Opinion
C/A 8:23-2321-RMG-PJG
07-17-2023
David Antonio Little, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Corporate Federal United States; Corporate United States; The State of South Carolina Corporation; Alltel Communications Inc. LLC, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff David Antonio Little, Jr., a self-represented state prisoner, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is an inmate in McCormick Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 claiming that the defendants violated numerous constitutional rights by surveilling him. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that over two days in February 2021, he was followed by “a government agent of some sort” after visiting a bank in Texas and was electrocuted through a chip that was implanted in his back when he was a child. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff also alleges that his cell phone was tapped by the defendants as part of a conspiracy, violating his privacy. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants “are responsible for the drugs or poisonous diseases(s) that were injected into the plaintiff's body on February 16, 2021.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3.)
Plaintiff's Complaint does not contain any other specific allegations. Rather, the remaining facts listed in the Complaint generally assert that Plaintiff chooses not to accept citizenship, that the defendants have created a “matrix” in which to place people as “strawmen” so that the governments can steal “all the gold” and put chips in babies' bodies. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff also does not raise any recognizable legal causes of action but asserts that his rights under numerous constitutional amendments have been violated. Plaintiff indicates that he seeks damages in this action, as well as injunctive relief in the form of pardons and expungements of his criminal convictions and dismissal of his criminal charges.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and further, that this action is frivolous. Plaintiff indicates that he raises claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. Section 1983 “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Meanwhile, § 1985 allows a plaintiff to recover for damages arising out of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law. A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011). Section 1986, in turn, allows a plaintiff to seek damages against a party who neglects to prevent a conspiracy to violate a person's rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1985).
First, the two government defendants are not “persons” amenable to suit under the civil rights statutes. See generally U.S. Const. Amend. XI; Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983); see also D.C. v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973) (stating § 1983 “does not reach . . . actions of the Federal Government and its officers are at least facially exempt from its proscriptions”); Curtis v. Pracht, 202 F.Supp.2d 406, 418 (D. Md. 2002) (stating § 1983 does not apply to the federal government or its officers).
Regardless, Plaintiff fails to identify a recognizable legal cause of action that he seeks to raise against the defendants. Plaintiff cites multiple federal constitutional amendments but fails to expressly identify a right for which he seeks to recover. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Even if the court could liberally construe a constitutional tort raised by Plaintiff in light of his pro se status, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts about the named defendants that would plausibly show that they were involved in any constitutional deprivation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Given the lack of factual support for Plaintiff's purported claims and their conspiratorial and delusional nature of his few allegations, the court also finds that this lawsuit is frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (providing that a claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
Finally, Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief in the form of pardons, expungements, or any other interference in state criminal prosecutions, are not available in a § 1983 action. See generally Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (stating § 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge the validity or duration of confinement); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (stating that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which injunctive relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this case be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff is warned that if this recommendation is adopted, a future court may find that this action constitutes a strike. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141, 150 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that a future court may decide that a prisoner's previous filings constitute “strikes” under § 1915(g)).
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).