Opinion
April 17, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Coppola, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
It is settled that a bill of particulars is intended to amplify the pleadings, limit the proof, and prevent surprise at trial (see, Ferrigno v General Motors Corp., 134 A.D.2d 479, 480; Scott v General Motors Corp., 117 A.D.2d 662; Gausney v General Motors Corp., 115 A.D.2d 455). "`Whatever the pleading pleads, the bill must particularize' since the bill is intended to `[afford] the adverse party a more detailed picture of the claim * * * being particularized'" (Laukaitis v Ski Stop, 202 A.D.2d 554, 555, quoting Siegel, N Y Prac § 238, at 356-357 [2d ed]). A bill of particulars may not be used to allege a new theory not originally asserted in the complaint (see, Bryant v City of New York, 188 A.D.2d 446; Willinger v Town of Greenburgh, 169 A.D.2d 715; Mavroudis v State Wide Ins. Co., 102 A.D.2d 864). Under the facts of the case at bar, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from asserting in her amended bill of particulars references to the defendants' alleged intentional, willful, or wanton conduct since these claims were not previously pleaded (see, Thompson v Connor, 178 A.D.2d 752). Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, insofar as the plaintiff's original bill of particulars alleged negligence regarding the defendants' conduct in promoting and permitting players to throw souvenir hockey pucks into the stands at practices, the plaintiff will not be precluded from adducing evidence relevant thereto. Rosenblatt, J.P., Miller, Thompson and Santucci, JJ., concur.