Summary
finding American Pipe "irrelevant" to intervention
Summary of this case from Cahoo v. SAS Inst.Opinion
No. 18-16393
06-05-2019
APRIL LINDBLOM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., Defendant-Appellee, v. VICKI BLAKELY; et al., Movants-Appellants.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 1:15-cv-00990-BAM MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted June 3, 2019 Seattle, Washington Before: D.W. NELSON, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
This case concerns Movants' motions for permissive intervention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court's denial of permissive intervention.
The district court acted within its broad discretion when it denied Movants' motion for permissive intervention as untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). See Orange Cty. v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). The district court identified and applied the correct legal rule to determine whether the motions for permissive intervention were timely, see United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), by analyzing "(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the delay," United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to Movants' assertion, American Pipe and China Agritech are irrelevant to Movants' claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motions for permissive intervention. See China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (2018); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the proposed intervenors may be barred from intervention "if the district judge, in his discretion, concludes that the intervention will 'unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties'" (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b))). Further, Movants' argument that they will be prejudiced if not allowed to intervene is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry, in which the court considers the potential harm suffered by the original parties to the suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
The district court's conclusion that Movants' motions for intervention were untimely was neither illogical nor implausible, and it was based on inferences that may be drawn from the record. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262.
AFFIRMED.