Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 81, 84 (1832). Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 4 (1972), and cases cited. He argues that a determination of the defendant's state of mind must be made, and that this is a question of fact for the jury.
The essential element in all malicious prosecution actions to be proved by the plaintiff is that the defendant lacked probable cause in bringing the original action against the plaintiff. Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 4 (1972). Morreale v. DeZotell, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 281, 281-282 (1980).
Probable cause in the context of a malicious prosecution claim "has long been defined as ‘such a state of facts in the mind of the ... (defendant) as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion,’ that the plaintiff had committed a crime." Carroll v. Gillespie, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 12, 436 N.E.2d 431, 435 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972) ). It is an objective standard, and "defendant's conduct must be adjudged by his honest and reasonable belief at the time he instituted the complaint rather than by what may turn out later to have been the actual state of things."
Probable cause turns upon “whether the defendant acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time.” Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972). Probable cause “is ‘such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty.’ ”
Under Massachusetts law, "probable cause is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty."Lincoln v. Shea, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972) (internal quotations omitted). The burden of proving lack of probable cause rests on plaintiffs.
Keefe v. Johnson, 304 Mass. 572, 577 (1939). Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 5 (1972). In those situations, this rule apparently has the practical effect of requiring the judge to decide the issue of probable cause, even though the evidence, viewed under the usual directed verdict standard, is sufficient to permit the jury to decide the issue.
Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 745 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). Thus, a § 1983 malicious prosecution action based upon a deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights requires a showing of the absence of probable cause to initiate proceedings, see Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998), as does the parallel state tort claim of malicious prosecution, see, e.g., Lincoln v. Shea, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Mass. 1972). 1. The Appropriate Probable Cause Inquiry
“In the context of applying for a criminal complaint, the issue ‘is whether the defendant acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time.'” Wilson, 2021 WL 1387778, at *12 (quoting Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 4 (1972)).
Turning to probable cause, in a common law malicious prosecution claim, a police officer acts with probable cause if he "acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time." Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972). It consists of " ‘facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty.’ "
Probable cause turns on “whether the defendant acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time.” Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972). As explained by the United States Supreme Court, “[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”