Opinion
C. A. 22-4288-RMG-PJG
07-31-2024
David Antonio Little, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Eric McDaniel, Nurse; David Timmons, Correctional Officer; Sergeant Quick, Correctional Officer, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This self-represented plaintiff, David Antonio Little, Jr., who was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incidents described in the Complaint, filed this civil rights action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 104.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 107.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 113.) Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendants' motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The events at issue in this matter occurred on or around March 22, 2021 while Plaintiff was housed at the Florence County Detention Center. Specifically, he alleges that he was placed in a restraint chair and forcibly medicated by Nurse McDaniel. He alleges he was then placed in segregation, began hallucinating and hyperventilating, and then flooded his cell. Officer Timmons responded to the situation and allegedly used chemical munitions on Plaintiff and slammed Plaintiff's fingers in the food flap of the cell door. Officer Quick also responded and Plaintiff was tasered by the officers. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff seeks punitive damages. (ECF No. 1 at 6.)
The court construed Plaintiff's Complaint as asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and forced medication in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 15 at 2.) No party challenged the court's construction of these claims. (See Order, ECF No. 27.)
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
The defendants' motion largely relies on the absence of any genuine issue of material fact due to deemed admissions pursuant to Rule 36. (ECF No. 104-1.) During the discovery period, the defendants served numerous requests for admission to which Plaintiff failed to respond. Accordingly, the defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. (ECF No. 60.) In response to the defendants' motion, Plaintiff filed belated responses to the requests for admission. (ECF No. 77.) Notably, Plaintiff did not provide any cause for his untimely responses. Additionally, the belated responses filed by Plaintiff did not comply with Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and were largely nonresponsive to the defendants' actual requests. The court therefore granted the defendants' motion to have the requests deemed admitted. (ECF No. 98.) As of the date of this recommendation, Plaintiff has not moved to withdraw or amend his belated requests for admission, moved for an extension of time in which to file responses to the requests for admission, or moved for reconsideration or appeal of the court's order granting the defendants' motion to have the requests deemed admitted.
Some courts have expressed reluctance to award summary judgment based on deemed admissions when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, observing that the pro se party “may not have been aware of the detrimental impact of not responding to the requests for admission.” See, e.g., Simpson v. Kapuluck, C/A No. 2:09-cv-00021, 2010 WL 1981099, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. May 14, 2010); United States v. Turk, 139 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Md. Oct. 29, 1991) (“[T]he Court is reluctant to grant summary judgment against a pro se defendant based solely upon his failure to comply with the discovery requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Additionally, some courts have held that untimely responses to requests for admission may be viewed as the equivalent of a motion to withdraw or amend a response, and that such an amendment could be allowed when the opposing party suffered no prejudice by the amendment. See Metpath, Inc. v. Modern Medicine, 934 F.2d 319, 1991 WL 87534, at *2-3 (4th Cir. 1991) (table) (discussing conditions under which the court may permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions and holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the untimely responses). Ultimately, however, the language of Rule 36 leaves to the court's discretion whether to allow untimely answers to requests for admission. See Donovan v. Porter, 584 F.Supp. 202 (D. Md. 1984).
In its prior order, the court noted that Plaintiff had not filed a proper motion to withdraw or amend his admissions as required by Rule 36. However, as noted above, even if the court were to view Plaintiff's untimely responses as the equivalent of such, see Metpath, 934 F.2d 319, most of the responses themselves do not meet the requisite standard for answers and objections outlined in Rule 36(a)(4) and (5). In summary, despite the Plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant and the consequences of deemed admissions to the potential merits of Plaintiff's case, the court is now faced with the defendants' motion for summary judgment arguing there is no genuine issue of material fact combined with Plaintiff's utter failure to justify his untimely responses to the requests for admission or attempt to amend his admissions to comply with the federal rules, even after the court pointed out the deficiencies. See, e.g., United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 (7th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging the “harshness of the result” in granting summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact due to the defendants' default admissions, but noting that parties must comply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that “the harshness is tempered by the availability of the motion to withdraw admissions, a procedure which the defendants did not employ”); Poon-Atkins v. Sappington, No. 21-60467, 2022 WL 102042, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022) (“[T]he proper course for a litigant that wishes to avoid the consequences of failing to timely respond to rule 36 requests for admissions is to move the court to amend or withdraw the default admissions in accordance with the standard outlined in rule 36(b).”). Thus, crediting the admissions as is appropriate under Rule 36, the court proceeds to the defendants' motion.
1. Damages
Through Plaintiff's deemed admissions, the fact that Plaintiff suffered no actual injury as a result of his alleged claims is conclusively established. (Defs.' Request for Admiss. No. 5, ECF No. 60-1 at 1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(b). Thus, the defendants argue, he is precluded from recovering damages in this case. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 104-1 at 12-13); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury[.]”). Here, Plaintiff has not sought any form of damages other than punitive damages. (See Compl. ¶ VI, ECF No. 1 at 6.) But Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages because he did not seek nominal damages and cannot now show that he is entitled to compensatory damages. See, e.g., Davis v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 5:17-2824-JMC, 2017 WL 6621115, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 2017) (holding that, because the plaintiff did not plead compensatory, nominal, or general damages, the court was unable to award punitive damages); cf. Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 1997e(e) did not bar a plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for nominal and punitive damages even in the absence of a physical injury); Jones v. Price, 696 F.Supp.2d 618, 624-25 (N.D. W.Va. 2010) (collecting cases and holding that § 1997e(e) does not bar recovery of nominal and punitive damages in the absence of a physical injury when an inmate can show injury of constitutional dimensions). Relatedly, punitive damages under § 1983 are not available where the plaintiff cannot demonstrate actionable harm. See Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]bsent statutory language to the contrary, punitive damages are not recoverable absent proof of actual damage.”); People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, Va., 12 F.3d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the same, and reasoning that punitive damages are not appropriate in cases where a plaintiff has failed to demonstrate actionable harm); see also Givens v. O'Quinn, 447 F.Supp.2d 593, 602-03 n.5 (W.D. Va. 2006) (stating that because § 1983 is silent on the question, punitive damages may not be awarded on § 1983 claims where compensatory damages have not been awarded, but upholding the award of punitive damages because the jury awarded “nominal compensatory damages” in the amount of $1). Therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims seeking only punitive damages pursuant to § 1983.
2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-Defendants Timmons and Quick
Separate and independent of the issue of damages, Officers Timmons and Quick are entitled to summary judgment based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
A prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Generally, to satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of every level of available administrative review. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); but see Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016) (describing limited exceptions to the exhaustion requirement). Those remedies neither need to meet federal standards, nor are they required to be plain, speedy, and effective. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739). Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the [Prison Litigation Reform Act], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The defendant has the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Pretrial detainees are specifically included in this requirement pursuant to § 1997e(h), which defines a “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.”
According to state law, every detention center in the state of South Carolina is subject to an annual inspection by the Jail and Prison Inspection Division of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 24-9-10, -20. Pursuant to this statute, the South Carolina Association of Counties established standards found in a document entitled “Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities-Type II and/or IV Facility City, County, or Regional Jail and/or Combined Jail/Prison Camp” (the “Minimum Standards”), which was adopted by SCDC. The Minimum Standards provide that a written grievance procedure shall be made available to every inmate and outline the required provisions. (See Minimum Standards at 50.)
To access this document, see http://www.sccounties.org (choose “Resources,” then “Publications,” then choose “Jail Standards,” then follow the “Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities” hyperlink) (last visited July 29, 2024).
The only recognized exception to the PLRA's requirement to exhaust administrative remedies stems from the statutory language itself: an inmate need not pursue administrative remedies if they are not “available.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 642; see also Moore, 517 F.3d at 725 (“[A]n administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it.”). However, “a prisoner does not exhaust all available remedies simply by failing to follow the required steps so that remedies that once were available to him no longer are.” Moore, 517 F.3d at 725 (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. 81). Courts have recognized that generally the burden is on the defendant to show that there was an available administrative remedy that the prisoner did not use, and that the burden then “shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Once a defendant proves that a plaintiff failed to exhaust, however, the onus falls on the plaintiff to show that remedies were unavailable to him as a result of intimidation by prison officials.”).
Officers Timmons and Quick are entitled to summary judgment on their defense that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claims against them for two independent reasons. First, the matter is conclusively established through Plaintiff's deemed admissions. (Defs.' Request for Admiss. No. 2, ECF No. 60-1 at 1.) Second, no reasonable jury could find on this record that Plaintiff was prevented from filing a grievance as to these claims, as the only admissible evidence presented indisputably establishes that Plaintiff was able to file grievances during the relevant time frame-and in fact did so regarding other issues-but failed to file any grievance as to these defendants' actions. (Compare ECF No. 104-3 at 7.) Accordingly, on this record, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and the defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to the claims against Officers Timmons and Quick.
3. Qualified Immunity for Defendant McDaniel
Finally, the court concludes that Officer McDaniel is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claim regarding the alleged forced medication. Under the defense of qualified immunity, “governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Id. at 235, 242.
In determining whether the right violated was clearly established, the court defines the right “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). “If the right was not clearly established in the specific context of the case-that is, if it was not clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged was unlawful in the situation he confronted-then the law affords immunity from suit.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
[a] Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, “[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear” that every “reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (first alteration added). In analyzing this prong, a court in this district must first look to case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the South Carolina Supreme Court, and in the absence of binding authority, the court must next consider whether the right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive authority. Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017). The “salient question” “ ‘is whether the state of the law' at the time of an incident provided ‘fair warning' to the defendants ‘that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.' ” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
“When a court addresses qualified immunity in the summary judgment context, it can condense its analysis.” Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1996). In this context, the court can combine the two prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry by asking whether “the plaintiff has ‘allege[d] the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.' ” Id. (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)) (alteration in original). If so, the court must then determine whether the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct was illegal. Id. (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795 (4th Cir. 1995)). The Fourth Circuit has described this inquiry as whether “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates” the Constitution. Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 476 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). “Although the exact conduct at issue need not have been held unlawful for the law governing an officer's actions to be clearly established, the existing authority must be such that the unlawfulness of the conduct is manifest.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)).
An examination of clearly established excessive force jurisprudence is instructive in resolving this defense. As Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events raised in his Complaint, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-which “protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment”-governs this claim. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 405 (2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)). “[T]he appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim is solely an objective one,” and “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable,” regardless of the officer's state of mind. Id. at 397. In determining whether the force was objectively unreasonable, the court must consider the evidence “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “A court must also account for the legitimate interests that stem from the government's need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained, appropriately deferring to policies and practices that in the judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Importantly, “objective reasonableness turns on the “ ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case,' ” including many considerations that may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used, such as “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
The defendants argue generally that a reasonable medical provider would not have understood that restraining and administering medication to a detainee such as Plaintiff when he was a danger to himself and to detention center staff was unreasonable and that Defendant McDaniel is thus entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has failed to produce, and the court is not aware of, any authority sufficient to put Defendant McDaniel on notice that his conduct violated Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. To the contrary, the Fourth Circuit has noted the lack of such precedent in its recent unpublished opinion involving a mental health detainee in lawful state custody who, following a suicide attempt, was treated by a medical professional and administered medication-including a psychotropic drug and a sedative-against the detainee's will. See Doe v. Syverud, No. 19-2252, 2022 WL 563243, at *4-5 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 2022) (citing Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a doctor was entitled to qualified immunity where he “determined, pursuant to and consistent with accepted professional judgment, that it was in [the inmate's] medical interest to receive the one-time dose of Thorazine [against the inmate's will] in order to protect [the inmate] from imminent, selfinflicted harm”) (internal citation omitted)). Defendant McDaniel has provided affidavit testimony that, on the date on the incident, Plaintiff was “highly combative, indicated he would harm himself, spit on Officer Timmons, and was placed on a 15 minute suicide watch.” (McDaniel Aff. ¶ 7, ECF No. 104-3 at 1.) McDaniel further avers that he inquired about Plaintiff's medical history and was informed that Plaintiff had “daily episodes of psychosis” as well as a history of being combative with medical staff. (Id. ¶ 8, ECF No. 104-3 at 1-2.) McDaniel swears that the medical staff determined at that time that Plaintiff should be administered ten milligrams of Haldol and fifty milligrams of Benadryl because Plaintiff was a danger to himself and others. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff has presented no evidence refuting these facts. A reasonable officer facing these circumstances would not have fair notice that his conduct was a constitutional violation.
Accordingly, the absence of any authority establishing that Defendant McDaniel's conduct in the events described violated Plaintiff's clearly establish constitutional rights entitles McDaniel to qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted. (ECF No. 104.)
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).