Lincoln v. Shea

30 Citing cases

  1. Morreale v. DeZotell

    406 N.E.2d 1311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 81, 84 (1832). Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 4 (1972), and cases cited. He argues that a determination of the defendant's state of mind must be made, and that this is a question of fact for the jury.

  2. Bednarz v. Bednarz

    27 Mass. App. Ct. 668 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that claim for malicious prosecution failed where "part of claim" was valid

    The essential element in all malicious prosecution actions to be proved by the plaintiff is that the defendant lacked probable cause in bringing the original action against the plaintiff. Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 4 (1972). Morreale v. DeZotell, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 281, 281-282 (1980).

  3. Cass v. Town of Wayland

    383 F. Supp. 3d 66 (D. Mass. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Probable cause in the context of a malicious prosecution claim "has long been defined as ‘such a state of facts in the mind of the ... (defendant) as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion,’ that the plaintiff had committed a crime." Carroll v. Gillespie, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 12, 436 N.E.2d 431, 435 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972) ). It is an objective standard, and "defendant's conduct must be adjudged by his honest and reasonable belief at the time he instituted the complaint rather than by what may turn out later to have been the actual state of things."

  4. Boyle v. Barnstable Police Dep't

    818 F. Supp. 2d 284 (D. Mass. 2011)   Cited 28 times
    Granting summary judgment for defendants on abuse of process claim, where record did not include sufficient facts to create genuine issue concerning their participation in criminal proceedings against plaintiff: "[A]n abuse of process claim requires that the defendants participate in judicial proceedings against the plaintiff."

    Probable cause turns upon “whether the defendant acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time.” Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972). Probable cause “is ‘such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty.’ ”

  5. Limone v. U.S.

    497 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Mass. 2007)   Cited 43 times
    Finding that Barboza had pulled "the [scapegoats'] names out of thin air"

    Under Massachusetts law, "probable cause is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty."Lincoln v. Shea, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972) (internal quotations omitted). The burden of proving lack of probable cause rests on plaintiffs.

  6. Carroll v. Gillespie

    14 Mass. App. Ct. 12 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that "evidence was sufficient to support findings that [defendant] initiated the complaints with knowledge that they were groundless, that he sought to use the criminal process to collect a civil debt, and that he did so in spite of Officer Gerard's explicit warning that this was not its proper purpose."

    Keefe v. Johnson, 304 Mass. 572, 577 (1939). Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 5 (1972). In those situations, this rule apparently has the practical effect of requiring the judge to decide the issue of probable cause, even though the evidence, viewed under the usual directed verdict standard, is sufficient to permit the jury to decide the issue.

  7. Meehan v. Town of Plymouth

    167 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 1999)   Cited 75 times
    Holding that Broussard barred the plaintiff's malicious-prosecution claim under Massachusetts law, and that the "false testimony" exception did not apply because "no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that [the plaintiff's] conviction was based solely on the false testimony of the defendants"

    Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 745 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). Thus, a § 1983 malicious prosecution action based upon a deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights requires a showing of the absence of probable cause to initiate proceedings, see Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998), as does the parallel state tort claim of malicious prosecution, see, e.g., Lincoln v. Shea, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Mass. 1972). 1. The Appropriate Probable Cause Inquiry

  8. Greenspan v. Masmarques

    23-cv-10134-DJC (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    “In the context of applying for a criminal complaint, the issue ‘is whether the defendant acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time.'” Wilson, 2021 WL 1387778, at *12 (quoting Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 4 (1972)).

  9. Mackey v. Town of Tewksbury

    433 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D. Mass. 2020)   Cited 13 times

    Turning to probable cause, in a common law malicious prosecution claim, a police officer acts with probable cause if he "acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time." Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972). It consists of " ‘facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty.’ "

  10. Manchester v. City of Elizabeth

    138 F. Supp. 3d 54 (D. Mass. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    Probable cause turns on “whether the defendant acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time.” Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972). As explained by the United States Supreme Court, “[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”