Lind v. O. N. Johnson Co.

33 Citing cases

  1. Cortez v. Vogt

    52 Cal.App.4th 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 74 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in view of legislative statements of policy and purpose of the UFTA as a "cumulative and additional remedy," limitation period did not commence until debtor-creditor relationship existed after judgment was made final

    "(6) The remedies specified in this section, like those enumerated in Sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, are cumulative. Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 40, 282 N.W. 661, 667 [119 A.L.R. 940], (1939) (Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act held not to impair or limit availability of the `old practice' of obtaining judgment and execution returned unsatisfied before proceeding in equity to set aside a transfer); Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co., Inc., 298 Pa. 182, 186, 148 A. 94, 96 (1929) (Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act held to give an `additional optional remedy' and not to `deprive a creditor of the right, as formerly, to work out his remedy at law'); 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preference 120, 130, 150 (Rev. ed. 1940). [86 A.J. 8569].

  2. In re Michener

    217 B.R. 263 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1998)   Cited 10 times
    Stating that the UFTA "expanded creditors' remedies by allowing creditors without judgments to bring fraudulent conveyance actions" so that "present remedies under Minnesota's Fraudulent Transfer Act * * * extend to both simple unsecured creditors and attached judgment lien creditors"

    The Act was held to be a codification of prior law, preserving the fraudulent conveyance action, now under the statute, for judicial lien enforcement litigation. In Lind v. Johnson, 204 Minn. 30, 282 N.W. 661 (Minn. 1938), the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled: While the fraudulent conveyance act is remedial and as such should be liberally construed, there is nothing in its language or stated purpose leading to the belief that it was intended to impair or limit the old practice under our long established legal system.

  3. All Finish Concrete, Inc. v. Erickson

    899 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 11 times
    Stating that "[f]or collateral-estoppel purposes, issues are identical when the issues presented by the current litigation are in substance the same as those resolved in the previous litigation"

    The second was where the property legally liable to execution had been fraudulently conveyed and the creditor attempted to have the conveyance set aside. Id. (quoting Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co. , 204 Minn. 30, 36, 282 N.W. 661, 665-66 (1938) ). The first type of creditor's suit requires the creditor to exhaust its remedy at law by having an execution returned unsatisfied.

  4. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wartman

    841 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 11 times
    In Amica, this court held that a district court properly granted summary judgment in a veil-piercing action brought for the express purpose of satisfying a judgment where the judgment had expired by operation of law and there was, therefore, no judgment upon which to collect.

    The second was where property legally liable to execution had been fraudulently conveyed and the creditor attempted to have the conveyance set aside.Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 36, 282 N.W. 661, 665–66 (1938). For the first type of creditor's bill, the statute of limitations did not start to run until the creditor demonstrated that it had exhausted its remedy at law by having an execution returned unsatisfied.

  5. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wartman

    A13-0937 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2014)

    The second was where property legally liable to execution had been fraudulently conveyed and the creditor attempted to have the conveyance set aside.Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 36, 282 N.W. 661, 665-66 (1938). For the first type of creditor's bill, the statute of limitations did not start to run until the creditor demonstrated that it had exhausted its remedy at law by having an execution returned unsatisfied.

  6. Finn v. Alliance Bank

    838 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 17 times
    Stating six-year limit on claims for constructive fraud

    The first difference noted by the district court is that the supreme court interpreted the MUFCA as providing a definition of “creditor” that was “broad enough to embrace a party without a judgment.” Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 38–39, 282 N.W. 661, 666–67 (1938). In contrast, under common law, only a judgment creditor could seek relief. Wadsworth v. Schisselbauer, 32 Minn. 84, 86–87, 19 N.W. 390, 390–91 (1884).

  7. Finn v. Alliance Bank

    No. A12-1930 (Minn. Ct. App. Sep. 3, 2013)

    The first difference noted by the district court is that the supreme court interpreted the MUFCA as providing a definition of "creditor" that was "broad enough to embrace a party without a judgment." Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 38—39, 282 N.W. 661, 666—67 (1938). In contrast, under common law, only a judgment creditor could seek relief.

  8. Xemas, Inc. v. U.S.

    689 F. Supp. 917 (D. Minn. 1988)   Cited 10 times
    Applying Minn. Stat. §§ 513.23, 26

    The statutes are remedial and should be liberally construed. Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 40, 282 N.W. 661, 667 (1938). Under Minnesota law, if a creditor demonstrates sufficient badges of fraud, the burden of production shifts to the party contending that a fraudulent conveyance has not occurred. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Cooper, 395 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn.App. 1986).

  9. Pyramid Ctr., Inc. v. Weil (In re Momentum Dev., LLC)

    649 B.R. 333 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023)

    Often the asserted claim against the principal obligor might well be uncertain, and even speculative, or at least one in which the amount of recovery is very uncertain.52 Cal. App. 4th at 936, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 (quoting Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co. , 204 Minn. 30, 282 N.W. 661, 668 (1938) ).

  10. The Pyramid Ctr. v. Weil (In re Momentum Dev.)

    BAP CC-22-1084-CFL (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023)

    Often the asserted claim against the principal obligor might well be uncertain, and even speculative, or at least one in which the amount of recovery is very uncertain. 52 Cal.App.4th at 936 (quoting Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 282 N.W. 661, 668 (Minn. 1938)).