Opinion
24A-PL-1245
12-02-2024
Coralynn Littleton-Rose, Appellant-Plaintiff v. William L. Stidams, Appellee-Defendant
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Michael L. Schultz Jackson A. Hughes Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Jeremy M. Dilts Carson LLP Fort Wayne, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Washington Circuit Court Trial Court Cause No. 88C01-2209-PL-000599 The Honorable Larry W. Medlock, Judge
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Michael L. Schultz Jackson A. Hughes Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Jeremy M. Dilts Carson LLP Fort Wayne, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Less than a week after William Stidams installed a new ventilation hood above Coralynn Littleton-Rose's stove, a fire broke out when Littleton-Rose used the hood for the first time. Littleton-Rose sued Stidams and the hood's manufacturer for the damage caused by that fire. Stidams moved for summary judgment on Littleton-Rose's negligence claim against him, arguing that he did not install the hood incorrectly and that he did not cause or contribute to the fire. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Stidams. LittletonRose now appeals and raises two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Stidams.
[¶2] We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Stidams was contracted to replace the ventilation hood over Littleton-Rose's stove in her mobile home, among other repairs. Stidams, along with three other people, made the contracted repairs to Littleton-Rose's home, and Stidams was the person solely responsible for removing the old hood and installing the new hood.
[¶4] Less than a week later, on the afternoon of January 31, 2023, Littleton-Rose made chili on her stove, using the hood for the first time. After her chili was done, Littleton-Rose removed the pot from the burner, turned off the stove, and left the chili to cool. Littleton-Rose left the hood running to vent the chili smell from her kitchen while she watched television in the living room. Approximately 15 to 30 minutes later, Littleton-Rose's smoke detectors went off, and she discovered the hood and the cabinets surrounding it were on fire but the stove was not. Littleton-Rose immediately called 911, and when the fire department arrived, they "found a good deal of smoke throughout the trailer and charring on the cabinets above the stove." Appellant's App. Vol. III at 30. Those cabinets were "still burning inside," and the food therein was "smoldering." Id. According to the fire department, "[t]he stove hood vent had the most fire damage." Id.
[¶5] Littleton-Rose sued Stidams and the hood's manufacturer for fire-related damage, alleging in relevant part that Stidams negligently selected or installed the hood. Stidams filed a motion for summary judgment on Littleton-Rose's negligence claim against him, contending that he did not install the hood incorrectly and that he neither caused nor contributed to the fire. In support of this motion, Stidams designated (1) his own deposition with exhibits, including photographs and the fire department's report, and (2) a report by Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. (the "Rimkus Report") that concluded the fire probably originated on the stove and not in the hood.
Air King America, LLC is not a party to this appeal.
[¶6] In her response to Stidams's motion, Littleton-Rose designated (1) her declaration regarding the events of January 31, (2) Stidams's deposition with exhibits, and (3) the Rimkus Report. The trial court granted Stidams's motion and entered summary judgment in his favor. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
The Trial Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Stidams
[¶7] Littleton-Rose argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Stidams. We review summary judgment decisions de novo, which means we apply the same standard as the trial court. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 644 (Ind. 2023) (quoting 624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Hous. Auth., 193 N.E.3d 381, 384 (Ind. 2022)). Summary judgment is proper only "if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). "A fact is 'material' if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is 'genuine' if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences." City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009)).
[¶8] We consider only those portions of the pleadings, depositions, and any other matters specifically designated to the trial court by the parties for purposes of the summary judgment motion. T.R. 56(C), (H). We resolve "all factual inferences and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue" in favor of the nonmovant. Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). In so doing, "we give careful scrutiny to make sure the nonmovant's day in court is not improperly denied." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016)).
[¶9] The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wireman v. LaPorte Hosp. Co., 205 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citing Serbon v. City of E. Chicago, 194 N.E.3d 84, 91 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022)), reh'g denied (Apr. 5, 2023), trans. denied, 211 N.E.3d 1007 (Ind. 2023). The movant "can make this showing when undisputed evidence affirmatively negates a required element" of the nonmovant's claim. Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind. 2022) (citing Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187-88). Only if the movant meets this prima facie burden does the burden then shift to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Wireman, 205 N.E.3d at 1045 (citing Serbon, 194 N.E.3d at 91).
[¶10] Littleton-Rose's claim against Stidams is based solely on negligence. "The essential elements for a negligence action are '(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, (2) a breach of the duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach of duty.'" Yost v. Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 515 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind. 2011)). "In negligence cases, summary judgment is 'rarely appropriate,'" Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Tibbs v. Huber, Hunt &Nichols, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ind.1996)), because such cases "are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person-one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence," id.
[¶11] In seeking summary judgment, Stidams asserted that (a) he did not breach his duty of care in installing the hood and (b) he was not the proximate cause of the fire. We address each argument in turn.
a. Stidams Did Not Affirmatively Negate the Breach Element of Littleton-Rose's Negligence Claim
[¶12] Stidams first claims he did not install the hood negligently or otherwise inappropriately. In other words, Stidams argues that he did not breach his duty of care. Whether the defendant breached the duty of care is "usually a question of fact for the jury." Megenity v. Dunn, 68 N.E.3d 1080, 1083 (Ind. 2017) (citing Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 403). "Only where the facts are undisputed and lead to but a single inference or conclusion may the court as a matter of law determine whether a breach of duty has occurred." Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. 2010) (citing Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Ind. 2001)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316 (Ind. 2016); see also Cox v. Paul, 828 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Ind. 2005) (citing Harris v. Raymond, 715 N.E.2d 388, 394 (Ind. 1999)).
[¶13] Stidams's designated evidence shows that he followed his "standard procedure" in installing the ventilation hood. Appellant's App. Vol. III at 13-14. However, Stidams did not establish what the industry standards for installation of appliances such as a ventilation hood are or that his technique of installation was reasonable under those standards. As the movant, it was Stidams's burden to disprove the allegation that he breached the duty of reasonable care in installing the hood. See McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 377 (citing Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187-88). Yet Stidams asserted "[t]here is no evidence that [his] method of installation is incorrect or inappropriate in any way." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 23. "It is not enough to cite the absence of evidence and claim that the nonmoving party is thereby unable to prove an element of its case. Rather, the moving party must demonstrate that the undisputed facts conclusively establish the absence of a required element of the non-moving party's case." Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 676 (Ind. 2013). Therefore, Stidams did not affirmatively negate the breach element of Littleton-Rose's negligence claim, so he did not meet his prima facie burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding breach.
b. Stidams Did Not Affirmatively Negate the Proximate Cause Element of Littleton-Rose's Negligence Claim
[¶14] Stidams next claims that his installation of the hood was not the proximate cause of the fire in Littleton-Rose's kitchen. "An act or omission is said to be a proximate cause of an injury if the resulting injury was foreseen, or reasonably should have been foreseen, as the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission." Funston v. Sch. Town of Munster, 849 N.E.2d 595, 600 (Ind. 2006) (citing Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 388 (Ind. 2004); Vernon v. Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976, 981 (Ind. 1999); Havert v. Caldwell, 452 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind. 1983)). That is, proximate cause has two components: (1) causation-in-fact and (2) scope of liability. Kovach v. Caligor Midwest, 913 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ind. 2009) (citing City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith &Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1243-44 (Ind. 2003)). Stidams challenges only the first component, so we limit our review accordingly.
[¶15] To establish causation-in-fact-also known as factual causation-at trial, the plaintiff "must show that but for the defendant's allegedly tortious act or omission, the injury at issue would not have occurred." Kovach, 913 N.E.2d at 197-98 (citing King, 801 N.E.2d at 1243-44). Ordinarily, factual causation is "a factual question reserved for determination by the jury." Id. at 198 (citing King, 801 N.E.2d at 1243-44). "However, where reasonable minds cannot disagree as to causation-in-fact, the issue may become a question of law for the court." Id. (citing Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ind. 2004)).
[¶16] Here, Stidams relies on the Rimkus Report to demonstrate that his installation of the ventilation hood was not the proximate cause of the fire. In particular, Stidams points to following conclusion in the Rimkus Report: "The ignition of food product vapors, contained within a cooking pot, from the heat produced by the kitchen range's heating element, was identified as the probable ignition source for the fire." Appellant's App. Vol. III at 195 (emphasis added). We have previously held that "[s]tanding alone, evidence establishing a mere possibility of cause or which lacks reasonable certainty or probability is not sufficient evidence by itself to support a verdict." Mr. Bults, Inc. v. Orlando, 990 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (quoting Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873, 87778 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994)). It follows that such evidence is also not sufficient by itself to support a grant of summary judgment. See id. Additionally, "[t]here can be multiple proximate causes of a resulting event." Funston, 849 N.E.2d at 600. Consequently, the Rimkus Report's conclusion that "food product vapors" were the "probable ignition source for the fire," Appellant's App. Vol. III at 195, does not conclusively establish the cause or causes of the fire.
[¶17] This conclusion is further bolstered by Littleton-Rose's declaration in her designated evidence that shows the fire was "in the area of the ventilation hood and the cabinets right above it" and "[t]here was no fire on the stove itself." Appellant's App. Vol. III at 230. Stidams makes much of the fact LittletonRose relies on her declaration and did not designate an opposing expert opinion regarding the cause of the fire. There is no requirement in this context that an expert opinion be met by another expert opinion. Compare U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Nulls Mach. &Mfg. Shop, 736 N.E.2d 271, 285 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (noting causation in a negligence case "need not always be proven by expert testimony" if causation is within a lay person's understanding), trans. denied, with Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187-88 (explaining for a medical malpractice claim, a unanimous opinion by the medical review panel in favor of the movant is usually sufficient to meet the burden of negating an element of the claim, requiring the non- movant to rebut the medical panel opinion with expert medical testimony). Thus, it is for the factfinder to determine the weight and credibility of LittletonRose's observations of the fire versus the Rimkus Report's conclusions about the fire's cause or causes. In other words, Stidams has not affirmatively negated the proximate cause element of Littleton-Rose negligence claim and there is a genuine issue of material fact.
[¶18] In sum, Stidams did not affirmatively negate the breach and proximate cause elements of Littleton-Rose's negligence claim; that is, Stidams did not carry his prima facie burden of demonstrating there are no genuine issues of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we must conclude the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in Stidams's favor, and we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for trial.
[¶19] Reversed and remanded.
Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.