Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. SCV135769, Martin A. Hildreth, Judge. Retired Judge of the San Bernardino Mun. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.
Reed & Davidson, Dana W. Reed and Darryl R. Wold for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Strumwasser & Woocher, Fredric D. Woocher, Michael J. Strumwasser, and Bryce A. Gee for Real Parties in Interest and Appellants.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2005, the Loma Linda City Council adopted eight resolutions and ordinances, collectively approving specific plans and related general plan amendments and zoning changes, for two large-scale development projects known as Orchard Park and University Village (the project approvals). City residents and real parties in interest Jay Gallant, Georgia Hodgkin, and Wayne Isaeff sponsored two separate referendum petitions challenging the project approvals for each project. Each petition asked whether each specific plan and related general plan amendments and zoning changes should be approved (the referenda). The city clerk certified the petitions as having sufficient signatures. Thereafter, in January 2006, the city council ordered the referenda placed on the ballot for the June 6, 2006 election.
In March 2006, plaintiffs petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate removing the referenda from the ballot. Plaintiffs claimed the referendum petitions were invalid for two reasons: (1) they failed to include “the text” of the challenged ordinances in violation of Elections Code section 9238, subdivision (b), because they did not include modifications that the city council directed the developers to make to the specific plans at the time the council adopted the resolutions and ordinances adopting the specific plans, and (2) they violated the “single subject rule” because each sought to repeal a total of four resolutions and ordinances rather than a single resolution or ordinance. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs’ first argument, rejected their second, and issued the writ. Thus, the referenda were not placed on the June 2006 ballot.
Plaintiffs include Friends of Loma Linda, a nonprofit public benefit corporation whose members include residents and registered voters in the City of Loma Linda, and Dean Takeo Horinouchi, David Khoo, Randy A. Neff, and Richard Wayne Wysong, all of whom are registered voters in the City of Loma Linda.
All further statutory references are to the Elections Code unless otherwise indicated.
Real parties appeal, seeking reversal of the trial court’s order and placement of the referenda on the ballot for the next regularly scheduled election. Real parties argue that the referendum petitions substantially complied with section 9238, subdivision (b) because the directed-amendments to the specific plans were insubstantial and their omission from the referendum petitions was not confusing or misleading.
Plaintiffs also appeal, claiming the trial court erroneously concluded that the single subject rule applied only to initiative petitions, not referendum petitions. Plaintiffs further claim that real parties’ appeal is moot because the June 2006 election has passed and the referenda cannot be placed on the ballot for that election. Additionally, plaintiffs have filed a motion to dismiss real parties’ appeal on the grounds that events occurring subsequent to the filing of real parties’ notice of appeal have rendered that appeal moot.
We reverse. We conclude that both referendum petitions included the full text of the challenged resolutions and ordinances and thus did not violate the “full text” requirement of section 9238, subdivision (b). The text of the challenged resolutions and ordinances did not include or incorporate by reference any of the modifications that the city council directed be made to the specific plans. Furthermore, the trial court correctly concluded that the referendum petitions were not invalid because each challenged more than one resolution or ordinance. As the trial court ruled, the single subject rule applies only to initiative petitions, not referendum petitions. Finally, real parties’ appeal is not moot. The referenda can be placed on the ballot for a future election. Nor is real parties’ appeal moot for the reasons plaintiffs argue in their motion to dismiss real parties’ appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the order removing the referenda from the June 2006 ballot, and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to order the registrar of voters to place the referenda on the ballot for the next regularly scheduled election.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
The Orchard Park and University Village project areas are located in the northern portion of the City of Loma Linda, encompass 138 and 168.1 acres, respectively, and are adjacent to one another. On September 20, 2005, eight council bills, representing two resolutions and two ordinances for each project, were introduced before the Loma Linda City Council. The four resolutions were adopted on September 20. The four ordinances were first read on September 20 and adopted following their second reading on September 27.
Resolution Nos. 2414 (Orchard Park) and 2416 (University Village) amended the land use element and map of the city’s general plan from business and research park, and similar uses to specific planning area D. Resolution Nos. 2415 (Orchard Park) and 2417 (University Village) adopted specific plans for each project, and Ordinance Nos. 644 (Orchard Park) and 646 (University Village) adopted each specific plan as an ordinance. Ordinance Nos. 643 (Orchard Park) and 645 (University Village) amended the zoning designations within the specific plan areas to conform to the uses called for in the specific plans.
Resolution No. 2415 and Ordinance No. 644, which adopted the Orchard Park specific plan, both state that the Orchard Park specific plan called for the development of “approximately” 990 residential units, including mixed-use units, multifamily and single family residences, commercial and retail space, 13.1 acres of park land, trails connecting to “adjacent” developments, and open space to maintain existing orange groves. Similarly, Resolution No. 2417 and Ordinance No. 646, which adopted the University Village specific plan, both state that the University Village specific plan called for the development of “approximately” 1,507 residential units, including mixed-used units, multifamily and single family residences, 172,000 square feet of commercial and retail space, 25 acres of park land including a private community center, trails that connect to adjacent developments, open space to maintain existing orange groves, and an 11-acre school site for future elementary and junior high schools.
The Orchard Park specific plan was incorporated by reference into Ordinance No. 644 as “Exhibit 1.” Similarly, the University Village specific plan was incorporated by reference into Ordinance No. 646 as “Exhibit 1.” Significantly, no documents other than the specific plans are incorporated by reference into any of the challenged resolutions and ordinances or project approvals. And, although the minutes of the September 20 city council meeting indicate that the city council on that date approved and passed several motions directing the modification of the Orchard Park and University Village specific plans in several respects, no documents reflecting any of these modifications were presented to or approved by the city council at its September 20 or 27 meetings.
Plaintiffs have requested that this court take judicial notice of the minutes of the September 20 and 27, 2005, Loma Linda City Council meetings. We hereby grant the request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (h), 459, subd. (a).)
On September 20, the city council resolved that the Orchard Park specific plan would be revised to require that single family homes on lots 7,200 square feet or greater in size would be in “the same proportion as the number, acreage, or percentage in the University Village Project.” Second, both specific plans were to be revised “so that between the two projects, a total of 25 net acres would be provided for the School District; that each [project would] provide a pro-rata share contribution with University Village providing 13.2 acres and Orchard Park providing 11.8 acres including 3.2 acres of a joint use park; [and] that neither [project would be] deemed to have satisfied [this] condition without both parties insuring the school site equaled 25 net acres.” Third, both projects were directed to “participate in researching [a] solution” to connecting city trails to the Santa Ana River Regional Trail System north of Redlands Boulevard. Fourth, the “commercial language” in the University Village specific plan was to be modified to indicate that the acreage allotted for commercial uses was approximate and could increase or decrease depending upon commercial viability. Fifth and finally, the University Village project was to “provide trail connectivity with the Petersen Tract.”
At the September 27 city council meeting, it was reported that the specific plans for both projects were still in the process of being revised. It was also reported that the “proportionate share of single-family residential” homes in the Orchard Park project “would be dependent upon the final numbers” of single family homes built in the University Village specific plan. It is unclear from the record whether, or if so, when, the texts of either of the specific plans were revised to reflect any of the city council’s September 20 modifications.
Real parties had only 30 days from September 20, or until October 20, to circulate and obtain sufficient signatures on their referendum petitions and submit the petitions to the city. (§ 9237.) On September 29, Kathy Glendrange, a member of the citizens’ group Save Loma Linda, submitted a request to the city, pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) seeking all ordinances, resolutions, general plan amendments, specific plans, staff reports, and zoning changes related to the Orchard Park and University Village projects. On the same date, the city provided Ms. Glendrange with unsigned copies of the resolutions and ordinances that the city council adopted on September 20 and 27, together with staff reports, zoning changes, and general plan amendments for the two projects. Also on September 29, Ms. Glendrange requested signed copies of the resolutions and ordinances, but was told they were unavailable. On October 3, the city clerk informed counsel for Ms. Glendrange and real parties that she was still preparing the resolutions and ordinances for signature, and she did not know when signed copies would be available.
On October 7, real parties and members of Save Loma Linda began circulating the referendum petitions for signature. Each petition challenged the two resolutions and two ordinances adopted for each project, and identified each resolution and ordinance by its council bill number, just as the resolutions and ordinances were identified at the September 20 and 27 city council meetings. Each petition included the unsigned copies of the resolutions and ordinances that were provided to Ms. Glendrange on September 29 pursuant to her California Public Records Act request, together with copies of the specific plans that were still in the process of being revised. Neither petition included any documents or exhibits describing the modifications that the city council directed be made to the specific plans at the September 20 city council meeting.
The referendum petitions were submitted to the city clerk, and on December 8, the city clerk advised real parties by letter that the petitions “qualified as sufficient.” On January 24, 2006, the city council passed Resolution No. 2429, ordering that the two referenda be placed on the ballot for the next regularly scheduled election on June 6, 2006. Resolution No. 2429 stated the two referenda would appear on the ballot in the form of the following two questions:
“Shall the Orchard Park Specific Plan, generally located southwest of Redlands Boulevard and California Street, be approved (Ordinance [No.] 644 and Resolution [No.] 2415), including a zone change (Ordinance [No.] 643) and General Plan Amendment (Resolution [No.] 2414) to allow single and multi-family residential, affordable senior housing, commercial/retail, live-work units, elementary and middle schools, community recreational facilities, parks, open space, and trails?”
“Shall the University Village Specific Plan, generally located southwest of Redlands Boulevard and California Street, be approved (Ordinance [No.] 646 and Resolution [No.] 2417), including a zone change (Ordinance [No.] 645) and a General Plan Amendment (Resolution [No.] 2416) to allow single and multi-family residential, affordable senior housing, commercial/retail, live-work units, elementary and middle schools, community recreational facilities, parks, open space, and trails?”
Resolution No. 2429 further resolved that “the proposed complete text of the measures (Ordinance[] [Nos.] 643, 644, 645 and 646 and Resolution[] [Nos.] 2414, 2415, 2416 and 2417) submitted to the voters is attached as Exhibit ‘A.’” The record does not contain copies of the documents that were attached to Resolution No. 2429 as Exhibit A. And, as of January 24, 2006, real parties still had not received and the city clerk still had not posted signed and dated copies of the resolutions and ordinances that were adopted by the city council on September 20 and 27.
According to the county registrar of voters, March 24, 2006, was the deadline for submitting the June 6, 2006, ballot to the printer. On March 14, plaintiffs petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate directing the registrar not to include the two referenda on the June 6, 2006 ballot. Over real parties’ objection that plaintiffs had unreasonably delayed seeking writ relief, the trial court ordered expedited briefing and issued the writ following a hearing on March 23. Plaintiffs’ writ petition included signed and dated copies of the resolutions and ordinances that were adopted by the city council on September 20 and 27, 2005. The signed copies of Resolution Nos. 2414, 2415, 2416, and 2417 showed they had been adopted on September 20, and the signed copies of Ordinance Nos. 643, 644, 645, and 646 showed they had been adopted on September 27.
Each of the signed and dated resolutions and ordinances attached to plaintiffs’ writ petition was accompanied by a document, signed by the city clerk on March 13, 2006, certifying that the attached resolutions and ordinances were true and correct copies of the ordinances and resolutions that were adopted by the city council on September 20 and 27, 2006. In addition, the certified copies of Resolution Nos. 2415 and 2417, adopting the specific plans, and Ordinance Nos. 644 and 646, adopting zoning changes to conform to the specific plans, were accompanied by one-page exhibits describing the modifications that the city council directed be made to the specific plans. Each one-page exhibit was entitled “Exhibit 1” and stated that each specific plan was “being revised to reflect” modifications directed by the city council at the September 20 meeting. Each “Exhibit 1” also included summary descriptions of the modifications that were to be made to each specific plan.
The “Exhibit 1” that was attached to the certified, signed copies of Resolution No. 2415 and Ordinance No. 644 (Orchard Park) stated: “The Orchard Park Specific Plan is being revised to reflect the following changes as directed by the City Council at the Adjourned Regular Meeting of September 20, 2005. When available, the Specific Plan may be reviewed during normal business hours at the Loma Linda Branch Library, the Community Development Department and the City Clerk’s Office. [¶] Orchard Park single-family lots of 7,200 square feet or more to be the same number in proportion to those in University Village (acreage or number of lots)[.] [¶] Orchard Park shall provide 11.8 acres and University Village shall provide 13.2 acres net school site which will include 3.7 acres joint use park land. This condition cannot be satisfied by either project individually. Neither Orchard Park nor University Village is deemed to have satisfied this condition without both parties insuring the school site equals 25 net acres. [¶] Orchard Park and University Village to participate in researching solution to connecting City trails to Santa Ana River Regional Trail System for a north/south connection across Redlands Boulevard and contribute to solution.” (Bolding omitted.)
Neither the one-page exhibits nor any similar documents were presented to the city when it adopted the challenged resolutions and ordinances, or project approvals, on September 20 and 27, 2005. Nor were the one-page exhibits given to Ms. Glendrange or real parties in response to their Public Records Act request. The unsigned copies of the resolutions and ordinances that were attached to real parties’ referendum petitions are identical in all substantive respects to the signed, dated, and certified copies that were attached to plaintiffs’ writ petition, except that the one-page exhibits were not attached to real parties’ referendum petitions.
In granting plaintiffs’ writ petition, the trial court reasoned that real parties’ failure to include “modifications to the specific plan[s], which were attached as exhibits to the ordinances” was “fatal” to the referendum petitions because it violated the requirement of section 9238, subdivision (b) that a referendum petition contain the “full text” of the ordinance that is the subject of the referendum. (§ 9238, subd. (b).) The trial court further reasoned that the omission “may have deprived potential voters of full knowledge concerning the impact of the measure on the community,” and dismissed as “unimportant” real parties’ argument that their failure to include the exhibits in the referendum petitions was the result of the city clerk’s delay in providing them with complete copies of the resolutions and ordinances. The court also ruled that the “so-called single subject rule” applied only to initiative petitions, and therefore rejected plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the referendum petitions were invalid because each challenged more than one referendum or ordinance.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Real Parties’ Claims
Real parties claim the trial court erroneously concluded that the referendum petitions violated the “full text” requirement of section 9238, subdivision (b) and were therefore invalid because the petitions did not contain the one-page exhibits summarily describing the modifications that were to be made to the specific plans. Real parties maintain that the referendum petitions substantially complied with the full text requirement, because the modifications to the specific plans were minor. Thus, they argue, their failure to include the one-page exhibits describing the modifications in the referendum petitions was neither confusing nor misleading concerning the substantive provisions of the challenged ordinances and resolutions.
1. Applicable Law
Section 9238, subdivision (b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that each section of a referendum petition “shall contain . . . the text of the ordinance . . . that is the subject of the referendum.” (Italics added.) The statute applies to resolutions as well as ordinances because both are legislative acts subject to the referendum process. (Nelson v. Carlson (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 732, 737, fn. 4 (Nelson).)
The purpose of section 9238 is to inform prospective voters of the substantive provisions of the ordinance being challenged and reduce confusion so that the voters may intelligently exercise their referendum rights. (Creighton v. Reviczky (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1225, 1232-1233 (Creighton).) The state Supreme Court has long stressed, however, that “technical deficiencies in referendum and initiative petitions will not invalidate the petitions if they are in ‘substantial compliance’ with statutory and constitutional requirements.” (Assembly v. Deukmejian (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 652, citing California Teachers Assn. v. Collins (1934) 1 Cal.2d 202, 204; Costa v. Superior Court (2006) 37 Cal.4th 986, 1017-1019.)
In applying the “substantial compliance test,” courts ask whether technical deficiencies in a referendum or initiative petition “undermine or frustrate the basic purposes served by the statutory requirements. . . .” (Costa v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1019, fn. omitted.) The substantial compliance test serves the long-established judicial policy of liberally construing statutory and constitutional requirements governing initiative and referendum petitions, so that the voters’ initiative and referendum rights may be safeguarded. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 652.) Properly applied, the substantial compliance test also protects voters from confusing or misleading initiative and referendum petitions.
In view of the need to safeguard the right of initiative and referendum while also protecting voters from being confused or misled, courts have strictly enforced the full text requirement when necessary to inform prospective petition signers of the substantive provisions of the challenged ordinance. (E.g., Creighton, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1230-1233, Chase v. Brooks (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 657 (Chase), Nelson, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 732, Hebard v. Bybee (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Hebard).) In Creighton, a referendum petition included the title of the challenged ordinance but failed to include any part of the text of the ordinance. The court invalidated the petition because it “utterly failed to apprise prospective signers of the substantive provisions of the ordinance,” and therefore frustrated the purpose of former section 4052, the predecessor statute to section 9238. (Creighton, supra, at pp. 1230-1233.)
The full text requirement has also been applied to exhibits that were incorporated by reference into a challenged ordinance or resolution. In Nelson, the court invalidated a referendum petition that challenged a resolution adopting a general plan. The general plan was incorporated by reference into the resolution as an exhibit, but the petition did not include a copy of the general plan. The court reasoned that “the focus” of the resolution “was on the adoption of the plan and [the general plan] was incorporated into it. Without the plan individuals reviewing the petition had no way of informatively evaluating whether to sign it.” (Nelson, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 739.) In Chase, the court invalidated a referendum petition that failed to include the text of an exhibit to the challenged ordinance. The ordinance modified the zoning designations of property, and the exhibit consisted of a “metes and bounds legal description” of the property. (Chase, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 660, 664.) The court observed the legal description was necessary to inform voters of the general location of the reclassified property and the breadth of the challenged ordinance. (Id. at p. 644.)
Hebard involved a referendum petition that inaccurately described the title of the challenged ordinance. Section 9238 requires that a referendum petition include the “identifying number or title” of the ordinance (§ 9238, subd. (b)(1)), as well as “the text of” the ordinance. (Id., subd. (b)(2).) The failure to accurately describe the title of the ordinance was misleading, the court said, because it allowed potential signers of the petition to draw “numerous possible interpretations concerning the substance of the Ordinance.” (Hebard, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1340-1341.)
2. Analysis
Real parties claim their referendum petitions substantially complied with the full text requirement of section 9238, subdivision (b)(2), even though the petitions did not include the one-page exhibits summarily describing the modifications the city council directed be made to the specific plans. Real parties argue that the city council’s “oral modifications” to the specific plans were minor; thus the omission of the one-page exhibits describing those modifications from the referendum petitions neither confused nor misled potential signers of the petitions.
The trial court, relying on Hebard and Chase, ruled that the failure to include the one-page exhibits “may have deprived potential voters of full knowledge concerning the impact of the measure on the community,” and was therefore “fatal” to the referendum petitions. Real parties complain that the trial court erroneously applied a “per se rule” that any deficiency in a referendum petition warrants its removal from the ballot, and that the court erroneously failed to analyze whether real parties’ petitions substantially complied with section 9238, subdivision (b)(2).
We agree that the failure to include the exhibits was not “fatal” to the petitions and did not render them invalid, but not because, as real parties argue, the modifications to the specific plans were minor or insubstantial. The substantial compliance test applies only when a referendum petition fails to strictly or technically comply with the requirements of the statute. (See, e.g., Hebard, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1338-1339 [finding petition failed to comply with technical requirement of § 9238 before reaching substantial compliance question].)
The one-page exhibits describing the specific plan modifications were not required to be included in the referendum petitions, because they were not part of the text of any of the challenged resolutions or ordinances. (§ 9238, subd. (b)(2).) The petitions technically complied with the statute. It is therefore both unnecessary and inappropriate for this court to consider whether the petitions substantially complied with the statute or served its informative purpose. (Cf. Hebard, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1338-1339 [finding no technical compliance with § 9238 before reaching substantial compliance question].)
Indeed, none of the challenged resolutions and ordinances state that the one-page exhibits were incorporated by reference into their texts. Nor do any of the challenged resolutions and ordinances even mention the one-page exhibits. (Cf. Nelson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 735 [exhibit expressly incorporated into ordinance by reference] and Chase, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 660 [exhibit mentioned in text of ordinance and included in text of ordinance by implication].)
Furthermore, the certifications that were signed by the city clerk on March 13, 2006, and included in plaintiffs’ writ petition merely state that the attached resolutions and ordinances are true and correct copies of those that were adopted by the city council on September 20 and 27, 2005. The certifications do not mention the one-page exhibits, even though the exhibits were included with the certified copies of the resolutions and ordinances that were filed in the trial court. Moreover, and as the record indicates, the one-page exhibits were never made part of or incorporated into any of the challenged resolutions and ordinances.
It thus appears that the one-page exhibits were simply “tacked on” to the certified copies of Resolution Nos. 2415 and 2417, which adopted the specific plans, and to the certified copies of Ordinance Nos. 644 and 646, which adopted the zoning changes for each project, at some point before plaintiffs’ writ petition was filed. The exhibits were not given to real parties or Ms. Glendrage in response to their September 29, 2005, Public Records Act request. It is also undisputed that real parties did not receive the exhibits until after January 24, 2006, the date the city council ordered the referenda placed on the June 6, 2006, ballot.
As noted, Ordinance No. 644, which adopted the Orchard Park specific plan, and Ordinance No. 646, which adopted the University Village specific plan, each state the specific plan is “referenced herein and attached thereto [sic] as Exhibit 1.” To the extent plaintiffs may argue that these references to “Exhibit 1” effectively incorporated the one-page exhibits into the ordinances, they are mistaken. The one-page exhibits merely described the modifications that were to be made to the specific plans; they were not the specific plans themselves. And the specific plans were attached to the referendum petitions.
It is immaterial whether the one-page exhibits contained important information affecting voters’ decisions to sign the petitions. Section 9238, subdivision (b)(2) requires only that a referendum petition include “the text of ” the challenged ordinance or resolution. It does not require that the petition include all information voters may want to know or that may be helpful to them in deciding whether to sign the petition. (We Care—Santa Paula v. Herrera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 387, 390-391 (We Care—Santa Paula) [interpreting full text requirement of § 9201, which applies to initiative petitions].)
We Care—Santa Paula illustrates this point. There, the appellants sponsored an initiative petition to amend the land use element of the city’s general plan. The initiative proposed that any future amendment to the land use element, “which would have the effect of increasing the density as currently reflected in the land use element on a gross of 81 or more acres,” would be approved by a majority of the voters at a general or special election. (We Care—Santa Paula, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 388-389.) The city clerk refused to certify the petition on the grounds it failed to comply with section 9201, which provides that an initiative petition must contain the “text of the proposed measure.” (We Care—Santa Paula, supra, at p. 389.) The trial court denied the appellants’ petition for writ of mandate directing the city clerk to certify the petition and directing the city council to place the initiative on the ballot. (Ibid.)
In response to appellants’ appeal, the city argued that, because the initiative petition sought to amend the land use element of the general plan, the land use element of the general plan should have been included in the petition. The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that, if adopted, the measure would not change any land use or density designated in the general plan. Nor would it prohibit any change in land use or density. Instead, it would simply require that any proposed change in land use or density for projects involving 81 or more acres be approved by popular vote. Thus, there was no need to include any portion of the general plan in the measure. “Section 9201,” the court explained, “does not require that a petition include the text of every plan, law or ordinance the measure might affect.” (We Care—Santa Paula, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) Nor, the court said, does the statute require that an initiative petition contain all the information a voter would want to know to make an informed decision whether to sign the petition. (Id. at p. 391.)
Sections 9201 and 9238, subdivision (b)(2) are analogous and serve the same purposes. The statutes require that initiative and referendum petitions contain the full or complete “text” of the measure being proposed by initiative and the ordinance being challenged by referendum. The statutes share the same purpose: to inform voters of the substance of measures proposed by initiative and ordinances challenged by referendum and reduce confusion concerning the contents of initiative and referendum petitions. (Mervyn’s v. Reyes (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 93, 99 [initiative petitions]; Hebard, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338 [referendum petitions].) Neither statute requires the inclusion of information or documents that are not part of the text of the proposed measure or the challenged ordinance, regardless of their informational value to voters.
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims
In their appeal, plaintiffs claim the trial court erroneously concluded that real parties’ referendum petitions did not violate the “single subject rule.” They also claim that real parties’ appeal is moot because the June 2006 election has passed and the referenda cannot now be placed on the ballot for that election. We first address plaintiffs’ argument that the single subject rule applies to referendum petitions. We then address plaintiffs’ mootness claim.
1. The Single Subject Rule
Plaintiffs argue that each referendum petition impermissibly challenged more than one ordinance, in violation of the “single subject rule.” We disagree, for the reasons expressed by the trial court. As the trial court indicated, the single subject rule applies solely to initiative petitions and does not apply to referendum petitions. The state Constitution expressly provides that an “initiative measure” may not “embrac[e] more than one subject” (Cal. Const., art II, § 8, subd. (d)), but does not contain a single subject provision for referendum petitions (id., §§ 9, 11).
Plaintiffs claim there is no need for a constitutional provision expressly prohibiting referendum petitions from embracing more than one subject. They argue that the express single subject rule of article II, section 8, subdivision (d) of the state Constitution is “uniquely appropriate to the initiative process,” because if there were no such provision, an initiative proponent could propose a statute including “a wide variety of disparate subjects, in hopes of attracting enough support for popular provisions to also put a less popular provision on the ballot, and leading to confusion of the voters.” In contrast, plaintiffs argue, a referendum petition must “necessarily be limited to a single subject,” because a referendum petition “takes the targeted ordinance as it was drafted by the legislative body,” and the state Constitution expressly limits legislative enactments to a single subject. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 9.)
Plaintiffs would misapply the single subject rule to referendum petitions. As plaintiffs argue, the proponent of a referendum petition must “take the targeted ordinance as it was drafted by the legislative body.” But this does not mean that every ordinance or resolution adopted by a legislative body can logically or reasonably be made the subject of a single referendum petition. Knowlton v. Hezmalhalch (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 419 (Knowlton) illustrates why this is so. There, the court held that a single referendum petition may challenge more than one resolution, particularly when the various resolutions are interdependent and “could not be intelligently voted upon separately.” (Id. at pp. 430-435.)
The referendum petition in issue in Knowlton challenged four separate resolutions adopted by the Fullerton City Council concerning the acquisition of property for and the construction of a new city hall. In four separate resolutions, the council authorized or approved: (1) the purchase of a building site; (2) the appropriation of funds for the purchase; (3) the designation of the building site as the location for the new city hall; and (4) the selection of an architect to plan and oversee construction of the building. (Knowlton, supra, 32 Cal.App.2d at pp. 422-425.)
The Knowlton court looked at the substance of the four resolutions or city hall project approvals and found they were interdependent. “[S]tanding alone and by themselves,” the court said, the resolutions were “indefinite and uncertain and incapable of being understood . . . [or] voted upon separately.” (Knowlton, supra, 32 Cal.App.2d at p. 433.) Indeed, the resolutions constituted “one act” and were done for a single purpose: the acquisition of property for and the construction of a new city hall. (Id. at p. 432.) The court also observed that if every city ordinance had to be voted upon in a separate referendum, city councils could defeat the right of referendum simply by adopting multiple resolutions concerning a single subject. (Id. at p. 435.)
Although Knowlton predated the 1948 enactment of the single subject rule for initiative petitions (see Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 38 [single subject rule for initiative petitions was first adopted in 1948 as article IV, section 1c of the state Constitution]), its logic and reasoning applies to the two referendum petitions in issue in this case.
Here, as in Knowlton, the project approvals were interdependent, and none of them could have been intelligently considered or voted upon separately. As discussed, each referendum petition challenged two resolutions and two ordinances, which collectively approved the specific plan and related general plan amendments and zoning changes for each project. For each project, the city council first adopted a resolution amending the general plan to make the general plan consistent with the specific plans for each project. Then the council enacted both a resolution and a substantively-identical ordinance adopting each specific plan. Lastly, the council enacted an ordinance amending the city’s zoning regulations to make those regulations consistent with the types of uses called for in each specific plan. Challenging the four approvals for each project in a single referendum petition was both reasonable and necessary to the voters’ understanding of the import of the various approvals for each project.
Indeed, the purpose of the general plan amendments and zoning changes was to make the general plan and zoning regulations in each project area consistent with the uses called for in each specific plan. Moreover, and as real parties point out, a specific plan cannot be adopted and is void ab initio if it is inconsistent with the city’s general plan or zoning laws. (Gov. Code, § 65454; Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1196.) Thus, separate votes on the specific plans, apart from either the general plan amendments and/or the zoning changes, could not be held. (See DEBottari v. City Council (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1204, 1210 [election on referendum challenging zoning ordinance could not be held because enactment of the ordinance would have resulted in a zoning scheme inconsistent with the city’s general plan, in violation of Gov. Code, § 65860, subd. (a)].) This underscores the interdependency of the challenged resolutions and ordinances, or project approvals, for each project.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that the specific plan approvals, general plan amendments, and zoning changes for each project could have been voted upon separately, and should have been voted on separately. Plaintiffs agree that the resolutions and ordinances approving each specific plan constituted single legislative acts. But, they argue, each general plan amendment and zoning change constituted a separate legislative act that should have been considered separately—both from each other and from the specific plan approvals.
Plaintiffs do not explain why the zoning changes should have been considered in separate referendum petitions. But, they argue, combining the general plan amendments on the same ballot with the specific plan approvals “threatens to disrupt important aspects of the city’s planning process.” They reason that the general plan amendments changed the permissible uses in the project areas from business and commercial to mixed use. And, they point out that if an ordinance is defeated by referendum, the same or a substantially similar ordinance may not be reenacted for one year following the election. (§ 9241.) Thus, they argue that if the voters reject the general plan amendments along with the specific plans and zoning changes, the city will be unable to designate the project areas for mixed uses for another year, and this would thus disrupt important aspects of the city’s planning process.
We are not persuaded. As noted, each general plan amendment amended the land use element of the city’s general plan, in each project area, from business and research park, and similar uses, to specific planning area D. If the voters reject either or both specific plans, together with each plan’s concomitant general plan amendments, section 9241 would not prohibit the city from amending its general plan for other purposes, within one year of the election. Any general plan amendments that are not based on the Orchard Park or University Village specific plans would not be the same or similar to the general plan amendments that were tied to these specific plans.
Lastly and alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the “language and structure” of the Elections Code provisions governing municipal referendum petitions (§ 9235 et seq.) imply that a referendum petition must be limited to a single subject, because the statutes “consistently” use the singular term “ordinance.” Plaintiffs reason that the statutes’ use of the singular term “ordinance” “reflects a clear legislative intent” that a referendum petition may challenge only one ordinance. Again, we are not persuaded. As real parties point out, the Elections Code provides, at section 8, that “[a]s used in this code . . . the singular includes the plural, and the plural, the singular.” Furthermore, even if the Elections Code is arguably ambiguous, it must be liberally construed in favor of upholding the right of referendum. (E.g., Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591.)
Section 9237 states: “If a petition protesting the adoption of an ordinance . . . is submitted to the elections official . . . the effective date of the ordinance shall be suspended and the legislative body shall reconsider the ordinance.” (Italics added.)
Plaintiffs also rely, by analogy, on Bennett v. Drullard (1915) 27 Cal.App.180, 183-184 (Bennett), which predated the 1948 enactment of the single subject rule for initiative petitions. Relying on city charter provisions, the court in Bennett held that a city initiative petition could not embrace more than a single subject, because the city charter provisions authorizing initiative petitions consistently used the singular term “ordinance” and did not expressly allow an initiative petition to embrace more than one ordinance or subject. Thus, the court held, the city charter “meant what it said”—that is, an initiative petition had to be confined to a single ordinance or subject. (Ibid.)
Bennett is distinguishable from the present case for two reasons: (1) it dealt with an initiative petition, not a referendum petition, and (2) it construed the provisions of a city charter, not the Elections Code, which, as noted, provides that its use of the singular includes the plural. (§ 8.) Indeed, the state constitutional provision recognizing the right of referendum is stated in the plural, not the singular. It provides, “The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a), italics added.) Both the state Constitution and the Elections Code thus contemplate and imply that a referendum petition may challenge more than one statute, legislative act, or ordinance.
Furthermore, the court in Knowlton observed the rule announced in Bennett—that an initiative petition should be limited to a single subject—should not apply to referendum petitions, because a referendum proponent is “obliged to adopt the form [of legislation] chosen by the city council . . . .” (Knowlton, supra, 32 Cal.App.2d at p. 435.) As Knowlton demonstrates, if referendum petitions had to be limited to a single subject, municipalities could undermine the right of referendum by adopting a single legislative act in several resolutions or ordinances. Finally, and as real parties also point out, there is no case authority holding that a referendum petition may only challenge a single resolution or ordinance.
2. Mootness
Plaintiffs contend that real parties’ appeal is moot because the “statutory date for the election,” namely, June 6, 2006, has passed. Plaintiffs are mistaken. An appeal is moot when it is impossible for the Court of Appeal to grant any effective relief. (Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 120 [appeal is moot when no effective relief can be granted].) Real parties’ appeal is not moot because the referenda can be placed on a future ballot. (We Care—Santa Paula, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 391.)
Substantially the same mootness argument that plaintiffs raise here was considered and rejected by the court in We Care—Santa Paula. As noted, the city clerk refused to certify an initiative petition on the grounds it failed to include the full text of the proposed measure in violation of section 9201. The initiative sponsors sought a writ of mandate in the trial court directing the clerk to certify the petition and directing the city council to place the measure on the November 2005 ballot. After the trial court denied the writ, the initiative sponsors appealed. In May 2006, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment denying the writ on the grounds the initiative petition complied with section 9201 and included the full text of the proposed measure. (We Care—Santa Paula, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 388-391.)
In addition, the court squarely rejected the city’s claim that the sponsors’ appeal was moot because the June 2005 election had passed, reasoning that the measure could be “placed on some future ballot.” (We Care—Santa Paula, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 388-391; see also Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 565, 574 [ordering referenda placed on ballot three years after challenged resolutions and ordinances were adopted by city council], Merriman v. Board of Supervisors (1983) 138 Cal.App.3d 889, 893-894 [ordering referenda placed on ballot over three years after originally scheduled referendum election].) Here too, real parties’ appeal is not moot because the referenda can be placed on a future ballot.
Plaintiffs rely on two cases, Hayward Area Planning Assn. v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 53 (Hayward), and Myers v. Patterson (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 130 (Myers), for the proposition that real parties’ appeal is moot because the June 2006 election has passed. Neither case supports plaintiffs’ position.
In Hayward, the trial court issued a writ of mandate invalidating a referendum petition and striking it from the ballot on the grounds it failed to comply with the full text requirement of former section 4052, the predecessor to section 9238. The referendum sponsor and the city appealed, and also petitioned the appellate court for a writ of supersedeas staying the trial court’s writ. The appellate court denied the stay request on the grounds the trial court’s writ was automatically stayed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1110b. The referendum sponsor and the city then petitioned the appellate court to consider their appeal on an expedited basis, or by extraordinary writ, on the grounds the appeal could not be determined before the scheduled election. The appellate court agreed to hear the appeal on an expedited basis, reasoning that, because the referendum would remain on the ballot, it would “inevitably caus[e] confusion in the electorate as to the effect of the vote” because the referendum had been ruled invalid. (Hayward, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 55-56.) The court also noted that, if the stay were lifted, the ensuing election on the referendum would render the appeal moot. (Id. at p. 56.)
Based on Hayward, plaintiffs argue that real parties’ appeal is moot because real parties did not petition this court to hear their appeal on an expedited basis before the June 6, 2006, election. Not so. The court in Hayward observed that the appeal would have been moot if the election on the referendum had been held before the decision on the appeal. The court did not say that the appeal would have been moot if the stay had been lifted and the election was not held prior to the decision on the appeal. (Hayward, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at pp. 55-56.) The court did observe that the appellate remedy was inadequate because an appellate decision could not be made before the scheduled election, and for that reason agreed to hear the appeal as an extraordinary writ. (Id. at p. 56.) But that does not mean that the appeal would have been moot had the referendum been placed on a ballot after the decision on appeal. Ultimately, the Hayward court reversed the trial court’s decision and allowed the election to proceed as originally scheduled. (Id. at p. 60.) Had the court issued its decision after the originally scheduled election, the referendum could have been placed on a later ballot.
Plaintiffs also argue that real parties’ appeal is moot because real parties failed to challenge the trial court’s judgment by extraordinary writ petition. Real parties were not required to do so, however, and nothing in Hayward, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at pages 55 and 56, suggests they were. Furthermore, seeking extraordinary writ relief in advance of the June 6, 2006, election was impracticable, given that the trial court granted plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of mandate on March 23, 2006, only one day before the March 24 deadline for submitting the June 6, 2006, ballot to the printer.
Nor does Myers support plaintiffs’ argument. In Myers, the proponents of a city initiative measure, a commercial rent control ordinance, failed to comply with an Elections Code provision which required them to publish and file a “notice of intention” and include a copy of the notice in each section of their initiative petition. The proponents published the notice, but did not include a copy of it in their initiative petition before they gathered signatures on the petition. For this reason, the registrar of voters refused to place the initiative measure on the ballot for the next election in November 1986. The trial court denied the initiative proponents’ petition for writ of mandate, and the Myers court affirmed. The court first indicated that the appeal was moot because the November 1986 election had passed, but nevertheless reached the merits of the appeal because it presented issues of public importance that were likely to recur. (Myers, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 134-135.)
Myers is distinguishable because the court’s holding that the appeal was moot was not based solely on the fact that the November 1986 election had passed. As the court also observed, former section 4006 provided that an initiative petition had to be filed within 180 days from the date the notice of intention was published, and that date had passed by the time the appeal was heard. Accordingly, the proponents would have had to publish a new notice of intention, include that notice in their petition, and “regather” signatures on their petition. (Myers, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 134.) In other words, the proponents’ old initiative petition was invalid, and the city registrar could not be compelled to place the proponents’ old initiative measure on the November 1986 ballot or on any future ballot. Here, in contrast, real parties’ existing referendum petitions are not invalid and can be placed on a future ballot. Unlike the initiative proponents in Myers, there is no need for real parties to either revise or recirculate their referendum petitions for signature.
Plaintiffs next argue that real parties’ appeal is moot because the challenged resolutions and ordinances have taken effect, and there is no provision in the Elections Code for challenging an ordinance by referendum once the ordinance has taken effect. We reject this argument, because it is based on the invalid assumption that the trial court’s judgment invalidating the petitions was final. We explain.
First, and as plaintiffs point out, a city ordinance does not take effect until 30 days after passage. (§ 9235.) And, if a valid referendum petition is submitted to the city within that 30-day period, the effective date of the ordinance is suspended until the city council reconsiders the ordinance. (§ 9237.) If the council does not repeal the ordinance, the suspension continues until the election at which the voters either approve or reject the ordinance. (§ 9241.) If the voters reject the ordinance and resolution, the city may not reenact them for a period of one year following the election. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs argue that, because the trial court ruled that real parties’ referendum petitions were invalid, the submission of the petitions to the city did not trigger the suspension of the effective date of the resolutions and ordinances under section 9237. Thus, plaintiffs argue, the challenged resolutions and ordinances retroactively took effect 30 days after their final passage on September 20 and 27, 2005, pursuant to section 9235. Finally, plaintiffs reason that real parties’ appeal is moot because there is no authority for challenging an effective ordinance.
Plaintiffs’ argument is absurd, because it would nullify real parties’ right to appeal the trial court’s judgment. If, as plaintiffs argue, the trial court’s judgment that the petitions are invalid means that the challenged resolutions and ordinances took effect 30 days after their final passage on September 20, and 27, 2005, and real parties therefore cannot challenge the ordinances, then real parties would effectively have no right of appeal. That is simply not the case, however.
Plaintiffs also claim that real parties’ notice of appeal did not stay enforcement of the trial court’s judgment against the city, because the city did not appeal. Thus, plaintiffs argue, “the appeal has no effect on the city’s adoption of the ordinances, which remain in effect.” This argument misses the mark. The challenged resolutions and ordinances have never been in effect. After real parties submitted their referendum petitions, the city did not repeal the ordinances; rather, it ordered them placed on the ballot for the June 6, 2006, election. The challenged resolutions and ordinances will not take effect unless and until the voters approve them. (§§ 9237, 9241.)
Plaintiffs also argue that real parties’ appeal is moot because placing the referenda on the ballot for a future election could “impermissibly postpone the statutory one-year moratorium on reenactment.” (Capitalization and bolding omitted.) Section 9241 provides that if a majority of voters do not vote in favor of an ordinance at a referendum election, “the ordinance shall not again be enacted by the legislative body for a period of one year after the date of . . . disapproval by the voters.” Courts have interpreted section 9241 as barring the reenactment not only of the same ordinance, but of an ordinance that is “essentially the same as the first.” (Lindelli v. Town of San Anselmo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110.)
Plaintiffs reason that, if the referenda are placed on the ballot for a future election and the voters reject the challenged resolutions and ordinances, the city will be unable to enact the same or similar ordinances for several years after the ordinances were first adopted in September 2005. Plaintiffs argue that such a result would be “completely inconsistent” with unspecified Elections Code provisions which they claim provide for a “speedy and clear resolution” of the question of whether ordinances subject to a referendum will become law or not. Plaintiffs cite no Elections Code provisions or other authority to support this argument, and we find it unpersuasive. If voters reject the challenged resolutions and ordinances and similar approvals cannot be reenacted for several years after September 2005, that will not be inconsistent with the Elections Code. And, if the passage of time were sufficient to render real parties’ appeal moot, real parties would have no effective right of appeal.
In their separate motion to dismiss real parties’ appeal, plaintiffs argue that real parties’ appeal is moot in light of two events that occurred after real parties filed their notice of appeal. These are: (1) the city council’s adoption, on June 25, 2006, of a new general plan; and (2) the voters’ enactment, in November 2006, of initiative Measure V, entitled “Residential and Hillside Development Control Measure.” Measure V imposed controls on residential developments throughout the city, including building height, lot size, and level-of-service requirements. (Loma Linda Mun. Code, tit. 19, ch. 19.16.)
In support of their motion, plaintiffs have requested that we take judicial notice of the following city records, and we hereby grant the request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (h), 459, subd. (a).): (1) Resolution No. 2466, dated July 25, 2006, and approving the adoption of a new general plan; (2) the cover page of the city’s new general plan and section 2.2.8.4, entitled “Special Planning Area D”; (3) Resolution No. 2486, certifying the results of the November 2006 election results for Measure V; (4) a document entitled “Official Report to the City Council,” dated June 12, 2007, and indicating that the Orchard Park specific plan is inconsistent with the city’s new general plan; (5) a document entitled “Official Report to the City Council,” dated June 12, 2007, indicating that the University Village specific plan is inconsistent with the city’s new general plan; and 6) the minutes of the city council’s regular meeting of June 12, 2007.
In their motion, plaintiffs argue that the challenged resolutions amending the general plan “have been superseded by the adoption by the city of a new general plan on July 25, 2006 and are no longer in effect.” They also claim the specific plans are invalid because they are now inconsistent with the city’s general plan as amended by the voters’ November 2006 enactment of Measure V. Finally, plaintiffs claim that the ordinances amending the city’s zoning regulations in the project areas may not be submitted to the voters, because the voters’ rejection of the zoning ordinances would render the zoning regulations in the project areas inconsistent with the city’s new general plan.
For each of these reasons, plaintiffs claim that real parties’ appeal is now moot. Plaintiffs are mistaken. An appeal concerning a statute or ordinance becomes moot if the statute or ordinance is repealed or significantly amended during the pendency of the appeal. (E.g., Sierra Club v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 698, 704-705; Equi v. San Francisco (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 140, 141-142.) Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss is based on the mistaken assumption that the challenged resolutions and ordinances took effect following the trial court’s judgment finding the referendum petitions invalid. For the reasons explained above, this is not the case. The challenged resolutions and ordinances have never been in effect and will not become effective unless and until a majority of the voters vote in favor of enactment by voting in favor of the referenda. (§ 9241.) Because the challenged resolutions have never taken effect, it cannot be said that any of them have been repealed or significantly amended. For this reason, real parties’ appeal is not moot and plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss real parties’ appeal on this ground is denied.
It is another matter whether any of the challenged resolutions and ordinances, if enacted, would be inconsistent with the city’s new general plan and are therefore invalid. (Gov. Code, §§ 65860, subd. (a) [zoning regulations must be consistent with general plan], 65454 [specific plan must be consistent with general plan]; see deBottari v. City Council, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 1213 [referendum election could not be held on zoning ordinance because if enacted the ordinance would be inconsistent with the city’s general plan and therefore invalid ].) This issue is not properly before us, however.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment granting plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to order that the referenda be placed on the ballot for the next regularly scheduled election in the city and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Real parties shall recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: GAUT J. MILLER J.
The minutes were unavailable in March 2006 when plaintiffs’ writ petition was heard in the trial court. The minutes were approved by the Loma Linda City Council at a meeting on February 27, 2007.
Similarly, the “Exhibit 1” that was attached to the certified, signed copies of Resolution No. 2416 and Ordinance No. 645 (University Village) stated that: “The University Village Specific Plan is being revised to reflect the following changes as directed by the City Council at the Adjourned Regular Meeting of September 20, 2005. When available, the Specific Plan may be reviewed during normal business hours at the Loma Linda Branch Library, the Community Development Department and the City Clerk’s Office. [¶] University Village shall provide 13.2 acres and Orchard Park shall provide 11.8 acres and net school site which will include 3.7 acres joint use park land. This condition cannot be satisfied by either project individually. Neither Orchard Park nor University Village is deemed to have satisfied this condition without both parties insuring the school site equals 25 net acres. [¶] University Village and Orchard Park to participate in researching solution to connecting City trails to Santa Ana River Regional Trail System for a north/south connection across Redlands Boulevard and contribute to solution. [¶] Provide trail connectivity with Petersen Tract. [¶] Modify commercial language in the Specific Plan to indicate acreage is approximate and may increase or decrease based upon commercial viability.” (Bolding omitted.)
Similarly, section 9238, states: “(a) Across the top of each page of the referendum petition there shall be printed the following: [¶] ‘Referendum against An Ordinance Passed by the City Council[.]’ [¶] (b) Each section of the referendum petition shall contain . . . (2) the text of the ordinance that is the subject of the referendum.” (Italics added.) Singular references to “the ordinance” are also found in sections 9241 (providing for legislative body’s duties in the event “the ordinance” challenged is not repealed), 9242 (providing that signatures and referendum petition must be filed within 30 days of the date “the ordinance” is adopted), and 13120 (providing for form of question on ballot).