Opinion
22-6432 23-6329
08-26-2024
Jonathan Joseph Lind, Appellant Pro Se. Andrea Nease Proper, Michael Ray Williams, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: July 31, 2024
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, Chief District Judge. (2:14-cv-26284)
Jonathan Joseph Lind, Appellant Pro Se.
Andrea Nease Proper, Michael Ray Williams, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Before KING, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Jonathan Joseph Lind seeks to appeal the district court's order denying various nondispositive motions, the court's order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Lind's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, and the court's order denying his Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115-17 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
As a preliminary matter, we grant Lind's motion to supplement the informal appendix. In addition, limiting our review of the record to the issues raised in Lind's informal brief, we conclude that Lind has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see also Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) ("The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that brief."). Accordingly, deny his motion to certify, deny his motions to appoint counsel, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeals.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED.