Opinion
CV-21-08073-PCT-JJT
10-24-2022
Annmarie Linda, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
Honorable John J. Tuchi, United States District Judge
At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Annmarie Linda's Application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's Opening Brief (Doc. 17, “Pl. Br.”), Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner's Answering Brief (Doc. 18, “Def. Br.”), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 19, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 16, “R.”) and now remands the Administrative Law Judge's decision (R. at 10-30) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1-3).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed an application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income Benefits on March 17, 2017, for a period of disability beginning December 3, 2011. (R. at 351-53.) Plaintiff's application was denied initially on August 21, 2017 (R. at 185), and again after reconsideration on December 6, 2017 (R. at 198). On November 8, 2018, Plaintiff was diagnosed with chronic cerebral white matter disease based on results from an MRI scan (“initial MRI”). (R. at 735.)
Plaintiff first testified before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on August 22, 2019. (R. at 39-65.) The ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled in a decision dated November 14, 2019. (R. at 156-67.) Plaintiff appealed from that decision, and the Appeals Council remanded the case to a new ALJ on June 16, 2020. (R. at 174-77.) One of the requirements from the Appeals Council was to “[o]btain additional evidence concerning the claimant's impairments in order to complete the administrative record . . . The additional evidence may include, if warranted and available, a consultative examination with medical source opinions about what the claimant can still do despite the impairments.” (R. at 176-77.)
On October 5, 2020, Plaintiff received another MRI scan (“2020 MRI”). The full MRI report indicated that there was “[n]o white matter signal abnormalities to suggest multiple sclerosis” which gave the impression of a “[n]egative brain MRI” but found “[n]o significant changes since prior” compared to the initial MRI (R. at 877-78).
On November 13, 2020, Plaintiff testified at a hearing held before the new ALJ. (R. at 66-107.) During that hearing, Plaintiff's counsel requested a neuropsychological consultive examination consistent with the Appeals Council's Order. (R. at 72.) At the end of the administrative hearing, the ALJ rejected the request for a neuropsychological consultive examination “given the evidence that we have in the file right now.” (R. at 106.)
In short, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 3, 2011. (R. at 16.) The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff did not have any medically determinable impairments before Plaintiff's last day insured on September 30, 2015 (R. at 17-18), but did have medically determinable impairments as of March 16, 2017. (R. at 19-23.) Out of those medically determinable impairments, the ALJ found gastritis, hiatal hernia, and white matter disease to be severe. (R. at 19.) The ALJ then considered Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and found that Plaintiff can perform medium work with ready access to a restroom and normal break accommodations, can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, nor be exposed to moving mechanical parts or unprotected heights. (R. at 23.) Based on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a delivery driver or pawn shop manager (R. at 28), but could work as a hand packager, vehicle cleaner, or packager (R. at 29).
The ALJ considers two distinct time periods of disability: (1) The alleged onset date of disability through the date last insured (December 3, 2011-September 30, 2015); and (2) the date of Plaintiff's applications through the date of the ALJ's decision (March 16, 2017-December 4, 2020). In determining that Plaintiff did not have any medically determinable impairments-and was therefore not disabled--prior to September 30, 2015, the ALJ noted that the record was entirely deficient of medical evidence from the first time period. (R. at 17.) The rest of the ALJ's decision focused on the second time period.
Upon considering the medical records, opinions, and testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled on December 4, 2020. (R. at 10-30.) On February 18, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-3.) On April 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, a district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). A court may set aside the Commissioner's disability determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, a court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises three arguments for the Court's consideration: the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting Plaintiff's symptom testimony; (2) rejecting the lay witness testimony from Mr. Harvey Ritter (“Mr. Ritter”); and (3) failing to develop the record pertaining to white matter disease. (Pl. Br. at 3.) In its responsive brief, Defendant argues the ALJ's rejection of Plaintiff's symptom testimony and lay-witness testimony are supported by evidence in the record. (Def. Br. at 6, 9.) Defendant also contends that the ALJ properly determined that the record was adequately developed and had no duty to develop it further. (Def. Br. at 10.) In reply, Plaintiff again asserts each of her three arguments and further states that the ALJ failed to give specific, clear, and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff's testimony. (Reply at 2.) Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the ALJ's determination for immediate award of benefits pursuant to the credit-as-true rule or, alternatively, remand the case for further proceedings. (Pl. Br. at 16.)
Defendant notes in her response that Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's determination of non-disability prior to September 30, 2015. (Def. Br. at 2 n.2; see supra note 1 (discussing the two time periods analyzed by the ALJ).) In reply, Plaintiff argues that she did not waive challenging this specific determination and contends that “Defendant is obligated to ensure the evidence of record is fully developed prior to determining that a claimant is not disabled . . . .” (Reply at 2.) The failure to develop the evidence of record before September 30, 2015, according to Plaintiff, is reversible error. (Reply at 2.) Conversely, Plaintiff argues in her opening brief that the ALJ erred in not developing the record only as it pertains to Plaintiff's white matter disease. (Pl. Br. 13-15.) Plaintiff makes no mention of a deficient record prior to September 30, 2015 in her opening brief. The Court will not consider Plaintiff's new argument that the ALJ erred in not developing the record prior to September 30, 2015.
A. The ALJ erred by improperly rejecting Plaintiff's symptom testimony.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting her symptom testimony. (Pl. Br. at 10-13.) Although credibility is the province of the ALJ, an adverse credibility determination requires the ALJ to provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony regarding the severity of the claimant's symptoms.” Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). While the ALJ may properly consider that the medical record lacks evidence to support certain symptom testimony, that cannot form the sole basis for discounting the testimony. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin, 466 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2006). Unless there is evidence that the claimant is malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting pain testimony associated with the underlying impairment. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, because the ALJ found an underlying impairment, his opinion must meet this standard.
To begin, Plaintiff was initially evaluated in August 2017 and upon reconsideration in December 2017, wherein the evaluators noted nonsevere medically determinable impairments of gastritis and duodenitis, hernias, and depressive, bipolar, and related disorders. (See R. at 108-18, 132-42.) The ALJ notes that these medical evaluations “did not have the benefit of considering the additional evidence that was available only after their reports, including . . . findings of white matter disease . . . and reports of tremors from white matter disease.” (R. at 26.) The ALJ determined that white matter disease constituted a severe impairment that significantly limited Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities. (R. at 19, 25.) The ALJ ultimately rejected Plaintiff's testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of white matter disease because it was inconsistent “with the medical and other evidence.” (R. at 26.)
Specifically, Plaintiff testified about her daily limitations, which included difficulties in completing personal care tasks, using email, and watching television. (R. at 26.) In rejecting this testimony, the ALJ noted that “at one point or another in the record” Plaintiff was able to complete more substantial daily activities. (R. at 26.) Plaintiff also testified to her inability to concentrate, maintain pace with tasks, understand instructions, and remember instructions. (R. at 20, citing to 68-107, 431-439.) The ALJ rejected this testimony for being inconsistent with Plaintiff's other testimony that she could remember the plot from TV shows, schedule medical appointments, and follow written instructions. (R. at 20.) Still, the ALJ gave “some consideration” to Plaintiff's “allegation of memory loss,” which was addressed by tailoring Plaintiff's RFC to receiving “simple instructions.” (R. at 25.) Aside from pointing out Plaintiff's inconsistent testimony, the ALJ supported his rejection of Plaintiff's symptom testimony with (1) the “negative” 2020 MRI (R. at 25, citing to 877); and (2) Plaintiff's lack of seizures in the preceding three years (R. at 25, citing to 749).
The ALJ cites to Plaintiff's function report dated July 27, 2017 (R. at 431), a physical evaluation report dated July 6, 2017 (R. at 537), and two physician reports dated June 2 and October 19, 2017 (R. at 575, 607). Notably, each report occurred more than a year before Plaintiff received her diagnosis of white matter disease.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ lacked clear and convincing reasons to reject her symptom testimony. (Pl. Br. at 12.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erroneously relied on a lack of objective medical evidence to discredit Plaintiff's statements and presented no support for finding Plaintiff's daily activities were inconsistent with her statements. (Pl. Br. at 7, 10.) In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ had “valid reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Plaintiff's symptom allegations.”(Def. Br. at 9.) The “negative” 2020 MRI report and Plaintiff's general lack of seizures provided the ALJ with the requisite support for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony. (Def. Br. at 7-8.) Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's testimony that she continues to serve her friend, Mr. Ritter, as a caregiver is inconsistent with her reported limitations with memory and concentration. (Def. Br. at 9.)
Because the ALJ's erroneous treatment of the white matter issue is dispositive, the Court does not address Plaintiff's other arguments, which pertain to the issues with the ALJ's analysis regarding Plaintiff's gastritis and hiatal hernia.
In a footnote, Defendant argues that the correct standard to apply in reviewing an ALJ's rejection of a claimant's testimony is substantial evidence. (Def. Br. at 7 n.7.) Defendant then recognizes that the Ninth Circuit employs a clear and convincing standard and argues that the ALJ's reasoning will survive any standard applied by this Court. (Def. Br. at 7 n.7.)
Defendant characterizes the 2020 MRI report as a “negative” finding of any white matter abnormalities. (Def. Br. at 7.) Defendant further contends that the 2020 MRI report and Plaintiff's lack of seizures are “inconclusive” as to Plaintiff's white matter disease. (Def. Br. at 10.)
The Court finds no objective medical evidence that provides a basis for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony. While the 2020 MRI report does summarize the results as “negative,” it also states in an addendum report on the next page that there is “[n]o change since prior,” citing to the initial MRI, dated November 8, 2018. (R. at 878.) To declare that the 2020 MRI shows no abnormalities ignores the totality of the 2020 MRI report, which contains ambiguous statements about Plaintiff's condition. The 2020 MRI report and Plaintiff's general lack of seizures in preceding years do not contradict her reports of tremors, memory loss, or inability to concentrate. There is no other objective medical evidence regarding white matter disease found in the record. The ALJ does rely on parts of the record that indicate a lack of memory problems generally, but these citations to the record point to notes from appointments that took place before Plaintiff received her diagnosis. (See R. at 20 (citing to a physician's office notes from June 2, 2017 that suggests Plaintiff's “remote memory [is] normal”); see also supra note 3.)
As the Ninth Circuit makes clear, an ALJ may not discredit a claimant's symptom testimony solely due to a lack of supporting objective medical evidence. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 884. By implication, this requires some objective medical evidence to begin with. The ALJ could refer to no clear objective medical evidence for discounting Plaintiff's testimony regarding the severity of white matter disease, so his rejection of the same is improper.
B. The ALJ erred by improperly rejecting Mr. Ritter's lay witness testimony.
Lay witness testimony from family and friends is competent evidence that an ALJ must consider. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). A lay witness need not be medically trained to provide testimony about a claimant's ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(4) (defining nonmedical evidence as “any information or statement(s) form a nonmedical source”); SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed.Reg. 49465 (Oct. 25, 2017) (acknowledging family and friends as nonmedical sources); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[F]riends and family members in a position to observe a claimant's symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify as to her condition.”). An ALJ may only reject testimony from a lay witness for “germane reasons,” such as conflicts with objective medical evidence. Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511 (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996)). Further, these germane reasons must be specific. Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009). An ALJ may not discount lay witness testimony solely because the witness is a close family member or may have an “abstract pecuniary interest.” Valentine v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Regennitter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the ALJ's reason for discrediting the lay witness testimony-that she was the claimant's mother and “biased”-was legally insufficient).
Mr. Ritter has known Plaintiff for over twenty-six years, lived with her for two years, and is her best friend. (Pl. Br. at 6.) In relevant part, Mr. Ritter provided his written testimony that Plaintiff is unable to focus and remember spoken instructions. (R. at 424, 427.) The ALJ gives little weight to Mr. Ritter's testimony because (1) he is not medically trained; (2) he simply “parrots” Plaintiff's symptom testimony; and (3) his statements are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. (R. at 27-28.)
Plaintiff contests the ALJ's rejection of Mr. Ritter's statements. (Pl. Br. at 11-12.) Plaintiff argues that Mr. Ritter's lack of medical training does not subtract from his credibility as a lay witness. (Pl. Br. at 11.) Further, “parroting” Plaintiff's symptoms does not provide a sufficient basis for rejecting Mr. Ritter's testimony, but instead reflects the ALJ's “sheer disbelief' of Plaintiff's testimony. (Pl. Br. at 11.) Defendant argues that the ALJ properly rejected Mr. Ritter's testimony for the same reasons he rejected Plaintiff's testimony-inconsistencies and a lack of objective medical evidence. (Def. Br. at 10, citing to R. at 27.) The Court disagrees.
First, the fact that Mr. Ritter is not medically trained has no bearing on his role as a lay witness and does not render his testimony less credible. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(4); SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed.Reg. 49465 (Oct. 25, 2017); Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918-19. Second, the record does not contain sufficient objective medical evidence to contradict Mr. Ritter's testimony about Plaintiff's inability to focus and remember spoken instructions. According to the ALJ, “the statements of Harvey Ritter are not accepted to the extent that statements are inconsistent with the evidence in the record,” reasoning that Mr. Ritter repeating Plaintiff's complaints renders his testimony equally inconsistent. (R. at 27.) However, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff's lack of seizures, 2020 MRI report, and physician reports preceding Plaintiff's diagnosis as medical evidence, which the Court already deemed to be ambiguous or insufficient. Therefore, the ALJ improperly rejected Mr. Ritter's testimony regarding Plaintiff's memory and concentration.
C. The ALJ failed in carrying out his duty to develop the record.
An ALJ has a “duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996)). The duty to develop the record is triggered when evidence is ambiguous or lacking to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Id. An “ALJ may discharge this duty in several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant's physicians, submitting questions to the claimant's physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record in relation to Plaintiff's white matter disease. (Pl. Br. at 13.) Plaintiff notes that her prior counsel requested a neuropsychological consultive examination at the administrative hearing. (Pl. Br. at 13, citing to R. at 72.) At the hearing, the vocational expert testified to four different hypothetical scenarios relevant to memory and concentration limitations: (1) an individual like Plaintiff in age, education and work experience without any limitation related to instructions or reminders to stay on task (R. at 98-99); (2) the same individual with a limitation of understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions (R. at 105); (3) the same individual with a limitation of needing occasional reminders from supervisors to stay on task (R. at 106); and (4) the same individual with a limitation of being off task for 20% of the workday (R. at 106.)
In response to the first and second hypotheticals, the vocational expert opined that such an individual would be capable of work in the national economy and listed several appropriate jobs. (R. at 98-99, 105.) Then, the vocational expert testified that the individual in the third and fourth hypotheticals would be incapable of working in the national economy, specifying that “no more than 10% off task on a continuing [basis] would be tolerated.” (R. at 106.) Nonetheless, after the hearing, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's request because the evidence in the record was sufficient. (R. at 106.)
The ALJ subsequently determined that Plaintiff was not disabled because the impairment resulting from white matter disease only limited her receiving “simple instructions” based on the second hypothetical (R. at 25; see 105.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed an error by failing to develop the record and substituting his arbitrary judgment for the examination that Plaintiff requested. (Pl. Br. at 14-15.) Defendant argues that the ALJ had no duty to develop the record because the record was already sufficient, and since his determination was based on a sufficient record, no error was committed. (Def. Br. at 11.) The Court disagrees and finds that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record and failed in carrying out his duty.
In determining that Plaintiff is limited only to simple instructions because of her impairment, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's lack of seizures and the 2020 MRI report. (R. at 25.) However, this evidence is inconclusive because (1) the ALJ provides no basis to support that a general lack of seizures informs the severity of limitations resulting from white matter disease; and (2) the 2020 MRI report ambiguously declares that Plaintiff has shown “[n]o significant change since prior” scans and the white matter does not suggest multiple sclerosis (R. at 878.) The ALJ can point to no other report from consultants, treating physicians, or otherwise, that directly discusses white matter disease and what limitation it imposes on Plaintiff's ability to understand, remember, and carry out instructions. The ALJ even determined that the State agency medical consultants “did not have the benefit of considering the additional evidence that was available only after their reports, including . . . findings of white matter disease,” signifying that he recognized to some extent that such a diagnosis would have informed the consultants' evaluation. (R. at 26.)
For reasons apparent from neither the ALJ's decision nor the record, the ALJ opined that Plaintiff is limited, at the least, to “simple instructions,” and provides no discussion as to why Plaintiff would not be precluded from work based on the third and fourth hypotheticals. The objective evidence, amounting to an unclear 2020 MRI report and Plaintiff's lack of seizures, is insufficient as it relates to Plaintiff's limitations. Therefore, the ALJ had an affirmative duty to develop the record before rendering a decision and failed in carrying out this duty.
D. The credit-as-true rule does not apply.
Because the ALJ failed in his duty to develop the record, the Court must determine the appropriate remedy. Plaintiff requests a reversal for immediate award of benefits pursuant to the credit-as-true rule, or alternatively, a remand for further administrative proceedings. (Pl. Br. at 15.) Defendant argues that remand is the only appropriate remedy because the credit-as-true rule applies to extraordinary cases, of which this matter is not. (Def. Br. at 14.) The Court agrees that remand is the proper remedy.
The credit-as-true rule does not apply in this case. The credit-as-true rule only applies in cases that raise “rare circumstances” which permit the Court to depart from the ordinary remand rule. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099-1102. These rare circumstances arise when the following elements are present: (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, id. at 1100; (2) the record is fully developed without ambiguities or outstanding issues so that further administrative proceedings would not be useful, id. at 1101; and (3) the testimony and evidence, if taken as true, “leaves ‘not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of [the] proceeding,'” id. (citation omitted). The Court has made clear that the record is underdeveloped as it pertains to Plaintiff's white matter disease, and therefore fails the second element of the credit-as-true rule.
Next, the Court must consider whether remand is appropriate. When there is a finding that the record was insufficient and the ALJ failed to develop that record, the proper relief is to remand for further proceedings pursuant to the harmless error rule. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the harmless error rule applies to Social Security cases). Accordingly, remand is proper for cases in which there is a substantial likelihood based on the circumstances of the case that the error prejudiced the claimant. Id. Here, Plaintiff's claim of limitations resulting from white matter disease were erroneously rejected based on findings from an insufficient record. The likelihood that the insufficient record prejudiced Plaintiff is substantial, and remand for further proceedings is appropriate.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED reversing the December 4, 2020 decision of the Administrative Law Judge, (R. at 10-30), as upheld by the Appeals Council February 18, 2021 (R. at 1-3).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment consistent with this Order and close this case.