Starting some ten to fifteen years ago, challenges to residency ordinances began to appear in the reporters with some frequency. Absent unique factual circumstances ( e.g., grounds for estoppel, see Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, 780, 577 P.2d 42, 49 (1978)), nearly every such challenge has been rejected. This is especially true of challenges based on the United States Constitution.

Linda contends that under the well-established general rule, attorney fees are not allowable as damages in the absence of a statute authorizing their recovery. She cites to Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, 577 P.2d 42 (1978), as authority for this statement. In Lines, this court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiff who had been terminated as a building inspector for the City of Topeka.

5. ATTORNEY FEES — Statutory Requirements. Generally, attorney's fees are not allowable as damages in the absence of a statute. Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, Syl. ¶ 7, 577 P.2d 42 (1978). 6. CONTRACTS — Attorney Fees — Statutory Prohibition of Contract for Payment of Attorney Fees in Note on Guaranty Agreement. Where a contract for payment of attorney's fees in a note is prohibited in K.S.A. 58-2312, a contract for payment of attorney's fees contained in a guaranty agreement for the note is also prohibited by the same statute.

A party asserting equitable estoppel must show that another party, by its acts, representations, admissions, or silence when it had a duty to speak, induced it to believe certain facts existed. It must also show it rightfully relied and acted upon such belief and would now be prejudiced if the other party were permitted to deny the existence of such facts. Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, Syl. ¶ 4, 577 P.2d 42 (1978) (following United American State Bank Trust Co. v. Wild West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 221 Kan. 523, 561 P.2d 792). An illegal contract is a promise that is prohibited because the performance, formation, or object of the agreement is against the law.

The plaintiffs contend the County is estopped from claiming it did not have the statutory authority to hold a binding election. For support, the plaintiffs cite several cases in which this court has found rules of estoppel can be applied to municipal corporations. For example, in Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, Syl. ¶ 5, 577 P.2d 42 (1978), we stated: "Within the scope of its power and authority to act, a municipal corporation is subject to rules of estoppel in those cases wherein justice and equity require their application and where such application will not interfere with the proper exercise of governmental functions." See Cole v. City of Kanopolis, 159 Kan. 304, 153 P.2d 920 (1944); Derby Oil Co. v. City of Oxford, 134 Kan. 59, 4 P.2d 435 (1931).

"A party asserting equitable estoppel must show that another party, by its acts, representations, admissions, or silence when it had a duty to speak, induced it to believe certain facts existed. It must also show it rightfully relied and acted upon such belief and would now be prejudiced if the other party were permitted to deny the existence of such facts." Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, Syl. ¶ 4, 577 P.2d 42 (1978). See Osborne v. City of Manhattan, 244 Kan. 107, 110, 765 P.2d 1100 (1988).

In its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, UMH asked the district court to reduce the jury verdict to be in conformity with applicable Kansas law. UMH argues that the damages awarded here exceed those appropriate for recovery in a breach of employment contract case, where a party is entitled to recover only his actual damages less those he might have reasonably prevented. Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, 577 P.2d 42 (1978). The court noted:

Due process requires that a statute which requires or forbids the doing of an act and subjects persons to penalties for failure to comply with the statute, must not be so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and application. Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, 776, 577 P.2d 42 (1978). A statute will not be considered vague if it employs words previously judicially defined, 223 Kan. 772, and the word "filed" has been judicially defined.

Second, there is no showing of any action lessees took in reliance on Herl's check. See Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, Syl. p 4, 577 P.2d 42 (1978).        There are a number of things we are not called upon to decide in this case.

2 Williston on Contracts § 277B (3rd ed. 1959); 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency § 76. The doctrine of estoppel was recently discussed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772, 577 P.2d 42 (1978):