Opinion
No. 00 Civ 3457 (LTS)(DFE)
September 25, 2002
ORDER
An Opinion granting Defendants' motions to dismiss in this matter was entered on March 28, 2002. Judgment was entered against Plaintiff on April 4, 2002. On April 10, 2002, Plaintiff filed a timely motion pursuant to Rules 52(a) and (b), Rule 59(a) and (e), Rule 60(b)(2), (3), (4) and (6), and Rule 62(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to stay, set aside, vacate, alter or amend the Opinion and Judgment entered. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on April 26, 2002. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed motions to disqualify Defendants' counsel, preclude evidence and submissions by Defendants, compel disclosure and find Defendants in contempt for allegedly submitting affidavits in bad faith. The background of this case is set out in detail in the March 28, 2002 Opinion.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(i), an appeal is held in abeyance until Rule 52(b) and Rule 59(e) motions are decided. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group, Inc., 204 F.3d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 2000); Jones v. J.R. O'Keefe, No. 99 Civ. 12279 (RCC), 2000 WL 1804153, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2000). Once a decision is rendered, the previously filed Notice of Appeal returns jurisdiction to the circuit court. See Jones v. J.R. O'Keefe, 2000 WL 1804153, at *2. Rule 52 allows the Court to amend its findings or make additional findings and amend the judgment accordingly. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b). Rule 52 may be used to correct "manifest errors of law or fact[,]" or "to present newly discovered evidence." United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 831 F. Supp. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 1995).
Rule 59 provides that, "[o]n a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). Like Rule 52, Rule 59(e), which allows the district court to alter or amend the judgment, is not intended to allow a party "to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Supreme Oil Co. v. MTA, No. 96 Civ. 5169 (DLC), 1997 WL 715735 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1997), (quoting 11 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice Procedure § 2810.1, at 127-28 (1995)), aff'd, 157 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999). Motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) are governed by the same standards governing motions for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3. See Worldcom, Inc. v. Voice Plus Int'l, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 8265 (DLC), 2000 WL 274182, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 2000). Local Civil Rule 6.3 provides that movant shall "set forth concisely the matters of controlling decisions which [the movant] believes the court has overlooked." S.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 6.3. "The `narrow aim' of Rule 59(e) is `to make clear that district court possesses the power' to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment." Greene v. Town of Blooming Grove, 935 F.2d 507, 512 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The decision whether to grant the motion or not lies within the sound discretion of the district court. See Dellefave v. Access Temporaries, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098 (RWS), 2001 WL 286771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 22, 2001).
As for Plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(2) (newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time), Rule 60(b)(3), (4) and (6) (fraud and/or misconduct of adverse parties, a judgment that is void, and other reasons justifying relief from judgment), while the Federal Rules do permit the district court to "relieve a party or party's legal representative from a final judgment," See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "docketing of a notice of appeal `ousts the district court of jurisdiction except insofar as it is reserved to it explicitly by statute or rule." Toliver v. County of Sullivan, 957 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Ryan v. United States Line Co., 303 F.2d 430, 434 (2d Cir. 1962)). The district, thus, may grant a rule 60(b) motion after an appeal is taken only if the moving party obtains permission from the circuit court. A district court, however, may entertain and deny a Rule 60(b) motion after an appeal has been taken. Hyle v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 198 F.3d 368, 372 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1999); Ryan, 303 F.2d at 434. Thus, this Court at this juncture is limited to either denying Plaintiff's request for Rule 60(b) relief, or advising the Court of Appeals and the parties of its willingness to grant such relief. Rule 60 (b) motions are addressed to the broad discretion of the court and are granted "only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Newmaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that this Court committed a manifest error of law in entering its opinion, order and judgment. Further, Plaintiff has failed to identify newly discovered evidence that would affect the outcome of this litigation. The Court has carefully considered Plaintiffs application and has found nothing in the record or in Plaintiffs post-judgment submissions to justify the relief Plaintiff requests. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiffs motion pursuant to Rules 52, 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is denied in its entirety.
Rule 62(b) provides that, in the event a Rule 59 or Rule 60 motion is made, the Court may, in its discretion, stay the execution of the judgment pending the depositions of such a motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 62 (b). As Plaintiffs motion pursuant to Rule 59 and Rule 60 has been disposed of, Plaintiffs 62(b) motion is denied as moot.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to introduce additional evidence and submissions in support of her motion, the record in this case is closed.See generally Supreme Oil Co. v. MTA, 1997 WL 715735, at *1. Thus, Plaintiffs motions to disqualify Defendants' counsel, preclude evidence and submissions by Defendants, compel disclosure and find Defendants in contempt for submitting affidavits in bad faith are also denied as moot.
Finally, this Court's Opinion states plainly that Plaintiff and her former attorney, Arthur M. Wisehart,
are permanently enjoined from litigating further any claims relating to alleged harassment during, or the termination of, Plaintiffs employment with the National Red Cross, as well as any claims concerning any alleged attempts unlawfully to prevent Plaintiff for litigating such employment related claims and any claims arising from judicial or disciplinary proceedings relating to Plaintiffs and Wisehart's misappropriation of privileged documents during Lipin I, except to seek appellate review of this decision or submit papas responding to applications, if any, by Defendants.
Opinion dated March 28, 2002 at 27. To the extent Plaintiff raises the issues above and her motion constitutes "litigating further" the claims described in the Opinion, Plaintiffs motion is also denied as violative of the Court's March 28, 2002 Order.
SO ORDERED.