Twenty-one years ago, this Court adopted a three-pronged analysis for claims of retroactivity of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In Linkletter, the Court held that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the States, would not be applied retroactively to a state conviction that had become final before Mapp was decided.
Pp. 726-735. (a) Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, and Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, established the principle that in criminal litigation concerning constitutional claims the Court may make a rule of criminal procedure prospective, basing its determination upon the purpose of the new standards, the reliance placed on the prior decisions on the subject, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the rule. Pp. 726-727.
. Employing the retroactivity standard of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965), the Court concluded that the rule announced in Batson should not be applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that became final before Batson was announced. The Court defined final to mean a case "'where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our decision in' Batson . . . ." 478 U.S., at 258, n. 1 (citation omitted).
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2240 n. 11, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) (footnote omitted). See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637-38, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1741-42, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). The law's concern for finality of decisions is in no way diminished by the availability and utilization of a collateral remedy such as Rule 3.850.
1. The constitutional rule established in today's decisions in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, ante, pp. 218, 263, has application only to cases involving confrontations for identification purposes conducted in the absence of counsel after this date. Cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719. Pp. 296-301. 2. Though the practice of showing suspects singly for purposes of identification has been widely condemned, a violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the surrounding circumstances.
397 U.S., at 395. Prior to this Court's 1965 decision in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, there would have been less doubt concerning the retroactivity of the Waller holding. For, until that time, both the common law and our own decisions recognized a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886), subject to limited exceptions of a nature such as those stated in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). In Linkletter, the Court, declaring that it was charting new ground ( 381 U.S., at 628 and n. 13), held that with respect to new constitutional interpretations involving criminal rights "the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect."
(b) The retroactivity question presented here is fairly resolved by applying the Payton rule to all cases still pending on direct appeal at the time Payton was decided. To do so (1) provides a principle of decision-making consonant with this Court's original understanding in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, and Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, that all newly declared constitutional rules of criminal procedure would apply retrospectively at least to convictions not yet final when the rule was established; (2) comports with this Court's judicial responsibility "to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and to "resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles," Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.); and (3) furthers the goal of treating similarly situated defendants similarly. Pp. 554-556.
Appellant urges reversal on the basis of Chimel. Initially, it should be realized that the case of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) stands for the proposition that there is no constitutional requirement of retroactive application of decisions; the Court is free to announce a decision as retroactive or prospective. The Supreme Court of the United States, since this first landmark decision, has in the majority of cases refused to give any retroactive effect to its decisions.
Held: The doctrine of Griffin v. California will not be applied retrospectively. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, followed. Pp. 409-419.
367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The footnote in Commonwealth v. Linde was as follows: "It should be noted that although the search occurred in 1958 and therefore pre-dated the decision of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961), which applied the federal exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to the state courts, the case of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731 (1965), held the Mapp ruling applicable to any judgment not finalized, a condition that can be said to exist only when availability of direct appeal has been exhausted, prior to June 19, 1961. See Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 421 Pa. 169, 218 A.2d 249 (1966).