Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). The fact that the person arrested is later found innocent is not material. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1976). The facts in this case are greatly disputed. If the version of the facts presented by defendants is true, then defendants had probable cause to arrest Arnott.
Under these circumstances, we hold that Baetz's subjective reason for making the arrest is irrelevant to a fourth amendment challenge to the arrest. We find support for our decision in two cases, Jureczki v. City of Seabrook, 760 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1985) ( Jureczki), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045, 106 S.Ct. 1261, 89 L.Ed.2d 571 (1986), and Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1976). In Jureczki, the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant after a criminal complaint had been filed against him for violating a city building code.
. Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1976).
Thus, the question boils down to whether Defendants had probable cause to arrest Rivas, as the term "probable cause" is conventionally understood by the federal courts in civil rights context. If probable cause existed, Rivas's arrest and detention were justified; if such cause did not exist, the arrest and subsequent detention were unlawful and violated Rivas's constitutional rights. See Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1976). It is not entirely clear if Rivas's allegations concerning her detention are part of an ongoing constitutional violation based on the arrest or a separate violation.
When the issue of probable cause arises in a damage suit and "the facts are not disputed or are susceptible to only one reasonable inference, the question is one of law for the court." Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted); see also Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 438-39 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028, 107 S.Ct. 1952, 95 L.Ed.2d 525 (1987); Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264, 1270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 864, 103 S.Ct. 143, 74 L.Ed.2d 121 (1982). Under such circumstances, the general rule against considering new arguments on appeal has less appeal.
We note that one court has found a novel way to cure the error in a situation such as this. In Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1976), the trial court "merged" a § 1983 claim with a pendent state law assault and battery claim "[i]n view of the close relationship between the first and second causes of action and to avoid the possibility of a double recovery." Id. at 857.
Probable cause for arrest, then, includes two aspects: first, that a crime has been committed, and, second, that the accused more probably than not participated in it. In Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1976), a civil rights action involving a claim of false arrest, the Eighth Circuit held that each case involving the question of probable cause for arrest must be decided on its own facts. The court further noted: "Where the facts are in dispute or where they are subject to different inferences the question of probable cause is for the jury; however, where the facts are not disputed or are susceptible to only one reasonable inference, the question is one of law for the court."
We must now view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's findings and must give the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be drawn from the evidence. Nodak Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 533 F.2d 401, 407 (8th Cir. 1976); Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir. 1976); Figge Auto Co. v. Taylor, 325 F.2d 899, 901 (8th Cir. 1964). Judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be granted if the evidence, so viewed, was such that reasonable men could not differ as to the conclusion that the plaintiff's proof had failed to meet its burden as to an essential element of the cause of action.
See Br. in Supp. of Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 37) at 19-20; Oct. 25, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at 57:458:6; id. at 60:6-11 (Mr. Humphrey's counsel arguing that “[j]ust the word reasonable” means it “is a question for the jury”). 531 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1976).
However, while an officer who "conclusively know[s] that an investigative target's behavior is protected by a legally cognizable affirmative defense . . . lacks a legal foundation to arrest that person for that behavior," officers are not "required to conduct a trial-like inquiry as a precondition to executing a valid arrest." Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 n. 21 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1976)) (emphasis added). In the absence of conclusive knowledge that a valid affirmative defense excuses a suspect's conduct, "the merits of an alleged affirmative defense should be assessed by prosecutors and judges, not policemen."