See generally Littlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982); Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982); Johnson v. District Court, 195 Colo. 169, 576 P.2d 167 (1978); Leubsdorf, The Standard For Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (1978). A request for a temporary injunction necessarily involves a consideration of the substantive law applicable to the trial on the merits, and it is within this substantive framework that Johnson's claims must be evaluated. II.

¶ 17 The interpretation of a deed and the determination of whether it is ambiguous are questions of law subject to de novo review by this court. SeeLittlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139, 1144 n. 6 (Colo.1982); Terry, 892 P.2d at 393. ¶ 18 The Furrow Defendants assert that, where the provisions of a “granting clause” and those of “a warranty (or habendum) clause” conflict, the provisions of the granting clause (here, reserving no mineral interests) must prevail.

Findings of fact made by the trial court are binding on review if supported by evidence in the record. Littlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982). Here, the trial court found that "the evidence in this case has provided, thus far, that Gold Messenger has taken substantial steps to protect the confidential nature of the confidential Operations and Procedures manual, as well as to [protect] other information provided to its franchisees."

We disagree. Relying on Stratford v. Littlehorn, 635 P.2d 910 (Colo.App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982), and Wilson v. Goldman, 699 P.2d 420 (Colo.App. 1985), WIA argues that the Committee had no authority to grant an exception to the express provisions of the covenants. It maintains that because the covenants plainly prohibit "outside aerials or antennas," a term that in its view included satellite dishes, the Committee acted in excess of its authority in 1990 by approving the Brenners' plans for installation of a satellite dish.

Appling v. Federal Land Bank, 816 P.2d 297 (Colo.App. 1991). Moreover, because these questions concern issues of law, the trial court's findings are not binding on a reviewing court. Littlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982). Here, the deed from Mills Ranches to Jerry Mills unequivocally and unambiguously describes the parcel in terms of the nomenclature of the public land survey system as to the boundaries of the devised estate, without any reference to the fence.

We are not bound by the trial court's interpretation of the contract, see Littlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982), and we agree with Thompson's contention that the trial court's interpretation is not correct. By its terms, the contract could terminate in five ways: (1) by expiration of the term of employment; (2) by discharge for cause; (3) by agreement; (4) by abandonment or breach by Thompson; and (5) by termination without cause.

We disagree. Questions relating to whether a written contract is ambiguous and the interpretation of its terms raise issues of law, and the findings of the trial court with respect to those matters are not binding on a reviewing court. Littlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982). In determining whether the language of a contract is ambiguous, a court should construe the terms according to the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words, with reference made to all provisions of the agreement.

An ambiguity is an uncertainty of the meaning of language used in a written instrument. The question of ambiguity of a document is one of law as to which trial court findings are not binding on a reviewing court. Littlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982). While the plaintiffs' interpretation of the warranty deed alone is a tenable one, the simultaneous execution of the quitclaim deed conveying a one-half interest in the mineral rights casts doubt upon the warranty deed's meaning.

Further, the findings of fact made by the trial court are binding on review if supported by evidence in the record. Littlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982); Crosby v. Watson, 144 Colo. 216, 355 P.2d 958 (1960). That evidentiary support is lacking here.

Under paragraph 21 of the covenants, the Committee only had authority to approve "holding corrals . . . and fences around dwellings or yards," and the construction of all other fences except those on an exterior lot line of the subdivision were expressly prohibited. Thus, the Committee lacked the authority to approve the construction of a fence around the perimeter of defendant's lots. See Stratford v. Littlehorn, 635 P.2d 910 (Colo.App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, Littlehorn v. Stratford, 653 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982). II. Leasing