Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG4148388
NEEDHAM, J.
Gustave William Link (Link) appeals from a summary judgment entered against him on his complaint for various claims related to the termination of his employment and fraud. He contends the court erred in concluding that his employment-related claims were barred by collateral estoppel and that he could not prevail on his fraud claim as a matter of law. We will affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Link was employed by respondent Vortex Marine Construction, Inc. (sued as Vortex Diving, Inc.) (Vortex). Vortex ended the employment relationship in January 2002. After initiating a grievance procedure that resulted in an arbitration decision adverse to him, Link filed a lawsuit in March 2004 against Vortex and other respondents.
A. Link’s Complaint
In his complaint, Link alleged that Vortex, its owner Blaise Fettig (sued as “Blaze Fetting”), and yard supervisor Eric Spears wrongfully terminated his employment with Vortex in violation of an applicable labor agreement, and that they defrauded him in regard to his sale of a used car to a coworker. In an amendment to the complaint, Link added Vortex’s in-house counsel, respondent Paul Ryan, as a defendant.
Link asserted seven causes of action. Six of them (causes of action 1-5 & 7) were based on his alleged wrongful termination: breach of implied employment contract; termination without sufficient cause; failure to provide notice to terminate under Labor Code section 2922; retaliatory termination; fraudulent misrepresentation in termination; and failure to provide a hearing before the termination. The remaining cause of action (cause of action 6) alleged fraud in the purported car sale transaction.
B. Summary Judgment
In December 2005, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. The hearing was scheduled for March 14, 2006.
1. Respondents’ Moving Papers
Respondents contended that the arbitration decision barred Link’s employment claims under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, that the employment-related claims were time-barred, and that Link had no cognizable fraud claim because he was not damaged by the purported fraud. Respondents submitted a separate statement of undisputed facts and supporting evidence, which asserted the following.
Link was a union member of the Piledrivers, Divers, Bridge, Wharf and Dock Builders’ Local Union No. 34 (Local 34), which is an affiliate member of the Northern California Carpenters Regional Counsel (Carpenters). Vortex was an employer-member of the Association of General Contractors of California, Inc. (AGC), which is an affiliate member of the Association of Engineering Construction Employers (AECE).
Employment disputes between members of Local 34 and Vortex were subject to a collective bargaining agreement. More specifically, the Carpenters, on their own behalf and on behalf of its affiliates such as Local 34, and AECE on its own behalf and on behalf of its affiliates such as the AGC, entered into a collective bargaining agreement covering the work period of 2000 through 2004 (Master Agreement). Vortex authorized AGC to execute the Master Agreement on its behalf.
Section IX of the Master Agreement provided for a grievance dispute resolution procedure for employment-related grievances such as discharge from employment. Under the heading, “ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES,” section IX provides: “Any dispute concerning any application or interpretation of this Agreement shall be subject to the following procedure.” According to this procedure, an employee discharged from employment must timely file a grievance with the Local 34 union. If the matter is not resolved by the union and the employer, it proceeds to a board of adjustment, comprised of a member named by the union, a member named by the association, and an impartial arbitrator. This panel conducts a hearing, at which the parties may provide testimony, cross-examine witnesses, and argue their case. If the panel is unable to reach a majority ruling, the arbitrator issues a final and binding decision. Section IX, paragraph 8, reads: “Decisions of the Board of Adjustment or an Impartial Arbitrator shall be within the scope and terms of this Agreement and shall be final and binding upon all parties hereto.” (Italics added.) The word “parties” is used elsewhere in section IX to include the grievant-employee.
In September 2001, Link was hired by Vortex out of Local 34 as a pile driver apprentice. In November 2001, Link sold a used car to his Vortex coworker, Mark Williams (Williams), for $600. As a down-payment, Williams gave Link $300. Williams took possession of the car, but Link kept the vehicle’s title document or registration in his name pending Williams’ payment of the $300 balance.
When Williams did not pay the $300 balance, Link “repossessed” the vehicle from Williams on January 28, 2002, while Williams was at work at Vortex. On January 29, 2002, Vortex purported to lay Link off from his employment. Within the next day or two, Williams paid Link the $300 he owed for the car, and Link considered his deal with Williams “concluded” and believed he had been fully paid for the vehicle.
Link next filed a grievance against Vortex for wrongful termination under the Master Agreement. An arbitration hearing was held on his grievance on March 14, 2002, pursuant to the Master Agreement’s mandatory procedures.
Evidence submitted by respondents indicates the issues and contentions raised at the arbitration hearing. According to an order later issued by the arbitrator, Gerald McKay, Vortex’s position was as follows: “[Vortex contends that Link] was employed as a piledriver apprentice and laid-off due to a reduction in force. The lay-off took place on January 29, 2002 and was the result of bad weather and a shrinking workload. While no other individuals were laid-off, the employer elected to retain individuals that they believed to possess stronger skill sets and better attendance records. On the last day of the grievant’s employment, he had reported to work and was subsequently told to leave and to return with an automobile he had sold to another employee. Upon his return, a significant level of controversy developed over the payment for the vehicle. The grievant left the site again only to return later. When the grievant arrived for the third time, he was paid for the vehicle and proceeded to leave again. The employer laid the grievant off by posting a letter to that effect. The position of the employer is that the grievant was laid off in a reduction in force and not discharged as alleged by the union. In addition the employer believes that the grievant is not entitled to any show-up pay, compensation, or waiting time penalties for January 29, 2002, because all of the time was consumed while dealing with the issues related to the sale of an automobile.”
Arbitrator McKay summarized the union’s position, asserted on Link’s behalf, as follows: “The Union alleges that the employer, Vortex Diving terminated the grievant without just cause and failed to compensate the grievant for the last hours of his employment. The Union argued that the grievant was a victim of a retaliatory act by the employer because of the sale of an automobile to a fellow employee had created friction between the individuals. The Union argued that the grievant had not been advised of the reason for his termination, therefore, he had been denied due process. Union counsel raised additional issues of denial of due process because the employer terminated the grievant without providing him with advance notice that his attendance was poor and that the employer had no record of prior disciplinary action taken against the grievant. The remedy sought by the Union is for the grievant to be returned to employment and to be made whole for all lost wages and fringe benefits.”
Arbitrator McKay further reported that the panel had deadlocked and the issue was submitted to him for final decision. In his order of May 15, 2002, McKay concluded: “The evidence establishes that the grievant was laid off in the normal course of business and that the grievant is entitled to four hours compensation, wages and benefits for January 29, 2002.” Vortex paid Link the amount he was awarded in the arbitration.
2. Link’s Opposition Papers
On March 10, 2006, Link filed an untimely opposition to respondents’ summary judgment motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(2) [opposition to summary judgment motion due 14 days before hearing].) His two-page memorandum of points and authorities argued: “The issues in the amended complaint are very clear. All the defendants conspired together to have plaintiff terminated from his employment because he refused to commit a crime that involved transferring title to vehicle on company time. Vortex retaliated against plaintiff because he refused to bring the vehicle to the company. The employer Vortex breached at will contract and wrongfully terminated plaintiff.” He cited Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 184 and Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, contending they supported his position that an employer cannot retaliate against an employee for refusing to do something illegal.
Link also submitted a document purporting to set forth “Disputed Material Facts and Supporting Evidence” in opposition to respondents’ motion. In this document, Link did not respond to each material fact that respondents had claimed was undisputed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) Instead, he listed seven “Facts,” the first three of which were consistent with undisputed facts asserted by respondents. The remaining “Facts” were not accompanied by any citation to admissible supporting evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)
“Fact No. 4” read: “On 1/29/02, Blaise Fettig, Eric Spears, & Paul Ryan became involved in Link’s repossession of Williams car by threatening to fire plaintiff if he didn’t bring the car back to the job. Plaintiff was told not to come back to Job if he didn’t have the car. Plaintiff was told by Spears and Fettig that they would go to the bank to get $300 to pay off Williams debt. Link’s Transaction with Williams had nothing to do with these company officials. Plaintiff brought the car back to the job with a witness after being promised to be given $300. Paul Ryan acted as an attorney and stole Link’s Pink slip. Link never did receive the $300, but was terminated from Vortex after they got the vehicle for Williams.” There was no citation to supporting evidence.
In “Fact No. 5,” Link asserted: “On 1/14/2002, a hearing was held on a grievance files [sic] by Link. The Arbitrator ignored the facts that involved Link being fired behind a vehicle and ignored the fact that these company officials broke the Law by conducting car sales business on company time and was trying to get Gustave to commit a crime on company time.” There was no evidence cited in support of these “facts.”
“Fact No. 6” stated: “On 5/15/2002, the arbitrator Gerald McKay ruled that Link was laid Off work and entitled to 4 hours of benefits. This order does not prevent plaintiff from filing a civil suit against Vortex for wrongful Termination. The statute of limitation starts 5/15/2002.” Link did not cite evidence in support of these purported facts or any authority in support of his legal argument and conclusions.
Lastly, “Fact No. 7” read: “There is clearly a dispute in material facts based on the attached Interrogatories that Fettig, Spears, and Ryan. All these defendants submitted untrue answers to the interrogatories. (Exhibit A, Blaise, Exhibit B, Spears, Exhibit C, Ryan, and Exhibit D, Vortex)” (Bold in original.) The interrogatory responses of Fettig, Spears, Ryan, and Vortex were attached to Link’s opposition papers. In handwriting on Fettig’s response are comments such as “Didn’t answer [the] question,” and “They are lieing [sic].” Included with the exhibit containing Spears’ response is a one-page handwritten document with observations such as “BULLSHIT ANSWER, EVADING” and “DID NOT ANSWER CORRECTLY,” and “EVADING.” No evidence was submitted to support the handwritten contentions.
3. Respondents’ Reply
Respondents’ reply papers contended that Link’s opposition was tardy and should not be considered, and that it failed to create a triable issue of material fact because it contained no admissible evidence.
4. Hearing and Judgment
After a hearing on March 14, 2006, the court granted summary judgment in respondents’ favor. As to the employment-related claims in causes of action 1 through 5 and 7, the court ruled that the claims had been resolved against Link through a final and binding arbitration proceeding. The court also noted that Vortex paid Link the amount he was awarded in the arbitration. Accordingly, the court ruled, all of the employment-related claims were barred by doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and accord and satisfaction. As to the sixth cause of action, the court determined there was no triable issue that the alleged fraudulent acts resulted in damage. According to the undisputed material facts, the court observed, Link still received the full amount that he was promised for the car and considered the deal to be concluded.
Judgment was entered against Link accordingly. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Link contends that the court erred in granting summary adjudication as to his employment-related claims, because collateral estoppel should not be applied. As to his fraud claim, he contends summary adjudication was inappropriate because he was damaged by respondents’ alleged actions. His arguments have no merit.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we conduct an independent review to determine whether there is a triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860; Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60; Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485.) We construe the moving party’s evidence strictly, and the non moving party’s evidence liberally, in determining whether there is a triable issue. (See D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20; Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 (Thomas).)
A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Thomas, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 72.) A triable issue may be demonstrated only by admissible evidence properly presented to the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1) & (3), (p)(2); Santa Ana Unified School Dist. v. Orange County Development Agency (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 404, 411 (Santa Ana).)
In this regard we note that Link failed to provide a separate statement responding to each of the material facts contended by respondents to be undisputed, followed by a reference to supporting evidence. This failure in itself authorized the trial court to grant respondents’ summary judgment motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) In other words, the fact that the trial court opted even to consider Link’s position on the merits was more than he necessarily deserved under the statute.
With these familiar principles in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments and evidence as to Link’s causes of action.
B. Employment-Related Claims
Causes of action 1 through 5 and 7 pertain to Link’s termination from his employment at Vortex on January 29, 2002. As a matter of law, respondents were entitled to summary adjudication on these claims based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Respondents contend that Link’s employment-related claims are also barred by the two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. Link’s termination occurred on January 29, 2002, and he did not file his complaint until March 30, 2004. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims. Claims for breach of contract or fraud have longer periods. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 337, 338.)
Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue that was litigated and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding that reached a final valid judgment. (Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 810, 813 (Bernhard); Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828 (Vandenberg).) Findings made in an arbitration may give rise to collateral estoppel. (Conner v. Dart Transportation Service (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 320, 322-324 (Conner).) Moreover, a non party to an arbitration (such as Fettig, Spears, and Ryan) may assert collateral estoppel to preclude a party to the arbitration from litigating issues decided in the arbitration. (Vandenberg, supra, at pp. 828-829; see Bernhard, supra, at p. 812.) Thus, if a prior arbitration decision resolved an issue adversely to the plaintiff, and the same issue is necessary to the plaintiff’s proof of a cause of action in subsequent litigation, the cause of action cannot be established as a matter of law and is subject to summary adjudication. (Conner, supra, at p. 322 [collateral estoppel effect of findings in labor grievance proceeding warranted summary judgment in subsequent lawsuit].)
In the matter before us, respondents presented evidence in support of their summary judgment motion that the 2002 grievance procedure resulted in a final decision and established certain issues adversely to Link. In particular, the evidence showed, Link contended in the arbitration that he was terminated without just cause, that his termination was in retaliation for his sale of an automobile that created friction at the job site, and that he was denied due process because he had not been advised of the reason for his termination or given advance notice of his poor attendance. Vortex’s position was that Link was not discharged, but was laid off due to a reduction in force, and that Link was chosen for the lay-off because of his poor job performance and poor attendance. Resolving these disputes, the arbitrator determined that “[t]he evidence establishes that the grievant was laid off in the normal course of business and that the grievant is entitled to four hours compensation, wages and benefits for January 29, 2002.” (Italics added.) Based on this evidence, the issues of whether Link was discharged or laid-off, and particularly Vortex’s reasons for ending the employment relationship, were actually and necessarily litigated in the arbitration that resulted in a final, binding decision.
The burden then shifted to Link to establish a material factual dispute in this regard. He presented no admissible evidence on these points. For purposes of summary judgment, therefore, it is undisputed that the arbitration ruling constituted a final decision as to the reasons for the end to Link’s employment relationship with Vortex. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Santa Ana, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 411 [admissible evidence is required to demonstrate a triable issue of fact].)
Link’s first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action would obviously require Link to prove that Vortex discharged him for retaliatory reasons or without just cause. His first cause of action, for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleges that respondents did not act in good faith because Link was “terminated for his refusal to provide them with a vehicle.” The second cause of action alleges that Link was “wrongfully terminated without sufficient ‘cause,’” based on his refusal to obey respondents’ purported order to perform illegal acts, in violation of Labor Code section 2856. The fourth cause of action contends that respondents terminated him in retaliation for his refusal to return a vehicle to Vortex. The fifth cause of action also asserts retaliatory termination, based on Link’s contention that respondents terminated his employment when he failed to accept the “fraudulent representations” of respondents. Because the issue of Vortex’s reasons behind the end to Link’s employment have been decided against him and cannot be relitigated, as a matter of law Link cannot prevail on these causes of action.
Labor Code section 2856 provides an exception to an employee’s obligation to comply substantially with his employer’s directions. It states: “An employee shall substantially comply with all the directions of his employer concerning the service on which he is engaged, except where such obedience is impossible or unlawful, or would impose new and unreasonable burdens upon the employee.”
A decision in an arbitration mandated by a collective bargaining agreement may not bar later litigation of certain statutory claims. (See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36, 44, 49 [title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.]; Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 745 [Fair Lab. Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.]; Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 404-405 [Lab. Code, § 1102.5]; Camargo v. California Portland Cement Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 995, 1006 [California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.].) Link did not allege claims specifically under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the FLSA, Labor Code section 1102.5, or the FEHA. Nor did he present any admissible evidence supporting any claim under these statutes or any other statute, or any cognizable cause of action at all, for retaliation or otherwise. As discussed in the text post, his references to Labor Code sections 2922 and 2924 are inapposite, as they have nothing to do with his claims of lack of notice or hearing. Despite his reference to Labor Code section 2856, he presented no admissible evidence indicating he might actually have a claim based on that statute. Furthermore, he did not contend in the trial court, and does not contend now, that the arbitration decision lacks preclusive effect on this specific ground. This case is therefore distinguishable, and the issue is not before us.
The arbitration also decided issues critical to Link’s third and seventh causes of action. According to the third cause of action, Labor Code section 2922 and due process required that Link be given notice before being “discharged from employment.” According to the seventh cause of action, Link was denied a hearing “before being terminated from his employment,” in purported violation of Labor Code section 2924 and due process. Respondents contend that these notice and due process arguments were litigated and resolved against him in the grievance procedure, because the arbitrator determined that Link was laid off by Vortex “in the normal course of business.” Indeed, Link specifically complained in the arbitration that he was not told the reason for his termination and did not receive advance notice of his poor attendance; there is no direct evidence that he complained of the absence of a due process hearing. But in any event, Link’s third and seventh causes of action are predicated on the contention that he was discharged from his employment rather than laid-off, an issue that was decided against him in the arbitration.
Moreover, the undisputed material facts show that Link’s third and seventh causes of action have no merit as a matter of law, for another reason. Contrary to Link’s assertion, Labor Code section 2922 does not require notice before termination of employment. It merely states: “An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month.” Similarly, contrary to Link’s assertion in his seventh cause of action that “Labor Code 2924 is clear in that the Employer must provide a hearing with the employee before he/she is discharged.” Labor Code section 2924 simply provides: “An employment for a specified term may be terminated at any time by the employer in case of any willful breach of duty by the employee in the course of his employment, or in case of his habitual neglect of his duty or continued incapacity to perform it.” (Italics added.) Labor Code section 2924 does not refer to hearing rights. Nor does it apply to Link’s employment at Vortex, since Link was not hired for a “specified term.” (Lab. Code, § 2924.) Link provides no authority for the proposition that his due process rights were violated.
Link contends that the arbitration decision is not binding and collateral estoppel is inapplicable because the issues raised in his complaint are not the same as the issues raised in the arbitration hearing. In particular, he contends his 2002 grievance procedure did not decide the specific claim that he was discharged because he refused to return the car to Vortex. His argument has no merit. In the first place, the arbitration decision indicates that the arbitrator did consider the fact that, “[o]n the last day of [Link’s] employment, he had reported to work and was subsequently told to leave and to return with an automobile he had sold to another employee,” and “[u]pon his return, a significant level of controversy developed over the payment for the vehicle,” yet the arbitrator concluded that Link was not wrongfully discharged but rather laid-off in the normal course of business. (Italics added.)
Further more, if we were to accept Link’s urging that he has now presented a new twist on his previous allegations, collateral estoppel would still apply. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues that were raised and decided, even if there might be some factual matter or legal argument that could have been presented on the issue but was not. (Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 415, 429.) Thus, since the issue of the reason for his termination was raised and decided in the arbitration, the fact that Link has come up with new arguments on this same issue is immaterial to the application of collateral estoppel.
Similarly, Link contends that conspiracy and Labor Code section 2856 were not expressly litigated in the arbitration. The point, however, is that the issues that were litigated and decided in the arbitration—that he was laid-off due to a reduction in force and his poor performance and attendance—bar him from ever recovering on his causes of action, regardless of whether he proves a conspiracy or puts a new label on an old claim.
Link is also precluded from asserting his causes of action against Vortex under the claim preclusion principles of res judicata, which bars parties from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in prior litigation between the parties or their privies. (Bernhard, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 810; Thibodeau v. Crum (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 749, 755, 758-761 [res judicata applies to arbitration award, and to claims that could have been raised in the arbitration but were not, even if the award has not been confirmed by a court].) Link’s grievance in arbitration was that the termination of his employment violated the terms of the Master Agreement. There is no indication in the Master Agreement, or in the arbitrator’s decision, that Link was precluded from litigating any aspect of his termination. The arbitrator’s final decision precludes Link’s wrongful termination claims against at least Vortex, the other party to the arbitration.
Link’s other arguments are meritless as well. In his reply brief, he “disagrees with Vortex’s reason of a reduction in the work force” and claims he submitted evidence that disputed this fact and showed that the discharge was due to his refusal to return the car. To the contrary, he did not present admissible evidence to support this contention at all. And even if he had, it would not have given rise to a triable issue of material fact, because the arbitration had already conclusively determined that Vortex actually laid Link off due to a reduction in the work force.
Lastly, Link argues that the arbitration hearing “didn’t have the elements of a judicatory procedure” because there were no witnesses, no court reporter, and no evidence, and “all the facts were ignored by the arbitrator.” However, the evidence before the trial court in the summary judgment proceeding was that the grievance procedure involved testimony and cross-examination of witnesses, as well as argument by the parties to the arbitration panel. Link failed to present admissible evidence to the contrary, or any evidence that the procedure failed to meet due process requirements or that the arbitrator ignored “all the facts.”
Link fails to establish that the court erred in granting summary adjudication on claims 1 through 5 and 7.
C. Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud
In his fraud cause of action, Link contended that respondents defrauded and damaged him because they stole the vehicle and its title and prevented him from obtaining the $300 balance on the car he sold to Williams. To prevail on a fraud claim, a plaintiff must prove that he was damaged as a proximate result of the defendant’s fraud.
As the parties seeking summary adjudication, respondents produced evidence that Link suffered no damage as a result of Vortex’s alleged conduct. Specifically, Link had agreed to sell the car to Williams for $600 and at first received $300 of that amount. Within a day or two after respondents allegedly stole the vehicle and its title and laid Link off on January 29, 2002, Williams paid Link the $300 balance. According to Link’s own deposition testimony, Link believed that the deal was thus “concluded” and he had been “paid in full.” From this evidence, the inference is that Link suffered no damages from respondents’ alleged fraud.
The burden then shifted to Link to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. He presented no admissible evidence indicating that he sustained any damage or injury of any sort as a result of respondents’ alleged fraud. Respondents were therefore entitled to summary adjudication on the sixth cause of action as a matter of law.
Because Vortex was entitled to summary adjudication on all the causes of action in Link’s lawsuit, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur. JONES, P. J., SIMONS, J.