, J.[¶ 1] Sears, Roebuck & Company (Sears) appeals from the entry of a final judgment in the Business and Consumer Docket ( Nivison, J.) concluding that, as a matter of law, our holding in Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33, 898 A.2d 408, applies retroactively. Sears argues that Maine recognizes the practice of retroactively applying certain legal holdings of a decision in a case to the parties in that case but only prospectively in all other instances. Sears urges us to adopt the three-part test enumerated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106–07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), when deciding whether to apply the holding of a decision retroactively to other cases. Sears further argues that Linnehan Leasing should not apply retroactively because the three Chevron factors weigh in favor of applying the holding with selective prospectivity.

The purpose of the statute is "to give a credit on a sales tax paid on a charge sale, the payment for which was not subsequently made." Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33, ¶ 19, 898 A.2d 408 (quotation marks omitted). To prove it is entitled to take the bad debt sales tax credit, BCCI must show it is 1) a retailer 2) that paid the sales tax on the initial sale, 3) charged off the debt on its books as worthless, and 4) applied for the credit within three years of the charge-off.

The purpose of the statute is "to give a credit on a sales tax paid on a charge sale, the payment for which was not subsequently made." Linnehan Leasing v. State TaxAssessor, 2006 ME 33, ¶ 19, 898 A.2d 408 (quotation marks omitted). To prove it is entitled to take the bad debt sales tax credit, BCCI must show it is 1) a retailer 2) that paid the sales tax on the initial sale, 3) charged off the debt on its books as worthless, and 4) applied for the credit within three years of the charge-off.

(1) the position asserted in the subsequent legal action [is] clearly inconsistent with a previous position asserted; (2) the party in the previous action [has] successfully convinced the court to accept the inconsistent position; and (3) the party [has] gain[ed] an unfair advantage as a result of [his or her] change of position in the subsequent action.Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33, ¶ 25, 898 A.2d 408. The doctrine rests on the principle that, after a party successfully asserts one position during a legal proceeding, that party is barred from asserting a contrary position at a later stage of the proceeding.

(1) the position asserted in the subsequent legal action [is] clearly inconsistent with a previous position asserted; (2) the party in the previous action [has] successfully convinced the court to accept the inconsistent position; and (3) the party [has] gain[ed] an unfair advantage as a result of [his or her] change of position in the subsequent action.Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor , 2006 ME 33, ¶ 25, 898 A.2d 408. The doctrine rests on the principle that, after a party successfully asserts one position during a legal proceeding, that party is barred from asserting a contrary position at a later stage of the proceeding.

Under Maine law, judicial estoppel applies if "(1) the position asserted in the subsequent legal action [is] clearly inconsistent with a previous position asserted; (2) the party in the previous action [has] successfully convinced the court to accept the inconsistent position; and (3) the party [has] gain[ed] an unfair advantage as a result of [his or her] change of position in the subsequent action." In re Child of Nicholas P., 2019 ME 152, ¶ 16, 218 A.3d 247 (alterations in original) (quoting Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33, ¶ 25, 898 A.2d 408). As noted above, there is no clear inconsistency between Luz's representations in her bankruptcy case and her position here that US Bank's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

" Middlesex policy, part 2b Attach. 3 at 7. "Loaned" must have an independent meaning from "rented" or it would be mere "suplusage." Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33, ¶ 21, 898 A.2d 408, 413 (applying "our rule of construction that we will not treat any provision of a statute as surplusage when a reasonable construction of a statute can provide meaning to each provision") (citation omitted). Under Maine law, "[a] rental of personal property is a contract whereby one gives temporary possession and control of the subject property to another for a consideration."

"Because the Superior Court is not acting in an appellate capacity, we review its determinations directly." Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor , 2006 ME 33, ¶ 16, 898 A.2d 408. [¶ 11] The Goggins contend that the court erred in rejecting their argument that the business taxes imposed on the LLC are functionally income taxes on the individual holders because of the "flow-through" nature of income realized by an LLC.

Although the Superior Court designated this case as an appeal brought pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, the Superior Court considers de novo those petitions seeking review of a decision of the Assessor pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 151(2)(F)(2), as well as those seeking review of a decision of the Maine Board of Tax Appeals pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 151–D(10)(I). We therefore review directly the decision of the Superior Court. SeeLinnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33, ¶ 16, 898 A.2d 408 ; Apex Custom Lease Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 677 A.2d 530, 532 (Me. 1996).II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 11] The Knopes challenge the court's application of unjust enrichment to award Green Tree the right to retain the disputed sum. We review both a default judgment and a declaratory judgment for abuse of discretion. SeeRichter v. Ercolini , 2010 ME 38, ¶ 18, 994 A.2d 404 ; Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor , 2006 ME 33, ¶ 30, 898 A.2d 408. [¶ 12] To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, the complaining party must show that "(1) it conferred a benefit on the other party; (2) the other party had appreciation or knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention of the benefit was under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without payment of its value."