Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 154607
OPINION
ROBIE , J.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence established that in early 2004, Randy Lindner and Rebecca Binns, who were dating at the time, purchased a home together for $289,000. Because Binns had a bankruptcy, Lindner obtained the loan and purchased the property in his name alone. Binns contributed $20,000 for the down payment and closing costs, while Lindner contributed money for remodeling costs and furniture. Because he thought he had only a few months to live, Lindner (who was suffering from colon cancer) immediately deeded the house to Binns.
The parties’ relationship ended in May 2005 when Lindner told Binns he was leaving her, and she had him removed from the house by police. When Binns failed to respond to Lindner’s requests for his share of the house, he filed a complaint for damages against her, ultimately asserting claims for fraudulent concealment, intentional interference with economic advantage, constructive trust, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Binns claimed she called the police after Lindner “threw an item at [her] in the kitchen.” Lindner denied throwing anything at her.
The case was tried to the court in May 2006, primarily on the testimony of the two parties. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties and that they “purchased the property with the intent to share ownership . . . during [Lindner’s] life.” The court further found that Binns “breached her fiduciary duty to [Lindner] when she took possession of the property and refused to honor [their] arrangement to share ownership during [Lindner’s] lifetime.” The court determined that between the time the parties purchased the property in March 2004 and the time Binns excluded Lindner from the property in May 2005, the property increased in value by $121,000. Concluding that Binns had contributed $20,000 “for capital expenses attributable to the subject property,” while Lindner had contributed $10,000 for that purpose, the court awarded Linder one-third of the increased value, or $40,333, as “damages to be secured by an equitable lien on the subject property.”
Binns testified that after she listed the property for sale in June 2005, she turned down an offer of $410,000. The trial court used this figure to determine the value of the property.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Lindner in June 2006. Binns moved unsuccessfully for a new trial then filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
As we have explained, the trial court awarded Lindner $40,333 in damages based on Binns’s breach of fiduciary duty in excluding Lindner from the property they had agreed to share during his lifetime. On appeal, we presume the trial court’s ruling was correct, and Binns bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error. (See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 610.)
To the extent Binns’s arguments on appeal address the trial court’s ruling, Binns has failed to carry her burden. Binns first argues that Lindner did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to an interest in the property. (See Evid. Code, § 662 [“The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof”].) “This argument is one of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s determination. The trial court was the trier of fact and the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses. We are not in a position to weigh any conflicts or disputes in the evidence. Even if different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we may not substitute our own inferences or deductions for those of the trial court. Our authority begins and ends with a determination of whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the judgment. [Citations.] Therefore, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s decision, and resolving conflicts in support of the trial court’s decision.” (Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 778-779.)
“[A]s the appellant, [Binns] bears the burden of showing reversible error and when, as here, the error is addressed to the sufficiency of the evidence, must set out a fair and adequate statement of the evidence which is claimed to be insufficient with citations to the record. [Citation.] [Binns] cannot shift this burden to [Lindner] nor expect the reviewing court to undertake an independent examination of the record.” (Maggio, Inc. v. United Farm Workers (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 847, 878.)
Binns has failed to carry her burden of showing the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. Indeed, in her argument she does not even address the evidence; instead, she simply asserts “[t]he evidence is not ‘so clear as to leave no substantial doubt in the mind of the trier of fact’ and is not ‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’” We are not persuaded since Binns fails even to tell us what evidence she is referring to.
Binns next argues that “the existence of an alleged fiduciary relationship between the parties . . . is again unsupported by the evidence.” Once more, however, Binns fails to actually discuss what the evidence was; she simply asserts “[t]here was no agreement establishing . . . a fiduciary duty.” Again, we are not persuaded by this skeleton of an argument.
The remainder of Binns’s argument on appeal is directed at the trial court’s award of damages. Although it is difficult to decipher, the thrust of Binns’s argument appears to be that if Lindner had contributed money toward the purchase of the property, he might have been entitled to the enforcement of a resulting trust on the property limited to the amount of money he contributed, but in no event was he entitled to any part of the increase in the value of the property after it was purchased.
The primary flaw in this argument is that it does not address the substance of the trial court’s ruling -- an award of damages for breach of fiduciary duty. At no point does Binns provide any authority or argument regarding the proper measure of damages for breach of fiduciary duty; thus, her challenge to the trial court’s award misses the mark completely. For this reason, too, she has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating trial court error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Lindner shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(2).)
We concur: SIMS , Acting P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.