LaROSE, [fn1] Judge. [fn1] Judge LaRose has been substituted for Judge Salcines, who was on the original Cromwell panel. This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of Florida for reconsideration after Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 990 So.2d 473 (Fla. 2008) (Liner II). See Pollard v. K.C. Cromwell, Inc., 18 So.3d 975 (Fla. 2009). K.C. Cromwell, Inc., d/b/a Workforce, U.S.A. (Workforce), appealed a final judgment awarding Michael Pollard $160,000 in statutory damages for violations of section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000-2003).
We have for review K.C. Cromwell, Inc. v. Pollard, 974 So.2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), in which the Second District Court of Appeal declared that section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000-2003), was unconstitutionally vague. In so holding, the Second District explicitly agreed with and adopted the rationale of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 962 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (" Liner I"), rev'd 990 So.2d 473 (Fla. 2008). We have jurisdiction.
” Liner v. Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc., 990 So.2d 473, 477 (Fla. 2008). Plaintiffs' allegation in the Amended Complaint that the FLPA “is a remedial statute” (Doc. #54, ¶ 4) is therefore incorrect.
But instead of stopping at reversal based on this sound reasoning, as it should have, see Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 990 So. 2d 473, 482 (Fla. 2008) ("In Florida, it is well established that this Court should refrain from deciding the constitutional questions when the case may be resolved on other grounds."), the Fourth District proceeded to the First Amendment issue and tied the statutory phrase "words, images, or language … directed at a specific person" in the definition of cyberstalking found in the 2014 version of section 784.048(1)(d)1 to its constitutional analysis. The David opinion continued:
A trial court's findings of fact are cloaked in a presumption of correctness and reviewed for whether they are supported by competent substantial evidence. Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. City of Sarasota , 48 So. 3d 755, 761 (Fla. 2010) ; Liner v. Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc. , 990 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 2008). "[A] decision interpreting a contract presents an issue of law that is reviewable by the de novo standard of review."
McDougall v. Culver , 3 So.3d 391, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). But we review the trial court's interpretation of the law de novo. Liner v. Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc. , 990 So.2d 473, 476 (Fla. 2008) ("We review the statutory interpretation conducted by the trial court to reach this ultimate ruling de novo, while we defer to those factual findings of the trial court that are supported by competent, substantial evidence from the record.").A. Alleged Sunshine Law Violations
In the final judgment, the trial court ruled that the circulation of the memoranda from the senior officials in the Sheriff's Office to McDougall constituted a "meeting" under the Sunshine Law, and therefore, the failure of the Sheriff's Office to make the memoranda public during the IA investigations was a violation of the Sunshine Law. We conclude that the record supports the trial court's factual findings; however, we hold that the memoranda did not constitute a meeting of a "board" or "commission," and therefore, the Sheriff's Office did not violate the Sunshine Law. See Liner v. Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc., 990 So.2d 473, 476 (Fla. 2008) ("We review the statutory interpretation conducted by the trial court to reach this ultimate ruling de novo, while we defer to those factual findings of the trial court that are supported by competent, substantial evidence from the record."). Section 286.011(1) provides as follows: