Similarly, while the Little Tucker Act waives the Government's sovereign immunity, it affords no substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. See Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citingMitchell, 463 U.S. at 216-17); Trayco, Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 832, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiff "met the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 1346(a)(2) and alleged a substantive right against the United States for money damages"). "Thus, for a claim to be based on the Little Tucker Act, it must be founded on a provision that can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation from the United States."

The seizing agency then turns the matter over to the United States Attorney, who must institute judicial condemnation proceedings in federal district court. Id.; see also Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1996). During the judicial proceedings, the government bears the burden of establishing probable cause for the forfeiture.

Once again, the trial court correctly held that it lacks the general federal question jurisdiction of the district courts, which would allow it to review the agency's actions and to grant relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1994). Reasoning sua sponte from Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the Court of Federal Claims also considered and rejected the possibility that it had jurisdiction to resolve Crocker's claim as an unlawful exaction. Because the Tucker Act does not provide any substantive rights, Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216-17; United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976), Crocker's ability to bring a claim in the Court of Federal Claims turns on whether the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1994), creates "a substantive right for money damages in situations in which a penalty is improperly exacted."

See Notice of Seizure of Property dated July 12, 1998, Exhibit 2 to plaintiff's memorandum. "Based on the clarity of this notice, . . . it satisfies Constitutional due process requirements." Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Parenthetically, the court notes that LSB asserts, without citation to any authority, that the government should not have forfeited the vehicle after LSB raised, in its petition for remission, the "innocent owner" defense.

Thus, the District Court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction over Curry's challenge to the administrative forfeiture decision. See McGlory, 202 F.3d at 670; see also Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 124243 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a district court lacked jurisdiction to review administrative forfeiture proceedings); cf. Troconis-Escovar v. United States, 59 F.4th 273, 275, 279 (7th Cir. 2023) (dismissing an Eighth Amendment challenge to an administrative forfeiture because the plaintiff did not timely file a claim with the agency); Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818, 821-22 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (same). For that reason, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

The First and Eighth Circuits have ruled that when notice of administrative forfeiture is inadequate, the district court must set aside the forfeiture and either order return of the seized property or direct the government to commence judicial forfeiture in district court. See, e.g, United States v. Volanty, 79 F.3d 86,88 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 1993). The Federal Circuit has held that a district court can excuse a property owner's failure to comply with the statutory requirements when notice in an administrative forfeiture proceeding is inadequate. Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit, upon ruling that a district court has jurisdiction over due process challenges to administrative proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, remanded the case for an adjudication on the merits.

Indeed, notwithstanding that the 1984 revision explicitly distinguished, for purposes of administrative forfeiture, between property seized below a fixed dollar value and certain classes of property subject to administrative forfeiture irrespective of the dollar value (a distinction carried over to the 1990 amendments), many courts have continued to refer to property generally without acknowledging that distinction. See, e.g., Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1998); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997); Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818, 819-20 (Fed. Cir. 1996); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1217, n. 9 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 510 (1st Cir. 1995); Linarez v. United States Dept. of Justice, 2 F.3d 208, 209 (7th Cir. 1993); Schrob, 948 F.2d at 1412, n. 9. We note that these statements, however, are mere dicta.

Id. at 794-95. In Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the forfeiture of his vehicle violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that, so long as the plaintiff received adequate notice of his right to have the forfeiture proceedings in a judicial forum under 19 U.S.C. § 1608, the failure to pursue this statutory option constituted a waiver of the plaintiff's opportunity to assert his constitutional claims in federal court.

The Federal Circuit has held that a district court can excuse a property owner's failure to comply with the statutory requirements when notice in an administrative forfeiture proceeding is inadequate. Litzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit, upon ruling that a district court has jurisdiction over due process challenges to administrative forfeiture proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §(s) 1331, remanded the case for an adjudication on the merits.

No further notice is required to satisfy due process. See alsoLitzenberger v. United States, 89 F.3d 818, 822 (Fed.Cir.1996) ("Based on the clarity of this notice, we agree with the district court that it satisfies Constitutional due process requirements."). The Court will therefore dismiss Count Nine.