The Court of Appeals issued its writ of certiorari on the wife's petition. That Court reversed in Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 307 Md. 408, 514 A.2d 476 (1986) ( Litzenberg III). It first opined: This Court has held that various sections of the 1677 Statute of Frauds or modern versions thereof, are satisfied by admissions in the form of sworn testimony in court or on deposition, or in an answer to a complaint.
I. THE HEARING ISSUE In Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 57 Md. App. 303, 469 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 300 Md. 89, 475 A.2d 1201 (1984), appeal after remand, 307 Md. 408, 514 A.2d 476 (1986), a case also involving a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, we said: It is now well established that the trial court has power to summarily enforce on motion a settlement agreement entered into by the litigants while the litigation is pending before it. Quite obviously, so simple and speedy a remedy serves well the policy favoring compromise, which in turn has made a major contribution to its popularity.
Appellant contends that although the parties are subject to the Statute of Frauds, the trial judge erroneously held that "an out of court 'admission' made by Appellant to a third person satisfied the admission exception to the Statute of Frauds." She further argues that when the judge found, as a matter of law, that Appellant's statements to the auto detailer were admissions of a party under Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 307 Md. 408 (1986), it erred. She maintains:
Adams v. Wilson, 264 Md. 1, 284 A.2d 434 (1971). Trossbach v. Trossbach, 185 Md. 47, 42 A.2d 905 (1945); Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 307 Md. 408, 415, 514 A.2d 476 (1986). Such admissions may also be made by a current agent of the party.
Id. at 52. In Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 307 Md. 408 (1986), the Court of Appeals stated that the Trossbach rule would apply to in-court admissions made through an agent, but held that the testimony relied on by the plaintiff in Litzenberg was not an in-court admission by the defendant because the witness was not the defendant's agent at the time he gave the testimony. See id. at 417.
Judicial admissions can be binding on a principal when made by an agent. Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 514 A.2d 476, 480 (Md. 1986). To be attributed to the principal, an agent's admission must be made during the existence of the agency relationship.
When applying the statute, it is established that "the Statute of Frauds, at least as it applies to executory land contracts, is not satisfied [only] by a finding that there was in fact an oral contract to transfer." Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 307 Md. 408, 420, 514 A.2d 476, 482 (1986). A signed memorandum that sets forth all of the material facts is required to constitute a binding contract.
The Statute of Frauds is satisfied "by admissions in the form of sworn testimony in court or on deposition, or in an answer to a complaint." Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 307 Md. 408, 415, 514 A.2d 476 (1986). Such admissions may be made through an agent.
the last twenty-five years has held that judicial admissions are an exception to the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Flight Sys., Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 112 F.3d 124, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying Pennsylvania law and holding that Pennsylvania's statute of frauds does not bar an oral agreement if the party against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced admits to the existence of the contract in pleadings or testimony); Consolidation Servs., Inc. v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n, 185 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1999) (same, applying Indiana law); Stoetzel v. Cont'l Textile Corp. of Am., 768 F.2d 217, 222 (8th Cir. 1985) (same, applying Missouri law); Anchorage-Hynning Co. v. Moringiello, 697 F.2d 356, 361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same, applying District of Columbia law); Paris Util. Dist. v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 665 F.Supp. 944, 956-57 (D.Me. 1987) (same, applying Maine law); Timberlake v. Heflin, 180 W.Va. 644, 379 S.E.2d 149, 152-53 (W.Va. 1989) (same, applying West Virginia law); Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 307 Md. 408, 514 A.2d 476, 480 (Md. 1986) (same, applying Maryland law); Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984) (same, applying Utah law); Adams-Riker, Inc. v. Nightingale, 119 R.I. 862, 383 A.2d 1042, 1044-45 (R.I. 1978) (same, applying Rhode Island law); Herrera v. Herrera, 126 N.M. 705, 974 P.2d 675, 679-80 (N.M.Ct.App. 1999) (same, applying New Mexico law); Davis v. Roberts, 563 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (same, applying Iowa law); Wolf v. Crosby, 377 A.2d 22, 26-27 (Del.Ch. 1977) (same, applying Delaware law). But see Key Design Inc. v. Moser, 138 Wash.2d 875, 983 P.2d 653, 659-61 (Wash. 1999) (declining to adopt judicial admission exception as an exception to the requirement under Washington's statute of frauds that contracts for the sale of real property contain a legal description of the property); Durham v. Harbin, 530 So.2d 208, 212 n. 5 (Ala. 1988) (recognizing strong arguments favoring judicial admission exception, but declining to depart from prior case law rejecting exception where the oral con
(Pl.'s Mem. 5-6, ECF No. 29). "The Statute of Frauds is satisfied `by admissions in the form of sworn testimony in court or on deposition, or in an answer to a complaint.'" Barranco v. Barranco, 604 A.2d 931, 934 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (citing Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 307 Md. 408, 415, 514 A.2d 476 (1986)). The admission must be made either by the party against whom the contract is being enforced, or by that party's agent.