Opinion
December Term, 1822.
1. An act which a party is bound to perform only by honor and moral duty can be enforced only by considerations addressed to his feelings, and would not be the subject of a legal action.
2. A bill to enforce performance of such an act will therefore be dismissed for want of equity, for equity must here follow the law, which designs to give effect to contracts founded on the mutual exigencies of society, and not to undertakings which are merely gratuitous.
THE bill stated that complainant had become the purchaser for the consideration money of $15,000 of the tract of land in the county of Granville on which the courthouse of that county was erected; that shortly after his purchase certain individuals excited discontent among the citizens of the county by representing that complainant enjoyed a monopoly in being sole proprietor of the public houses near the courthouse, and a petition to the Legislature of the State was circulated by them for subscriptions, praying that the seat of justice might be removed if complainant would not permit a town to be laid off on his land at the courthouse; that complainant, to prevent the ruin which would ensue to him from the removal of the seat of justice, assented to the petition to the Legislature, and accordingly, in 1811, an act was passed appointing (303) commissioners to contract with complainant for fifty acres of land to erect a town upon; that to the application of these commissioners complainant replied that his situation forbade his fixing on a specific sum as the price of the land, but that he left the matter to their consideration and sense of justice, and expressed his intention of conveying to them the land for any sum which they might assign as its value; that the commissioners declared their wish that complainant should have the full benefit of all the said land would bring, and that by a private agreement among the commissioners, unknown to complainant, he was to receive such sum above that for which he sold it as the land would yield upon the sale of it in lots by the commissioners; that the sum of $2,636 was proposed by the commissioners and accepted by this complainant and a conveyance executed accordingly; that this complainant was so situated that he was compelled to accede to any terms which might be offered by the commissioners, and therefore made no stipulations, but relied on the justice of the commissioners to adopt such measures as would secure to this complainant the value of the property. The commissioners sold the land in lots on credit for the sum of $4,360.84, and bonds were given by the purchasers to John F. Patillo, county trustee of the county of Granville; that Patillo had assigned to complainant bonds to the amount of $2,636 and refused to assign the residue. The bill prayed that Patillo might be directed to collect the money due and pay it over to complainant, or that it might be decreed that the remaining bonds might be assigned by Patillo to complainant.
Ruffin moved to dismiss the bill for want of equity.
Seawell and Gaston opposed the motion. (304)
Consider this case independent of the contract, and the justice of it would be that the complainant should be entitled to the value of the land — that is, the amount it sold for. But, viewing it under the contract made with the commissioners and the law arising thereon, I think he is entitled to nothing. The complainant is not to be viewed in the light of an oppressed man; he had it in his power either to keep the land or sell it; he was not bound to take for it what the commissioners offered him, unless he had determined to have a town located there at any price they might value the land at, however low; if this was the fact, he had in view a greater benefit to himself than the difference in price between what he got for the land and what it sold for. It is (305) clear, if the land had sold for less than was given for it, the county could have had no deduction made from the sum contracted to be given. Any ex parte considerations or conclusions which the commissioners had or might have come to would have been urged in vain in support of such a claim, and rightly too. The contract was the rule to go by; when the commissioners executed that their agency was at an end.
If the price paid for the land by complainant on which the town was located was a great one on account of the courthouse being situated thereon, this Court cannot take that circumstance into consideration, because it must have been, or might have been, known to complainant when he purchased that the county had a right to remove it.
I do not doubt about the propriety of dismissing the bill.
The bill does not make out a case which entitles the complainant to relief. The contract of sale was completed between the parties, and the price, an indispensable ingredient in such contract, fixed and agreed upon. The additional sum now sought to be recovered entered in no degree into the views and calculations of the parties; there was no mutual agreement and understanding between them concerning it, and it could form no part of the inducement with the complainant to sell the land, for from him it was concealed till an after period; consequently no valid obligation to pay the money was incurred. If the commissioners, upon an after reflection, thought it an act of justice to allow the complainant the sum which the land might sell for above the stipulated price, the performance of an agreement to that effect must be left to the same sense of justice by which it was prompted. But it may be doubted whether they could bind their principals by an agreement relative to a purchase which was then completed, and as to which their authority was functus officio, even if a valid contract (306) had been made. If the agreement to pay this money could, by any construction, form part of the price of the land, then it cannot be proved by parol; otherwise, part of the contract would rest in deed, the other depend on the memory of witnesses, but the deed is the best evidence of what the contract was. It may be confidently inferred from this that, however strong the sentiment of justice might be under which the commissioners made the agreement or however deliberate their purpose of fulfilment, they did not mean to subject themselves to legal responsibility. The law designs to give effect to contracts founded on the mutual exigencies of society and not to undertakings merely gratuitous, nor does equity differ in this respect. If damages are sought in the one court, the plaintiff must be able to state some valid, legal, contract, which the other party wrongfully refuses to perform; if a specific performance is sought here the party must state some contract, legal or equitable, concluded between the parties which the other refuses to execute. But a voluntary conveyance cannot be enforced in this Court, any more than damages can be given at law for the breach of a voluntary promise. 1 Ves., 133, 280; 3 Atk., 399; 18 Ves., 149. It would be impossible to frame a declaration at law upon the case made in this bill; the agreement was made amongst the commissioners themselves, and not with the complainant or any one in his behalf, and the consideration, if any existed, was altogether passed and executed. Dyer, 272; 2 Strange, 933. It may therefore be said, as it has been in another case, "This agreement resting on private contract and honor, may, perhaps, be fit to be executed by the parties, but can only be enforced by considerations which apply to their feelings, and is not the subject of an action. The law encourages no man to be unfaithful to his promise, but legal obligations are, from their nature, more circumscribed than moral duties." 1 H. (307) Blackstone, 327. Let the bill be dismissed without costs.
HENDERSON, J. Having been of counsel in this case, gave no opinion.
PER CURIAM. Dismissed without costs.