Lindsey v. Spec. Adm. of Estate of Phillips

12 Citing cases

  1. Gaddy v. Schulte

    663 N.E.2d 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 3 times

    Here we are not concerned with the relation back doctrine, because plaintiffs filed the petition for appointment of Schulte within the statute of limitations and before they filed a civil complaint. Plaintiffs rely on Lindsey v. Special Administrator of the Estate of Phillips, 219 Ill. App.3d 372, 579 N.E.2d 445 (1991), in support of their argument. In Lindsey, a complaint was filed on April 11, 1990, alleging that on April 14, 1988, the decedent was negligent and caused plaintiff injury. The complaint stated that the decedent died on October 14, 1988, and since probate administration had not commenced, the complaint listed defendant as special administrator.

  2. Hardimon v. Carle Clinic Association

    272 Ill. App. 3d 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 6 times
    Explaining that the plaintiff cured the "defect [in her capacity to represent the estate] by appointment as administrator in probate and the filing of an amended complaint"

    Lopez, 180 Ill. App.3d at 137, 535 N.E.2d at 11. Lindsey v. Special Administrator of the Estate of Phillips (1991), 219 Ill. App.3d 372, 579 N.E.2d 445, and Sisk v. Lewis (1993), 245 Ill. App.3d 689, 615 N.E.2d 46, involved an action against a defendant as special administrator who had not been appointed within the applicable statute of limitations. Based on the particular facts, the Lindsey court allowed relation back of the amended complaint, while the Sisk court denied application of the doctrine.

  3. Sisk v. Lewis

    615 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 1 times

    After the two-year limitations period had expired (remember Kingsley Lewis died more than six months before the end of the two-year period), the plaintiff sought the appointment of a special administrator. Cindy asks for relation-back treatment, citing Lindsey v. Special Administrator of the Estate of Phillips (1991), 219 Ill. App.3d 372, 579 N.E.2d 445, Stringer v. Estate of Jasaitis (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 270, 496 N.E.2d 1196, and Halberstadt v. Harris Trust Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill.2d 121, 302 N.E.2d 64. Stringer cited Pavlov v. Konwall (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 576, 447 N.E.2d 982, as authority for its decision. We find these cases different from the present one.

  4. Tucker v. Mitchell-Lawshea

    No. 17 CV 05883 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2019)   Cited 6 times

    There is likewise no dispute that Tucker's claim against Craig, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, survives his death. See Hicks v. Young, 2012 WL 1755735, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2012) (plaintiff's Section 1983 deliberate indifference claim survived death of defendant since personal injury claims survive the death of a party under Illinois law (citing Lindsey v. Special Adm'r of Estate of Phillips, 579 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). But the parties disagree on how the "proper party" determination can be made.

  5. Hicks v. Young

    CASE NUMBER 10 C 3874 (N.D. Ill. May. 15, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Under Illinois law, "[p]ersonal injury actions survive the death of the party defendant." Lindsey v. Special Adm'r of Estate of Phillips, 219 Ill.App.3d 372, 375, 161 Ill.Dec. 897, 579 N.E.2d 445 (4th Dist. 1991); see also Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, at 901 ("the modern trend is definitely toward the view that tort causes of action and liabilities are fairly a part of the estate of either plaintiff or defendant as contract debts"). Therefore, Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim, as well as his state law tort claims, survive Dr. Hammond's death.

  6. Relf v. Shatayeva

    2013 IL 114925 (Ill. 2013)   Cited 85 times
    Discussing § 13-209(c)

    Accordingly, appointment of a “special administrator” would not operate to trigger the provisions of section 13–209 of the Code of Civil Procedure permitting actions against an individual appointed to settle and distribute an estate pursuant to a petition for issuance of letters of office, i.e., personal representatives. See Greene v. Helis, 252 Ill.App.3d at 961, 192 Ill.Dec. 202, 625 N.E.2d 162;Lindsey v. Special Administrator of the Estate of Phillips, 219 Ill.App.3d 372, 376, 161 Ill.Dec. 897, 579 N.E.2d 445 (1991); Bricker v. Borah, 127 Ill.App.3d 722, 725, 82 Ill.Dec. 707, 469 N.E.2d 241 (1984). ¶ 45 In Keller v. Walker, 319 Ill.App.3d 67, 253 Ill.Dec. 99, 744 N.E.2d 381 (2001), a panel of the Third District of the Appellate Court did conclude that the plaintiffs in a personal injury action could satisfy the requirements of section 13–209(c) by seeking appointment of a special administrator in a case where the alleged tortfeasor had died without a will and no estate had been opened.

  7. Mankowski v. Keith Nemec & Total Health Inst., P.C. (In re Estate of Mankowski)

    2014 Ill. App. 2d 140154 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 10 times

    In Nagel, 402 Ill.App.3d 766, 342 Ill.Dec. 81, 931 N.E.2d 1264, the reviewing court noted that the administrator should be appointed first and the wrongful death action filed subsequently. Id. at 770, 342 Ill.Dec. 81, 931 N.E.2d 1264 (citing Lindsey v. Special Administrator of the Estate of Phillips, 219 Ill.App.3d 372, 377, 161 Ill.Dec. 897, 579 N.E.2d 445 (1991) ). However, the Nagel court also stated that a failure to follow this procedure was not necessarily fatal to a cause of action.

  8. Baez v. Rosenberg

    409 Ill. App. 3d 525 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that a party forfeits review of an argument unsupported by citation to authority

    By the very terms of the statute upon which Baez sought appointment as special administrator, the circuit court was not authorized to empower her to prosecute other causes of action in addition to the wrongful death cause of action. Whereas executors and administrators appointed under the Probate Act are given powers to collect and manages assets, pay claims and make distributions ( Lindsey v. Special Administrator of the Estate of Phillips, 219 Ill.App.3d 372, 376, 161 Ill.Dec. 897, 579 N.E.2d 445 (1991)), the powers and duties of a special administrator are strictly limited to those prescribed by the wrongful death statute ( Kubian v. Alexian Brothers Medical Center, 272 Ill.App.3d 246, 250, 209 Ill.Dec. 303, 651 N.E.2d 231 (1995)).          We note that when a person entitled to bring an action dies before the action is commenced and the cause of action survives, section 13-209 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the circuit court, where no petition for letters of office for the decedent's estate has been filed, to appoint a special representative for the purpose of prosecuting the cause of action.

  9. Nagel v. Inman

    402 Ill. App. 3d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 10 times
    In Nagel, 402 Ill.App.3d 766, 342 Ill.Dec. 81, 931 N.E.2d 1264, the reviewing court noted that the administrator should be appointed first and the wrongful death action filed subsequently.

    Ideally, the administrator should be appointed first and the wrongful-death action filed subsequently. Lindsey v. Special Administrator of the Estate of Phillips, 219 Ill. App. 3d 372, 377, 579 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1991). However, a failure to follow this procedure is not necessarily fatal to a cause of action.

  10. Minikon v. Escobedo

    324 Ill. App. 3d 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 9 times
    Permitting minor plaintiff to name a new defendant in a personal injury action more than two years after his injury occurred

    The two-year limitation period applicable to the plaintiff's individual claim against Thompson (see 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1998)) expired on January 2, 1999, a date after the filing of the plaintiff's original complaint but prior to the time that she learned of Thompson's death. The plaintiff's action against Thompson was one for damages predicated upon negligence resulting in bodily injury. Consequently, the claim survived Thompson's death. 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 1998)); Lindsey v. Special Administrator of the Estate of George Phillips, 219 Ill. App.3d 372, 375, 579 N.E.2d 445 (1991). Further, since the record reveals that Thompson and his estate are protected by liability insurance, the claim asserted in favor of the plaintiff individually is not "otherwise barred" within the meaning of section 13-209 of the Code.