Opinion
NNHCV095032879S
07-14-2017
Litchfield Newton, LTD et al. v. Sunmore Condominium Ass'n, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR COUNSEL FEES (#163)
Hon. John J. Nazzaro, J.
This case was tried to this court in May 2015. In a memorandum of decision dated January 14, 2016, this court entered judgment in favor of Litchfield Newton, Ltd. on count one and in favor of Janet Tracy on count three [61 Conn.L.Rptr. 646, ]. Thereafter, the plaintiffs, Litchfield Newton and Janet Tracy, filed a motion for counsel fees on October 25, 2016 (#163), which was accompanied by the fee and time records of the plaintiffs' counsel. On November 4, 2016, the defendant, Sunmore Condominium Association, Inc., filed an objection to the plaintiffs' motion for counsel fees (#164). On April 12, 2017, the court held a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for counsel fees.
Litchfield Newton, Ltd. is a subchapter C corporation in which Janet Tracy was the sole shareholder.
Counts one and three alleged common facts surrounding the plaintiffs' claim for money damages arising from the defendant's alleged failure to repair and/or replace components including roofs, walls, and windows of the condominium units 3D and 3G. This court entered judgment in favor of Litchfield Newton on count one in the sum of $2, 720, representing costs for initial repair of the interior walls for unit 3G, and in favor of Janet Tracy on count three in the sum of $1, 250 for initial repairs to the interior walls of unit 3D.
The plaintiffs argue that Article 16 of the Declaration of Sunmore Condominium Association, Inc. (Declaration) provides that a unit may recover damages in an action against the Association and " if any such action results in a final judgment or decree in favor of the party instituting such action, such judgment or decree may incorporate a provision for reasonable attorneys fees, . . . to be paid by the party against whom such judgment or decree is entered." The plaintiffs further argue that they were obliged to bring this action and try the case two times to secure the judgments that entered in the plaintiffs' favor. The defendant counters that the plaintiff " may" recover damages pursuant to Article 16 of the Declaration, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to recovery of counsel fees due to plaintiff Tracy's inability to work with the defendant's Board of Directors. Specifically, the defendant contends that plaintiff Tracy would not have incurred legal fees had she cooperated with the Board of Directors.
" Generally, attorneys fees may not be recovered, either as costs or damages, absent contractual or statutory authorization . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 646, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005). " [A] specific contractual term may provide for the recovery of attorneys fees and costs . . ." Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58, 73, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997). " An award of attorneys fees is not a matter of right. Whether any award is to be made and the amount thereof lie within the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the particular circumstances of the case . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Owen, 88 Conn.App. 806, 816, 873 A.2d 1003, cert denied, 275 Conn. 902, 882 A.2d 670 (2005).
" Our Supreme Court has long held that there is an undisputed requirement that the reasonableness of attorneys fees and costs must be proven by an appropriate evidentiary showing . . . We also have noted that courts have a general knowledge of what would be reasonable compensation for services which are fairly stated and described . . . and that [c]ourts may rely on their general knowledge of what has occurred at the proceedings before them to supply evidence in support of an award of attorneys fees . . . The court is permitted to assess the reasonableness of the fees requested using any number of factors, including its general knowledge of the case, sworn affidavits or other testimony, itemized bills and the like . . . [T]he value of [reasonable attorneys fees] is based on many considerations." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bobinski v. Kalinowski, 107 Conn.App. 622, 629, 946 A.2d 283, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 919, 958 A.2d 150 (2008).
Turning to the language of the Declaration, Article 16 provides, in part, that a unit owner may recover damages in an action against the Association " if any such action results in a final judgment or decree in favor of the party instituting such action, such judgment or decree may incorporate a provision for reasonable attorneys fees, . . . to be paid by the party against whom such judgment or decree is entered." After the trial, which included both the testimony of witnesses and admission of documentary evidence, this court found in favor of the plaintiffs on counts one and three. Pursuant to the unambiguous language of the Declaration, the prevailing plaintiffs may in fact be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees, provided that the fees are proven by an appropriate evidentiary showing. See Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, supra, 240 Conn. 77 (" [w]here a contract expressly provides for the recovery of attorneys fees, an award under such a clause requires an evidentiary showing of reasonableness").
In support of the plaintiffs' claim for attorneys fees, counsel for the plaintiffs submitted the billing statements, which included the attorneys fees and corresponding time records. The court received credible evidence that the plaintiffs' attorney commenced work in the plaintiffs' case on April 14, 2009, and continued work on related issues through April 25, 2016. The plaintiffs incurred a total of $64, 931 in reasonable attorneys fees related to the plaintiffs' cause of action against the defendant. The billing statements submitted by the plaintiffs' counsel reflect that of the $64, 931 total sum, a balance of $7, 975 remains unpaid by the plaintiffs. Applying the aforementioned measure, based on the documentary evidence provided by plaintiffs' counsel relating to the fees and the evidence adduced at trial, the court finds that the attorneys fees were fair and reasonable as charged. See Bobinski v. Kalinowski, supra, 107 Conn.App. 629. The plaintiffs did in fact prevail on counts one and three, but plaintiff Tracy is not without fault in that this court found that she delayed in providing proper documentation to the defendant. See Litchfield Newton, Ltd. v. Sunmore Condominium Assn., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-09-5032879-S (January 14, 2016, Nazzaro, J.) [61 Conn.L.Rptr. 646, ]. It would be inequitable for this court to award plaintiffs the entire sum of the attorneys fees where the court has made specific findings that plaintiffs had a role in delaying the repairs. See id. After considering all relevant aspects of the plaintiffs' claim, the defendant's objection, as well as the court's knowledge of this case from its inception, the court finds that the plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in the total amount of $7, 975.
Accordingly, judgment shall enter for the plaintiffs and against the defendant in the amount of $7, 975.
It is so ordered.