Opinion
A166237
09-27-2023
YANAN LIU, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. YIN LU, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG21103893)
HIRAMOTO, J. [*]
In September 2022, the trial court issued a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6) prohibiting Yin Lu (defendant) from contacting Yanan Liu (plaintiff) and her boyfriend, Chi Tai.Representing herself, defendant appeals. She has failed to demonstrate the court erred, so we affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. Our factual summary is drawn from the clerk's transcript. We do not consider documents appended to plaintiff's briefs or her compilation of exhibits because these documents are outside the appellate record. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1) [describing procedure to augment the appellate record].) We recite only those facts necessary to resolve the issues presented in this appeal; we disregard factual references in the parties' briefs unsupported by record citations. (Tanguilig, at p. 520.)
Background
In July 2021, plaintiff filed a request for a civil harassment restraining order against defendant. Plaintiff alleged she was dating Tai, and that she often spent time at his restaurant. Plaintiff further alleged defendant - who had previously been in romantic relationship with Tai - frequently snooped around the restaurant, harassing and threatening to harm her.
As relevant here, plaintiff's restraining order request described two incidents. The first incident occurred in May 2021. Plaintiff's car was in the restaurant parking lot. Defendant parked her car in the lot; when she saw plaintiff's car, she called the restaurant 16 times to "threaten to harm" plaintiff if she "stepped out" of the restaurant. The second incident occurred the following month. Defendant returned to the restaurant. Upon seeing plaintiff's car in the parking lot, defendant called Tai, "yelling and cursing." Then defendant went inside the restaurant and confronted plaintiff. She came very close to plaintiff's face and yelled and cursed at her; she also threatened to bring people to the restaurant to "beat [plaintiff] up." Then defendant hit plaintiff in the nose multiple times with her cell phone. Plaintiff called 911; the police arrived and arrested defendant. Plaintiff alleged she felt "enormous stress . . . and fear" as a result of defendant's "constant harassment and threats." A police report attached to the restraining order request indicates defendant was charged with misdemeanor battery.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order. Defendant did not file a written response, but she requested and received numerous continuances of the restraining order hearing. The court eventually held an unreported hearing on September 1, 2022. According to a minute order of the hearing, plaintiff and Tai testified; defendant appeared and - with the assistance of a certified interpreter - made a statement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued a restraining order pursuant to section 527.6. The restraining order requires defendant to stay away from plaintiff, Tai, and the restaurant. It expires in September 2027.
Discussion
Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) allows a victim of harassment to seek an order to prohibit harassment. Under the statute," '[h]arassment' is unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner." (Id., subd. (b)(3).) At the hearing on a request for a restraining order, the trial court must "receive any testimony that is relevant," and it "may make an independent inquiry." (Id., subd. (i).) If the court "finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment." (Ibid.) We review for substantial evidence factual findings supporting the court's decision to issue a restraining order, and we consider de novo whether the facts are sufficient to constitute harassment under the statute. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497.)
Defendant challenges the restraining order on several grounds. First, she contends she did not receive due process at the restraining order hearing. For example, defendant asserts the trial court did not give her enough time to present her testimony. In addition, she claims the court excluded the testimony of her witnesses and failed to consider the fact that her criminal case was dismissed. She also insists the interpreter did not provide "live interpretation" for a portion of the hearing.
Defendant has not provided an adequate record for us to consider these arguments. It is a well-established principle of appellate procedure that a trial court's order is presumed correct and that a party challenging the order has the burden to demonstrate - on the basis of an adequate record - the court committed reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) Without a transcript of the restraining order hearing, defendant cannot establish the court denied her a meaningful opportunity to present her case or that the alleged denial of "live interpretation" for a portion of the hearing mandates reversal. Defendant's description of the hearing in her opening brief is not an acceptable substitute for an oral record of the proceedings. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.134, 8.137 [describing alternatives to reporter's transcript].) We acknowledge defendant is representing herself, but self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)
While we recognize the constitutional dimension of defendant's allegations, the record does not support her due process claim. As noted above, the minute order of the restraining order hearing indicates a certified interpreter assisted defendant, and that the court reviewed a statement she made in open court. And defendant cites no persuasive authority supporting her assertion that the hearing did not comport with due process. (Conservatorship of Tedesco (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 285, 303, fn. 21 [contention unsupported by citation to relevant supporting authority is forfeited].)
Next, defendant complains the trial court did not advise her of her right to appeal. The record she has provided is inadequate to evaluate this claim. Her argument fails for the additional reason that she has cited no authority - and we are aware of none - requiring a court to advise a defendant in a civil restraining order proceeding of the right to appeal. In any event, we perceive no prejudice from any assumed failure to advise defendant of her appellate rights, as she timely appealed the restraining order.
Finally, defendant disputes the events giving rise to plaintiff's request for a restraining order. In effect, defendant appears to ask this court to reverse the restraining order based on assertions in her briefs. This strategy is unavailing for the reasons discussed above. We cannot" 'redetermine the facts'" - we" 'must accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.'" (In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1140.) Evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant's conduct constitutes harassment under the statute. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3); Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 497-502.)
We decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in defendant's reply brief, including her contention that "double jeopardy" bars the restraining order.
Disposition
The September 1, 2022 restraining order is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
WE CONCUR: BROWN, P.J. GOLDMAN, J.
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.