Opinion
No. 1-1031 / 01-0490
Filed April 10, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Peter A. Keller, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict based upon a claim that the defendant negligently caused damage to his property. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Randy V. Hefner of Hefner, Bergkamp Rhoads, P.C., Adel, for appellant.
Stephen E. Doohen of Whitfield Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Plaintiff, Luke Little, appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict based upon a claim that the defendant, William Liston, negligently caused damage to his property. Little contends the district court provided erroneous jury instructions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . While in the process of harvesting grain in the fall of 1999, the drive shaft on the grain truck broke, leaving it stranded in Luke Little's cornhusk covered field. Little knew the drive shaft could not be permanently repaired in the field, but hoped a temporary weld would allow the truck to be driven out of the field. He contacted nearby welder William Liston to undertake the job of "tacking" the drive shaft together. Liston joined Little in the field to assess the situation.
The conversation that took place between Little and Liston is the subject of great debate. Liston asserts that he recognized the dry husks that littered the field presented a fire hazard and told Little it was too dangerous to weld. In response, Liston claims Little stated, "You weld it, I'll watch for fire." However, Little claims there was no conversation regarding the possibility of a fire and that Liston never asked him to look out for fire. Little alleges that if Liston had expressed a concern about fire he would not have attempted the repair in those conditions.
There is no dispute as to what next occurred. Liston began welding while Little stood nearby. Little walked to the back of the truck to motion to his son who was operating a combine. Within five or six seconds after the welding began, a spark dropped below the drive shaft, igniting the bed of dried cornhusks. Liston flipped his welding helmet up and yelled, "Fire!" Liston and Little immediately began attempts to extinguish the fire with their hands. Their efforts failed. The use of a fire extinguisher slowed the spread of the fire, but drained before the fire could be put out. Meanwhile, Liston attempted to drive the truck to safety. However, seeing that his own truck was in jeopardy, Liston turned off the engine, climbed in his truck, and drove it out of harm's way. Other attempts to extinguish the fire failed, but a neighbor stopped its spread by plowing a fire break with his tractor. However, the grain truck, its cargo of grain, and the corn surrounding the truck had been substantially damaged or destroyed.
Little brought an action against Liston, alleging he negligently caused damage to his property. The jury returned a verdict finding Liston 60% at fault with Little responsible for 40% of his damages, which were found to be $32,000. Little appeals.
II. Jury Instructions . We review challenges to jury instructions for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 4. The district court must give a requested jury instruction if the instruction (1) correctly states the law, (2) has application to the case, and (3) is not stated elsewhere in the instructions. Weyerhauser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Iowa 2000). A party is entitled to have their legal theories submitted to the jury if supported by the pleadings and substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 823-24. When we weigh the sufficiency of the evidence to support a requested instruction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party seeking the instruction. Id. at 824. A district court's failure to give a requested instruction does not require a reversal unless the failure results in prejudice to the party requesting the instruction. Id.
A. Duty to Perform . Little first argues the jury should have been instructed that, in order to find he was at fault for his own damage, they must first find that Little was obligated to perform certain duties at the work site pursuant to his contract with Liston.
Jury Instruction No. 10 instructed related to the defendant's claim of contributory negligence. It reads:
Upon the Defendant's defense of comparative fault, you are instructed that the Defendant claims the Plaintiff, Luke Little, was at fault in the following particulars.
a. Negligence
This ground of fault have (sic) been explained to you in other instructions.
The Defendant must prove all of the following propositions:
1. The Plaintiff was at fault. In order to prove fault, the Defendant must prove the Plaintiff was negligent in one or more of the following ways:
a. In failing to provide a safe work area.
b. failing to maintain a proper lookout for fire.
c. In failing to have a fully or properly charged fire extinguisher available at the work area.
2. The Plaintiff's fault was a proximate cause of his damage.
3. The amount of damage.
If the Defendant has failed to prove any of these propositions, the Defendant has not proven his defense.If the Defendant has proven each of these propositions, than you will assign a percentage of fault against the Plaintiff, Luke Little, and include Luke Little's fault in the total percentage of fault found by you in answering the special verdicts.
However, Little alleges that Liston never asked him to perform any duties with respect to the repairs and that he never agreed to provide a safe work area, watch for fire, or provide a fire extinguisher. Because Little and Liston disagree over this point, Little argues it was for the jury to decide whether he had some duty with respect to the welding job. He proposed the following language be used in the jury instruction regarding comparative fault.
If you find that Plaintiff has proved both of the propositions explained to you in Instruction No. ___, you should then consider Defendant's contention that Plaintiff was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout. In order to establish this affirmative defense, Defendant must prove the following:
1. That a term of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant was that Plaintiff was to maintain a lookout for fire.
2. Plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care and was negligent in performing this term of the contract.
3. Plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's damage.
If Defendant has established all of these propositions, you should then compare Plaintiff's fault with Defendant's fault as explained to you in Instruction No. ___.
The court rejected this language without explanation.
In order to prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty, the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and the plaintiff suffered damages. Novak Heating Air Conditioning v. Carrier Corp., 622 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Iowa 2001). A duty to exercise reasonable care may be created by contract. Khan v. Heritage Prop. Mgmt., 584 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). The question of existence of a duty is a matter for the court. Porter v. Iowa Power Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221, 228 (Iowa 1974). However, the existence of a contract and its terms are questions for the trier of fact. Sauser v. Kearney, 126 N.W. 322, 324 (Iowa 1910). Because the existence of a duty is dependent on the terms of the contract, the jury should have been instructed that Little was at fault for his own damage only if he was obligated to perform certain duties at the work site pursuant to his contract with Liston. We find substantial evidence supports Little's requested jury instruction.
The failure to give the requested instruction resulted in prejudice to Little. Under the instruction given, the jury could find Little was negligent even if they believed Little's claim that there was never any discussion regarding his duty to watch for fire. Accordingly, we reverse.
B. Proximate Cause . Little also contends the court erred in submitting an instruction on his failure to maintain proper lookout for fire because the evidence established that any failure to maintain a lookout did not proximately cause his damage. We disagree. The question of proximate causation is ordinarily for the jury. Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 700 (Iowa 1999). Here, Little testified that he could have responded to the fire faster had he been watching for fire. Even though his response may have only been, as he estimated, a couple seconds faster, it is reasonable to conclude from the evidence presented that the fire may not have spread as quickly and as far had Little been watching for fire. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in instructing the jury on Liston's theory that Little was negligent in failing to maintain proper lookout for fire and we affirm on this issue.
III. Conclusion . We find the district court properly instructed the jury on plaintiff's negligent failure to maintain a proper lookout for fire. However, the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the plaintiff was at fault for his own damage only if he had a duty to perform certain tasks at the work site pursuant to his contract with the defendant. As a result, we remand this case for new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.