See id. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the court can hear the merits of the case, as distinguished from a permanent injunction, which is issued to provide permanent redress. See Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale, 131 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); see also 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 83:10. Accordingly, these different forms of injunctive relief are governed by separate standards.
Significantly, moreover, other decisions of the intermediate court hold that dispensation with a final-injunction hearing is appropriate only when premised upon agreement among the litigants. See, e.g. , Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale , 131 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) ("[I]t is inappropriate for a court to treat a hearing for a preliminary injunction as a final hearing and as a basis for a preliminary injunction, unless the parties stipulate to the contrary." (citation omitted) ).
A preliminary injunction is "intended to preserve the status quo and prevent imminent and irreparable harm that might occur before the merits of the case can be heard and determined." Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale, 131 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2015). By contrast, our Supreme Court has described a "special injunction" as granting "relief which is auxiliary to the main relief requested in the complaint."
However, a motion for post-trial relief is not necessary when appealing an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction. Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale, 131 A.3d 145, 150-51 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
. While a preliminary injunction preserves the status quo, Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale , 131 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), a permanent injunction goes "beyond preservation of the status quo" because it "amounts to affirmative relief, designed to permanently remedy the situation, instead of an interim measure ordered to protect the parties until a final hearing." Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen's Club , 361 Pa.Super. 473, 522 A.2d 1129, 1132 (1987).
Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale, 131 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); see id at 151 n.6 ("A court's final disposition of a request for permanent injunctive relief is independent of its determination relating to preliminary injunctive relief and the [granting] of the latter does not foreclose an order [denying] a permanent injunction.").
(1) the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages; (2) greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it, and, concomitantly, the issuance of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings; (3) the injunction will properly restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) the party seeking the injunction is likely to prevail on the merits; (5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and (6) the injunction will not adversely affect the public interest. Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale, 131 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing Dragoni v. Borough of Ambler, 37 A.3d 27, 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)).
"[A] preliminary injunction is intended to preserve the status quo and prevent imminent and irreparable harm that might occur before the merits of the case can be heard and determined." Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale, 131 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). It is well settled that
"[A] preliminary injunction is intended to preserve the status quo and prevent imminent and irreparable harm that might occur before the merits of the case can be heard and determined." Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale , 131 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Here, the Columbus statue sat "unhidden and exposed to public view within the confines of Marconi Plaza" since 1976.
In Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale, 131 A.3d 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), taxpayers sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the borough from contracting with a new waste disposal company. In granting the preliminary injunction, the trial court directed the borough to terminate the new contract and to accept the bid of the former waste disposal contractor.