"(6) The remedies specified in this section, like those enumerated in Sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, are cumulative. Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 40, 282 N.W. 661, 667 [119 A.L.R. 940], (1939) (Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act held not to impair or limit availability of the `old practice' of obtaining judgment and execution returned unsatisfied before proceeding in equity to set aside a transfer); Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co., Inc., 298 Pa. 182, 186, 148 A. 94, 96 (1929) (Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act held to give an `additional optional remedy' and not to `deprive a creditor of the right, as formerly, to work out his remedy at law'); 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preference 120, 130, 150 (Rev. ed. 1940). [86 A.J. 8569].
The Act was held to be a codification of prior law, preserving the fraudulent conveyance action, now under the statute, for judicial lien enforcement litigation. In Lind v. Johnson, 204 Minn. 30, 282 N.W. 661 (Minn. 1938), the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled: While the fraudulent conveyance act is remedial and as such should be liberally construed, there is nothing in its language or stated purpose leading to the belief that it was intended to impair or limit the old practice under our long established legal system.
The second was where the property legally liable to execution had been fraudulently conveyed and the creditor attempted to have the conveyance set aside. Id. (quoting Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co. , 204 Minn. 30, 36, 282 N.W. 661, 665-66 (1938) ). The first type of creditor's suit requires the creditor to exhaust its remedy at law by having an execution returned unsatisfied.
The second was where property legally liable to execution had been fraudulently conveyed and the creditor attempted to have the conveyance set aside.Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 36, 282 N.W. 661, 665–66 (1938). For the first type of creditor's bill, the statute of limitations did not start to run until the creditor demonstrated that it had exhausted its remedy at law by having an execution returned unsatisfied.
The second was where property legally liable to execution had been fraudulently conveyed and the creditor attempted to have the conveyance set aside.Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 36, 282 N.W. 661, 665-66 (1938). For the first type of creditor's bill, the statute of limitations did not start to run until the creditor demonstrated that it had exhausted its remedy at law by having an execution returned unsatisfied.
The first difference noted by the district court is that the supreme court interpreted the MUFCA as providing a definition of “creditor” that was “broad enough to embrace a party without a judgment.” Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 38–39, 282 N.W. 661, 666–67 (1938). In contrast, under common law, only a judgment creditor could seek relief. Wadsworth v. Schisselbauer, 32 Minn. 84, 86–87, 19 N.W. 390, 390–91 (1884).
The first difference noted by the district court is that the supreme court interpreted the MUFCA as providing a definition of "creditor" that was "broad enough to embrace a party without a judgment." Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 38—39, 282 N.W. 661, 666—67 (1938). In contrast, under common law, only a judgment creditor could seek relief.
The statutes are remedial and should be liberally construed. Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 40, 282 N.W. 661, 667 (1938). Under Minnesota law, if a creditor demonstrates sufficient badges of fraud, the burden of production shifts to the party contending that a fraudulent conveyance has not occurred. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Cooper, 395 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn.App. 1986).
Often the asserted claim against the principal obligor might well be uncertain, and even speculative, or at least one in which the amount of recovery is very uncertain.52 Cal. App. 4th at 936, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 (quoting Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co. , 204 Minn. 30, 282 N.W. 661, 668 (1938) ).
Often the asserted claim against the principal obligor might well be uncertain, and even speculative, or at least one in which the amount of recovery is very uncertain. 52 Cal.App.4th at 936 (quoting Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 282 N.W. 661, 668 (Minn. 1938)).