Opinion
24-1001-DDC-GEB
05-03-2024
JAMES LINLOR Plaintiff, v. JOHN HOLMAN, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GWYNNE E. BIRZER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants John Holman, Marcella Warner Holman, Black Diamond Angus Ranch Partnership, Black Diamond Angus Ranch LLC, Warner Angus Ranch Morgans, Aaron Kite, and Ansel Kay Barngrover's Motion to Consolidate (ECF No. 7) and Plaintiff James Linlor's Motion Under FRCP 42(b) to Bifurcate and Stay Case Elements Related to Defendants Kite and Barngrover (ECF No. 19). These Motions are fully briefed and the Court is ready to rule.
See ECF Nos. 18, 28, and 34.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds both Motions premature, and thus DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REFILING both Motions.
I. Defendants' Motion to Consolidate
On January 23, 2024, Defendants, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a), filed a Motion to Consolidate the present case with Holman, et al. v. Future Growth, LLC et al., Case No. 24-CV-1012-EFM-TJJ, which was removed from Kansas State Court to Federal Court on January 17, 2024. However, on February 29, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted (“Dispositive Motion”). The Dispositive Motion asks the Court to dispose of this case in its entirety by either granting judgment for Defendants or dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims.
ECF No. 7.
ECF No. 35.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a), if actions before the court “involve a common question of law or fact,” the court may consolidate the actions. The decision whether to consolidate is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. “In exercising its discretion, the court should consider whether judicial efficiency is best served by consolidation.” “The court generally weighs the saving of time and effort that consolidation would produce against any inconvenience, delay, or expense that consolidation would cause.”
Sprint Commc'ns, L.P. v. Cox Comm'ns, Inc., No. 11-2683-JAR-KMH, 2012 WL 1825222, at *1 (D. Kan. May 18, 2012) (citing Shump v. Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir.1978)).
Id. (quoting McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 02-2064-KHV, 2003 WL 124531, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2003)).
Id. (quoting C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1346 (D.Kan.2008) (citing 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2383, at 35-36 (3d ed.2008))).
Courts also consider (1) whether the relief sought varies substantially between the two actions; (2) whether defendants are being sued in different capacities; and (3) what would be gained by consolidation and what injury would be suffered by failure to consolidate. The party requesting consolidation bears the burden of showing that the balance weighs in favor of consolidation.
Id. (citing Shump, 574 F.3d at 1344; Lane v. United States, Nos. 90-4228-S, 90-4229-S, 1991 WL 105204, at *1 (D. Kan. May 28, 1991)).
Id. (citing Blagg v. Line, Nos. 09-CV-0703-CVE-FHM, 09-CV-0708-TCK-PJC, 10-CV- 0502-GKF-PJC, 2010 WL 3893981, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2010) (citing Bank of Montreal v. Eagle Assocs., 117 F.R.D. 530, 532 (S.D.N.Y.1987))).
Here, due to Defendants' pending Dispositive Motion, the Court finds that judicial economy would not be served by consolidation at this time. Instead, judicial efficiency is best served by deciding the Dispositive Motion prior to any consolidation. A favorable ruling on the Dispositive Motion could resolve this case in its entirety, making consolidation unnecessary. If, however, the Court denies the Dispositive Motion, Defendants may renew their request for consolidation.
See id. at *1-2 (denying without prejudice to refiling a motion to consolidate due to pending motions to dismiss and transfer).
Alternatively, the ruling could narrow the claims, making any renewed consolidation motion, if Defendants find one necessary, more focused. While both cases deal with real estate in Ford County, Kansas, the present action is much more encompassing in terms of claims presented, relief sought, and defendants included. For example, in this Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a myriad of claims against Aaron Kite and Ansel Kay Barngrover, the attorney and his legal assistant, representing the Holmans in the removal case. While the Holmans are parties in both cases, Kite and Barngrover are not. If the Court, in ruling on the Dispositive Motion, should dismiss the claims against Kite and Barngrover as premature, but allow certain other claims to proceed, a decision on consolidation would be more appropriate at that time.
See generally ECF No. 1.
II. Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay
In his Motion to Bifurcate and Stay, Plaintiff requests that his claims against Kite and Barngrover be separated under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b) into another case and stayed pending resolution of the removal action. Under Rule 42(b), a “court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Because this case is not yet near trial, the Court finds Plaintiff's Motion premature. The Court additionally finds a decision on Plaintiff's Motion premature due to Defendants' pending Dispositive Motion. The Court will be in a better position to decide any bifurcation and stay issues after a ruling deciding if all, some, or none of Plaintiff's claims will proceed.
ECF No. 19 at pp. 1-2.
Emphasis added.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Consolidate (ECF No. 7) and Plaintiff's Motion Under FRCP 42(b) to Bifurcate and Stay Case Elements Related to Defendants Kite and Barngrover (ECF No. 19) are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REFILING.
IT IS SO ORDERED.