Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and only appropriate where there is a clear legal duty bearing upon the defendant and a clear legal right by the plaintiff to discharge that duty. Livonia Drive-In Theater Co v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438, 446; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961); Oakland Co Bd of Co Road Comm v State Hwy Comm, 79 Mich. App. 505, 509; 261 N.W.2d 329 (1977). Maintaining a level of "actuarial integrity" in accordance with 1937 PA 345 will require the contribution of funds adequate to cover pensions earned by active members for services to be performed in the current year and earned by active members for services already performed, and actual pensions paid to the retirees.
Whether the remedy awarded is termed a writ of mandamus or a mandatory injunction, the decision to issue that relief is discretionary with the trial court. Donovan v Guy, 344 Mich. 187, 192; 73 N.W.2d 471 (1955) (mandamus is a discretionary writ); DeYoung v State Land Office Board, 316 Mich. 61, 66; 24 N.W.2d 424 (1946) (a writ of mandamus is a writ of grace and not a writ of right); Livonia Drive-In Theater Co v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438, 446; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961) (the remedy of mandamus is discretionary and such a writ will issue against public officials only to compel the enforcement of a clear legal duty); Steggles v National Discount Corp, 326 Mich. 44, 50; 39 N.W.2d 237; 15 ALR2d 208 (1949) (mandatory injunction is largely a matter of discretion of the trial court). See, generally, 52 Am Jur 2d, Mandamus, §§ 31-42; 42 Am Jur 2d, Injunctions, §§ 24-38; 55 CJS, Mandamus, § 9; 43 CJS, Injunctions, § 14.
CONCLUSION. Mandamus is not issued as matter of right but is a discretionary writ, Geib v Kent Circuit Judge, 311 Mich. 631, 636; 19 N.W.2d 124 (1945); Donovan v Guy, 344 Mich. 187, 192; 73 N.W.2d 471 (1955); and Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438, 446; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). The plaintiff has not made a case for the exercise of our discretion to grant the writ of mandamus by proving that the Legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority.
As the parties acknowledge, the charter grants broad veto power to the mayor. In Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961), the Supreme Court, interpreting the Livonia Charter, found that the mayor had veto power over not just legislation, but also over administrative matters decided by the city council. In that case, the plaintiff challenged the right of the mayor to veto a decision of the city council involving the issuance of a license to operate a drive-in theatre on industrially zoned property.
Third, even were we to accept an all-encompassing definition of "proceeding" within MCL 117.8, we would find that the last sentence of § 8 did not apply to this case because the detachment resolution technically had not been adopted in light of the county executive's veto and the board's subsequent failure to override the veto. MCL 45.561(2); Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438, 445; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961) (observing that "no valid resolution" existed after "the exercise of the veto power by the mayor, and the failure of the common council to override such action"). We lastly note regarding the issue of the county executive's veto authority that we fail to detect any "absurdity" resulting from our enforcement of the plain and unambiguous legislative vesting of a broad veto power in the county executive within the optional unified county form of government act, as chosen by the voters of Oakland County.
"Mandamus is a discretionary writ and will issue against a public official only to compel the enforcement of a clear legal duty. Livonia Drive-In Theater v. Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). Ordinarily the act requested must be of a ministerial nature.
Similarly, in Lundberg v Corrections Commission, 57 Mich. App. 327, 329; 225 N.W.2d 752 (1975), it was said: "Mandamus is a discretionary writ and will issue against a public official only to compel the enforcement of a clear legal duty. Livonia Drive-In Theatre v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). Ordinarily the act requested must be of a ministerial nature.
Mandamus is a discretionary writ and will issue against a public official only to compel the enforcement of a clear legal duty. Livonia Drive-In Theatre v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). Ordinarily the act requested must be of a ministerial nature.
While mandamus is a discretionary writ, it will not lie to compel a public officer to perform a nonministerial duty dependent on disputed and doubtful facts. Lobaido v Detroit Police Commr, 15 Mich. App. 138; 166 N.W.2d 515 (1968); Calida Corp v Trenton Engineer, 7 Mich. App. 496; 152 N.W.2d 38 (1967); Taylor v Ottawa Circuit Judge, 343 Mich. 440; 72 N.W.2d 146 (1955); Livonia Drive-In Theatre v Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; 109 N.W.2d 837 (1961). As is obvious under the Lincoln Park used auto parts licensing ordinance, the grant of a new license in this case is not merely ministerial, but demands an exercise of judgment and discretion on the part of the mayor and city council.
— REPORTER. Notwithstanding the presence of this factual issue in the case, and notwithstanding plaintiffs' burden of establishing their clear legal right to the relief sought to be compelled by the court's writ of mandamus ( Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co. v. City of Livonia, 363 Mich. 438; Goethal v. Kent County Supervisors, 361 Mich. 104; and Janigian v. City of Dearborn, 336 Mich. 261, and cases cited therein), there is nothing in the appendix submitted to this Court from which we can say that the map attached to plaintiffs' petition showed clearly the territory proposed to be incorporated as required by the act. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs to establish compliance with all of the requirements of the act, the benefits of which they seek by issuance of the writ of mandamus.