Here, the parties contend that the terms of the employment agreement are clear and unambiguous, but both plaintiff and defendants seek different interpretations of those terms. "The proper inquiry in determining whether a contract is ambiguous is `whether the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation'" ( Arrow Communication Labs. v. Pico Prods., 206 A.D.2d 922, 922-923, quoting Chimart Assoc., 66 N.Y.2d at 573; see Lipari v. Maines Paper Food Serv., 245 A.D.2d 1085). To be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of establishing that its construction of the agreement "is the only construction which can fairly be placed thereon" ( Lipari, 245 A.D.2d at 1085 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
See Chimart Assoc. v. Paul, 66 NY2d 571, 573 (1986). See also Jellinick, 296 AD2d at 78; St. Mary v. Paul Smith's College of Arts and Sciences, 247 AD2d 859 (4th Dept. 1998); Lipari v. Maines Paper Food Service, Inc., 245 AD2d 1085 (4th Dept. 1997); Levey v. A. Leventhal Sons, Inc., 231 AD2d 877 (4th Dept. 1996); Arrow Communication Laboratories, Inc. v. Pico Products, Inc., 206 AD2d 922 (4th Dept 1994). "A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that the construction it favors 'is the only construction which can fairly be placed thereon.'"
(quoting ChimartAssocs. v Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 573, 489 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1986)). Jellinick v. Joseph J. Naples & Assocs., Inc., 296 A.D.2d 75, 79, 744 N.Y.S.2d 610, 613 (2002) (quoting Lipari v Maines Paper & Food Serv., Inc., 245 A.D.2d 1085, 1085, 667 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (1997)). Mohawk Valley WaterAuth. v. State, 159 A.D.3d 1548, 1550, 74 N.Y.S.3d 430, 432 (2018) (quoting Airco Alloys Div., Airco Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 76 A.D.2d 68, 77, 430 N.Y.S.2d 179, 184 (1980)).
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 439 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (A contract "is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading.") (internal quotations omitted);Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. The Segal Co., 142 Fed. Appx. 511, 513 (2d Cir. 2005); Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) ("An ambiguous term is one that is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading, or one as to which reasonable minds could differ."); Alexander Alexander Servs., Inc. v. These Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 136 F.3d at 86;Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 7 F.3d at 1095; Goodheart Clothing Co. v. Laura Goodman Enter., Inc., 962 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1992); Seiden Assoc., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d at 428; Norfolk S. Ry. v. Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc., 2000 WL 1855112 at *5; Checkrite Ltd. v. Ill. Nat. Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 189; Berman v. Parco, 986 F. Supp. at 209 n. 9 (citing cases); Lipari v. Maines Paper Food Serv., Inc., 245 A.D.2d 1085, 1085, 667 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (4th Dep't 1997); Levey v. A. Leventhal Sons, Inc., 231 A.D.2d 877, 877, 647 N.Y.S.2d 597, 597 (4th Dep't 1996); Arrow Commc'n Labs., Inc. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 206 A.D.2d 922, 922-923, 615 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (4th Dep't 1994); Am. Express Bank Ltd. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 164 A.D.2d 275, 277, 562 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (1st Dep't 1990) ("A contract should be construed so as to give full meaning and effect to all of its provisions."), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 807, 569 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1991).
Accord, e.g., RJE v. Northville Indus. Corp., 329 F.3d at 314: Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d at 1192; Savers v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 7 F.3d at 1095; Seiden Assoc., Inc. v. ANC Holdings. Inc., 959 F.2d at 428; Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Flexi-Van Leasing. Inc., 2000 WL 1855112 at *5; ABC Radio Network, Inc. v. Lens America. Inc., 1999 WL 771360 at *3; Air Support Int'l. Inc. v. Atlas Air, Inc., 54 F. Supp.2d at 165.see, e.g., Lipari v. Maines Paper Food Serv., Inc., 245 A.D.2d 1085, 1085, 667 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (4th Dep't 1997); Levey v. A. Leventhal Sons, Inc., 231 A.D.2d 877, 877, 647 N.Y.S.2d 597, 597 (4th Dep't 1996); Arrow Communication Labs., Inc. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 206 A.D.2d 922, 922-923, 615 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (4th Dep't 1994): American Express Bank Ltd, v. Uniroyal, Inc., 164 A.D.2d 275, 277, 562 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (1st Dep't 1990) ("A contract should be construed so as to give full meaning and effect to all of its provisions."), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 807, 569 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1991); see also,e.g., Alexander Alexander Servs., Inc. v. These Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's.
Accord, e.g., RJE v. Northville Indus. Corp., 329 F.3d at 314; Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d at 1192; Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 7 F.3d at 1095; Seiden Assoc., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d at 428; Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc., 2000 WL 1855112 at *5; ABC Radio Network, Inc. v. Lens America, Inc., 1999 WL 771360 at *3; Air Support Int'l, Inc. v. Atlas Air, Inc., 54 F. Supp.2d at 165.See, e.g. Lipari v. Maines Paper Food Serv., Inc., 245 A.D.2d 1085, 1085, 667 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (4th Dep't 1997);Levey v. A. Leventhal Sons, Inc., 231 A.D.2d 877, 877, 647 N.Y.S.2d 597, 597 (4th Dep't 1996); Arrow Communication Labs., Inc. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 206 A.D.2d 922, 922-923, 615 N.Y.S.2d 187,188 (4th Dep't 1994); American Express Bank Ltd. v. Uniroyal. Inc., 164 A.D.2d 275, 277, 562 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (1st Dep't 1990) ("A contract should be construed so as to give full meaning and effect to all of its provisions."), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 807, 569 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1991); see also, e.g., Alexander Alexander Servs., Inc. v. These Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 136 F.3d at 86; Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 7 F.3d at 1095; Goodheart Clothing Co. v. Laura Goodman Enter., Inc., 962 F.2d at 272; Seiden Assoc., Inc. v.ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d at 428; Norfolk Southern Rv. Flexi-Van Leasing. Inc., 2000 WL 1855112 at *5; Berman v.Parco, 986 F. Supp. at 209 n. 9 (citing cases). Clear contractual language does not become ambiguous simply because the parties to the litigation argue differ
Conversely, a contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one meaning. E.g., Chimart Assoc. v. Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 763, 498 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (1986) (to determine if ambiguity exists in contract court must determine "whether the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation"); St. Mary v. Paul Smith's Coll. of Arts Sciences, 247 A.D.2d 859, 859, 668 N.Y.S.2d 813, 813 (4th Dep't 1998) (same, quoting Chimart); Lipari v. Maines Paper Food Serv., Inc., 245 A.D.2d 1085, 1085, 667 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (4th Dep't 1997); Levey v. A. Leventhal Sons, Inc., 231 A.D.2d 877, 877, 647 N.Y.S.2d 597, 597 (4th Dep't 1996); Arrow Communication Labs., Inc. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 206 A.D.2d 922, 922-923, 615 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (4th Dep't 1994); American Express Bank Ltd. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 164 A.D.2d 275, 277, 562 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (1st Dep't 1990) ("A contract should be construed so as to give full meaning and effect to all of its provisions."), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 807, 569 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1991); Hutzel v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 45, 49, 522 N.Y.S.2d 301, 303 (3d Dep't 1987) ("an ambiguity exists . . . when a term `is capable of more than one meaning'"), appeal denied, 71 N.Y.2d 804, 528 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1988); see, e.g., Alexander Alexander Servs., Inc. v. These Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 136 F.3d at 86; Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 7 F.3d at 1095; Goodheart Clothing Co. v. Laura Goodman Enter., Inc., 962 F.2d at 272; Seiden Assoc., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d at
We further conclude, however, that the court erred in granting defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting the declaration sought in the first counterclaim. By having each sought “summary judgment, both parties bore the burden of establishing that their construction of the [Declaration] ‘is the only construction which can fairly be placed thereon’ ” ( Levey v. Leventhal & Sons, 231 A.D.2d 877, 877, 647 N.Y.S.2d 597;see Lipari v. Maines Paper & Food Serv., 245 A.D.2d 1085, 1085, 667 N.Y.S.2d 548). Neither party met that burden.
We reject that contention. We agree with the court that the language of the Separation Agreement is unambiguous in its reservation of plaintiff's entitlement to top hat pension benefits as part of the deferred compensation program ( see generally Lipari v Maines Paper Food Serv., 245 AD2d 1085). We thus conclude that the Deferred Compensation Plan Committee (Committee) erred in rejecting plaintiff's claim for top hat benefits based on its interpretation of the Separation Agreement, whether we review the determination of the Committee either de novo or under an arbitrary and capricious standard ( see generally Miller v United Welfare Fund, 72 F3d 1066, 1070-1071).
In interpreting such an agreement, the court must examine the terms of the agreement as a whole in order to determine the intent of the parties ( see Benderson v. Wiper Check, 266 AD2d 903, 904, affd 96 NY2d 855; W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162-163), "giving a practical interpretation to the language employed so that the parties' reasonable expectations are realized" ( Sunrise Mall Assoc. v. Import Alley of Sunrise Mall, 211 AD2d 711, 711). We conclude that defendants established that their "construction of the agreement is the only construction which can fairly be placed thereon" ( Lipari v. Maines Paper Food Serv., 245 AD2d 1085, 1085 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, defendants met their burden of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and we conclude that plaintiff failed to raise a material issue of fact in opposition thereto ( see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Defendants established that plaintiff was the subject of final disciplinary action by the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct resulting in a consent order that contained conditions impairing plaintiff's ability to practice medicine.