327, 329; 225 N.W.2d 752 (1975), it was said: "Mandamus is a discretionary writ and will issue against a public official only to compel the enforcement of a clear legal duty. Livonia Drive-In Theatre v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). Ordinarily the act requested must be of a ministerial nature.

  8. Lundberg v. Corrections Comm

    57 Mich. App. 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 10 times
    Issuing writ of mandamus to require prison officials to promulgate rules

    Mandamus is a discretionary writ and will issue against a public official only to compel the enforcement of a clear legal duty. Livonia Drive-In Theatre v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). Ordinarily the act requested must be of a ministerial nature.

  9. Lepofsky v. Lincoln Park

    48 Mich. App. 347 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 13 times
    In Lepofsky v Lincoln Park, 48 Mich. App. 347, 359-360; 210 N.W.2d 517 (1973), the circuit court, while purportedly reviewing an administrative decision to deny a commercial license, conducted a full-blown trial of the issues complete with numerous witnesses; probably because the administrative record was inadequate.

    While mandamus is a discretionary writ, it will not lie to compel a public officer to perform a nonministerial duty dependent on disputed and doubtful facts. Lobaido v Detroit Police Commr, 15 Mich. App. 138; 166 N.W.2d 515 (1968); Calida Corp v Trenton Engineer, 7 Mich. App. 496; 152 N.W.2d 38 (1967); Taylor v Ottawa Circuit Judge, 343 Mich. 440; 72 N.W.2d 146 (1955); Livonia Drive-In Theatre v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). As is obvious under the Lincoln Park used auto parts licensing ordinance, the grant of a new license in this case is not merely ministerial, but demands an exercise of judgment and discretion on the part of the mayor and city council.

  10. Carpenter v. Genesee Supervisors

    123 N.W.2d 708 (Mich. 1963)   Cited 2 times
    In Carpenter v Genesee County Board of Supervisors, 371 Mich. 295; 123 N.W.2d 708 (1963), the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the denial of a writ of mandamus to compel the county board of supervisors to hold an incorporation election in Flint Township. Chief Justice CARR, writing for himself and three other justices, stated that the petition for incorporation was defective because it included territory of the City of Flint. Justice SOURIS, speaking for the other four justices, simply affirmed the denial of the writ on the basis that the plaintiffs had failed to show that they were entitled to it.

    — REPORTER. Notwithstanding the presence of this factual issue in the case, and notwithstanding plaintiffs' burden of establishing their clear legal right to the relief sought to be compelled by the court's writ of mandamus ( Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co. v. City of Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; Goethal v. Kent County Supervisors, 361 Mich. 104; and Janigian v. City of Dearborn, 336 Mich. 261, and cases cited therein), there is nothing in the appendix submitted to this Court from which we can say that the map attached to plaintiffs' petition showed clearly the territory proposed to be incorporated as required by the act. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs to establish compliance with all of the requirements of the act, the benefits of which they seek by issuance of the writ of mandamus.