Opinion
C. A. 23-2872-RMG-PJG
09-05-2023
David Antonio Little, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Eric McDaniel; David Timmons; Qiana Quick; Andrea Capers, Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff David Antonio Little, Jr., a self-represented state prisoner, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was severed from Civil Action No. 0:23-2186-RMG, and is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. (ECF No. 12.)
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is an inmate in the McCormick Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. This matter concerns Plaintiff's claims about his conditions of confinement at the Florence County Detention Center, beginning in March 2021. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986 seeking damages. Plaintiff alleges he was placed in a restraint chair upon arriving at the jail and Defendant Eric McDaniel, a nurse, forcibly injected him with medication without his consent. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Andrea Capers, a detention center officer, was present for the injection but did not stop it. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant David Timmons, an officer, maced Plaintiff for flooding his cell, kicked Plaintiff's hands while they were caught in the cell door flap, and along with Defendant Qiana Quick, another officer, tased Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims McDaniel violated his right to due process and his First Amendment rights by forcibly medicating him. Plaintiff claims Timmons and Quick used excessive force and were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. Also, Plaintiff claims Capers is liable for these actions under a theory of bystander liability.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court concludes that this matter should be summarily dismissed because it is duplicative of another lawsuit already filed by Plaintiff. On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a nearly identical lawsuit for damages pursuant to § 1983 against McDaniel, Timmons, and Quick. C/A No. 0:22-4288-RMG-PJG (“2022 lawsuit”). Plaintiff raised substantially the same allegations as he raises here about McDaniel forcibly medicating him and Timmons and Quick tasering him and slamming his fingers in a cell flap. The court authorized service of process in that case and the defendants filed an answer on February 17, 2023. The parties have since engaged in discovery in that case, including motions to limit certain discovery requests, deem certain requests admitted, and to compel responses. However, on June 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss that case stating that he does not want to argue with the defendants' attorney and he does not have the evidence to do so. Therefore, Plaintiff recently asked the court to dismiss the 2022 lawsuit without prejudice for Plaintiff to refile the case.
Plaintiff's Complaint in this case, filed June 21, 2023, appears to be his attempt to refile the 2022 lawsuit. However, the court has not granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the 2022 lawsuit without prejudice. That case remains pending, rendering this case duplicative of the 2022 lawsuit. The court has the inherent authority to issue orders to ensure that its docket is managed efficiently. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) (stating district courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases). The court will not allow Plaintiff to dismiss cases and refile them merely because he does not believe he can support his arguments in discovery disputes. Such redundant filings waste time and the court's resources, and may prejudice the defendants. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) (stating district courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases). If Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint, change his pleadings, or seek more evidence to support his arguments in his 2022 lawsuit, he must follow the appropriate procedure as allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rules of this court.
As this case is duplicative of a case that is already pending before the court, this case should be summarily dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)); McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (“ ‘Repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action' may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or malicious.”) (quoting Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.1988)).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this case be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff is warned that if this recommendation is adopted, a future court may find that this action constitutes a strike. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141, 150 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that a future court may decide that a prisoner's previous filings constitute “strikes” under § 1915(g)).
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).