The modification of child support must be based on a two-step analysis. Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 517 N.E.2d 967. The court must determine (1) if there has been a change in circumstances, and (2), if so, a redetermination of the amount of child support that need be made.

{¶ 26} Mother is correct in her assertion that a court does not have jurisdiction to modify the terms of a property division set forth in a separation agreement by the parties to a dissolution absent an express reservation of jurisdiction. See Colley v. Colley (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 87, 89-90; Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 125; R.C. 3105.65(B). However, to the extent that the property distributed to the parties pursuant to their separation agreement continues to provide income to the parties after the dissolution, that income is relevant to the child support calculation.

{¶ 37} Appellate review of attorney fee awards in domestic relations actions is limited to determining whether (1) the factual considerations upon which the award was based are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, or (2) the domestic relations court abused its discretion. Oatey v. Oatey (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 263, citing Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124. We interpret appellant's assigned error as falling under the first alternative designated in Oatey.

Following a dissolution of marriage, the trial court does not retain jurisdiction to modify a property settlement. See Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413; Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 517 N.E.2d 967. A review of the record reveals that the insurance trust was allocated to Barnard as part of the division of property.

The modification of child support is based upon a two-step process: the trial court must first determine if there has been a change in circumstances, and, if so, make a redetermination of the amount of child support. Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 126, 517 N.E.2d 967, 969-970; Cheek v. Cheek (1982), 2 Ohio App.3d 86, 2 OBR 95, 440 N.E.2d 831. During the January 26, 1994 hearing, the trial court expressly found no substantial change in the circumstances of the parties which would warrant a change in the support to be paid.

"Upon appeal the only questions for inquiry are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of the evidence; or, whether there was an abuse of discretion." Swanson v. Swanson (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 85, 90, 2 O.O.3d 65, 68, 355 N.E.2d 894, 898; Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio app.3d 124, 128, 517 N.E.2d 967, 971-972; Oatey v. Oatey (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 263, 614 N.E.2d 1054, 1061-1062; McCoy v. McCoy (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 570, 583, 632 N.E.2d 1358, 1366-1367. An "`abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable."

A court does not have jurisdiction to modify the terms of a property division set forth in a separation agreement by the parties to a dissolution absent an express reservation of jurisdiction. Colley v. Colley (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 87, 89-90, 538 N.E.2d 410, 411-412; Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 125, 517 N.E.2d 967, 968; R.C. 3105.65(B). However, despite the unfortunate labeling of appellee's motion, she did not seek to amend the provisions of the decree regarding appellant's retirement benefits, but merely to enforce the agreement of the parties.

Modification of an award of child support normally requires a two-step determination: (1) a determination whether there has been a change of circumstances; and (2), if so, a redetermination of the amount of child support by applying R.C. 3109.05(A). Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 126, 517 N.E.2d 967, 969; Cheek v. Cheek (1982), 2 Ohio App.3d 86, 2 OBR 95, 440 N.E.2d 831. Appellant contends that there were no changed circumstances from the time of the dissolution decree because "the parties contemplated that the financial conditions and obligations of the parties would remain substantially the same." The general rule is that the changed circumstances relied upon to obtain modification of the support order must not have been within the knowledge or contemplation of the court when the decree was entered, and must be substantial.

Appellate review of attorney fee awards in domestic relations actions is not intended to deny awards of reasonable attorney fees and is limited to determining whether (1) the factual considerations upon which the award was based are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, or (2) the domestic relations court abused its discretion. Linehan v. Linehan (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 124, 517 N.E.2d 967 (citing Swanson v. Swanson, supra, 48 Ohio App.2d at 90, 2 O.O.3d at 68, 355 N.E.2d at 898). An "`abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable."