Opinion
PC-2018-0379
03-12-2019
LINCOLN SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff, v. RHODE ISLAND COUNCIL ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION and D. DOE by and through his parents, Defendants.
For Plaintiff Michael J. Polak, Esq. For Defendant Amy R. Tabor, Esq., Paul V. Sullivan, Eq.
Providence County Superior Court
For Plaintiff Michael J. Polak, Esq.
For Defendant Amy R. Tabor, Esq., Paul V. Sullivan, Eq.
DECISION
VOGEL, J.
Defendant D. Doe (Doe) and his Parents (collectively, Defendants) bring this Motion to Modify or Suspend that portion of a Decision which addressed Attorney's fees that the Court previously had entered in this case. (Defs.' Mot. to Modify or Suspend the Decision of 12/21/18 as it Pertains to Attorney's Fees as Provided by the Order Entered on 3/15/18.) They contend that as the prevailing parties in this litigation, brought pursuant to the Children with Disabilities Act, G.L. 1956 § 16-24-1, they are entitled to attorney's fees and costs under that statute. Plaintiff Lincoln School District (District) and Defendant Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education (Council) have objected to the motion. This Court exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 42-35-15, 16-39-4, and 42-92-3(b).
I Facts and Travel
The Court included a detailed recitation of the facts in this case in a Decision which was issued on December 21, 2018. See Lincoln Sch. Dist. v. Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education and D. Doe by and through his parents, C.A. No. PC-2018-0379 (filed Dec. 21, 2018). In that Decision, the Court upheld a ruling of the Council, ordering the District to provide Doe-an eleven year old boy who suffers from severe to profound hearing loss-with special education services in the form of a teacher of the deaf (TOD) for all hours of academic instruction at Doe's private school. Id. at 1, 2. In doing so, the Court also ordered the District to reimburse Doe's parents for the costs that they previously had incurred in paying for a TOD at the private school since the 2015-2016 school year. Id. at 25.
In their counterclaims, Defendants sought a preliminary injunction to enforce the Council's decision and requested attorney's fees. (Defs.' Answer and Countercl.) The Court denied both counterclaims. Defendants now ask the Court to modify or suspend its ruling as it pertains to the denial of attorney's fees, contending that § 16-24-1 is a remedial statute which should be interpreted liberally to permit the recovery of attorneys' fees. The District and the Council object to the motion.
II Standard of Review
Defendants have labeled their motion as one to "Modify or Suspend" the Court's ruling with respect to its denial of attorney's fees under § 16-24-1. Essentially, however, they are seeking the Court to reconsider that portion of its previous Decision regarding attorneys' fees. It is well settled that "[t]he Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, do not provide for a motion to reconsider." Sch. Comm. of City of Cranston v. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d 629, 649 (R.I. 2009). However, the Court "applies a liberal interpretation of the rules to 'look to substance, not labels[, ]' . . . [and has] allowed 'motions to reconsider' to be treated as motions to vacate under Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. (internal citation omitted.)
Additionally, '"[a] motion to vacate a judgment is left to the sound discretion of the trial justice and such a ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.'" Santos v. D. Laikos, Inc., 139 A.3d 394, 398 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Turdo v. Main, 132 A.3d 670, 680 (R.I. 2016)). Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides in pertinent part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
In the instant matter, the Court has exercised its discretion to allow the parties to file briefs on this issue. See Order, Mar. 15, 2018. Having carefully considered the arguments of the parties, the Court herein renders its Decision on the motion.
III Analysis
Defendants contend that as the prevailing parties in this appeal, they are entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs under § 16-24-1. Specifically, they argue that § 16-24-1, which is silent with respect to attorneys' fees, is a remedial statute which must be construed liberally to allow such fees and costs; otherwise, parents would be out-of-pocket for attempting to vindicate the right of their disabled child to receive a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) under the statute. They further contend that as the definition of FAPE under § 16-24-1 is almost identical to that of the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Court should follow the broad construction of FAPE that the federal courts have adopted for the IDEA.
It is axiomatic "that, when a statutory section is clear and unambiguous, [the Court] appl[ies] the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute and [it] need not delve into any further statutory interpretation." Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482, 489 (R.I. 2018). That is because '"[t]he plain statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent."' In re A & R Marine Corp., 199 A.3d 533, 539 (R.I. 2019) (quoting State v. Graff, 17 A.3d 1005, 1010 (R.I. 2011)). Thus, when "examin[ing] an unambiguous statute, 'there is no room for statutory construction and [the Court] must apply the statute as written."' In re A & R Marine Corp., 199 A.3d at 539 (quoting State v. LaRoche, 925 A.2d 885, 887 (R.I. 2007)). Furthermore, '"[t]he Legislature is presumed to know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts a statute."' Prew v. Emp. Ret. Sys. of City of Providence, 139 A.3d 556, 561 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. Briggs, 934 A.2d 811, 814 (R.I. 2007)).
If, however, the Court is "presented with an ambiguous statute-one that contains a word or phrase . . . susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning[, ] then this Court will employ [its] well-established maxims of statutory construction in an effort to glean the intent of the Legislature." Balmuth v. Dolce for Town of Portsmouth, 182 A.3d 576, 580 (R.I. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The Court '"must consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections."' Grasso, 177 A.3d at 490 (quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)). Furthermore, '"[i]n effectuating the Legislature's intent, [the Court] review[s] and consider[s] the statutory meaning most consistent with the statute's policies or obvious purposes.'" Id. at 490 (quoting Bailey v. Am. Stores, Inc./Star Market, 610 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1992)).
Thus,
'"Wherever possible, a statute is to be construed in a way which will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and which will conform with the spirit of the act. . . . Therefore, . . . when a suggested construction of a statute in any given case necessarily involves a decided departure from what may be fairly said to be the plain purpose of the enactment, such construction will not be adopted to the exclusion of a possible, plausible interpretation which will promote and put in operation the legislative intent."' Grasso, 177 A.3d at 490-91 (quoting Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 122 P.2d 526, 532 (Cal. 1942) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Our Supreme Court has declared that '"[t]he issue of whether there exists a basis for awarding attorneys' fees generally is legal in nature . . . ."' Arnold v. Arnold, 187 A.3d 299, 315 (R.I. 2018) (emphasis in original) (quoting Danforth v. More, 129 A.3d 63, 72 (R.I. 2016)). It is well settled that "[t]his Court 'staunch[ly] adhere[s] to the American rule' that requires each litigant to pay its own attorney's fees absent statutory authority or contractual liability."' Arnold, 187 A.3d at 315 (quoting Danforth, 129 A.3d at 72). Such statutory authority exists where "the Legislature has determined that attorney's fees should be available to the prevailing litigant." Id. Accordingly, "[f]or a statutory basis to exist, 'our precedent indicates that a statute must explicitly include attorneys' fees in order for a court to award attorneys' fees pursuant to that statute."' In re Janet S. Bagdis Living Tr. Agreement, 136 A.3d 1122, 1129 (R.I. 2016) (citing Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 10 (R.I. 2015)).
Furthermore, "when reviewing a statute under which a party seeks attorneys' fees, 'this [C]ourt may not imply statutory authority through judicial construction in situations in which the statutes are unequivocal and unambiguous.'" Shine, 119 A.3d at 8 (quoting Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I. 1990)). This means that "when a rule is silent regarding attorneys' fees, there is 'no room for implication by judicial construction' and attorneys' fees are not available under the statute." Shine, 119 A.3d at 10 (citing Eleazer, 576 A.2d at 1221).
In the instant matter, Defendants contend that although § 16-24-1 is silent regarding attorneys' fees, the statute is remedial and must be construed liberally in order to be consistent with the Legislature's goal of providing a FAPE to every child. They further contend that as the definition of FAPE under § 16-24-1 and under IDEA are almost identical, the Court should follow the liberal construction of FAPE that the federal courts have applied when interpreting the IDEA.
Section 16-24-1 defines FAPE as:
"special education services and related services that: "(1) Are provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;
"(2) Meet all of the standards and requirements of the state of Rhode Island department of education and requirements of the regulations of the board of education governing the education of children with disabilities, which shall include initial evaluation and determination procedures;
"(3) Include preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the state; and
"(4) Are provided in conformity with an individualized education program that meets the requirements of the regulations of the board of education governing the education of children with disabilities." Sec. 16-24-1(d)(1)-(4). Similarly, IDEA defines FAPE as:
"special education and related services that
"(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;
"(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
"(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and
"(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title." 20 U.S.C. 1401(9).
However, as our Supreme Court has observed, "a statute is not 'remedial' simply because its goal is to improve societal woes. If this were the case, all statutes would be remedial to some degree." Esposito v. O'Hair, 886 A.2d 1197, 1203 (R.I. 2005). Furthermore, although § 16-24-1 and the IDEA may similarly define the term FAPE, there is one glaring difference between the two statutory schemes: the IDEA permits attorneys' fees and § 16-24-1 is silent on the issue. Specifically, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) permits reasonable attorneys' fees "to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability[, ]" while § 16-24-1 makes no such provision.
In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1025 (1984), the United States Supreme Court determined that petitioners under IDEA's predecessor statute-the Education of the Handicapped Act-were not entitled to attorneys' fees under that statute. The Court reasoned that "[t]he Act appears to represent Congress' judgment that the best way to ensure a free appropriate public education for handicapped children is to clarify and make enforceable the rights of those children while at the same time endeavoring to relieve the financial burden imposed on the agencies responsible to guarantee those rights." Id. at 1021. Shortly thereafter, Congress amended the statute to allow for attorneys' fees. See Mathern v. Campbell Cty. Children's Ctr., 674 F.Supp. 816, 817 (D. Wy. 1987) (observing that Congress "quickly responded to Smith, . . . by enacting the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986" to allow for the discretionary award of attorneys' fees).
Since the United States Supreme Court's opinion in 1984, our Legislature has amended chapter 24 of title 16 multiple times. As previously stated, "[t]he Legislature is presumed to know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts a statute." Prew, 139 A.3d at 561. Accordingly, the Legislature presumably was aware of the Supreme Court's opinion in Smith, and the subsequent response by Congress, when it did not amend the statute to allow for attorneys' fees in derogation of common law. Indeed, considering that attorneys' fees are available to prevailing individuals and businesses under chapter 92 of title 42-the Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act-the Legislature may have deemed it unnecessary and/or duplicative to add a provision to allow attorneys' fees under the Children with Disabilities Act.
Furthermore, even if §16-24-1 could be considered a remedial statute that should be liberally construed, the Court is prohibited from implying that the statute permits the award of attorneys' fees as the statute is silent on the issue. See Shine, 119 A.3d at 10 (stating "when a rule is silent regarding attorneys' fees, there is no room for implication by judicial construction and attorneys' fees are not available under the statute") (internal quotations omitted). As previously stated "our precedent indicates that a statute must explicitly include attorneys' fees in order for a court to award attorneys' fees pursuant to that statute." In re; Janet S. Bagdis Living Tr. Agreement, 136 A.3d at 1129. See also Eleazer, 576 A.2d at 1221 (acknowledging "that the right to collect attorney's fees did not exist at common law and that, consequently such fees may be taxed only when there is either specific statutory authority or contractual liability"). Here, not only does the statute not explicitly include attorneys' fees, but it has remained completely silent on the issue through multiple amendments since the United States Supreme Court opinion in Smith.
Defendants' argument is compelling, but the Court cannot legislate and add a provision to § 16-24-1. Unless the legislature amends the statute, the Court cannot grant the Defendants' motion even though to do so would provide reasonable compensation to deserving parents who incurred expenses vindicating the right of their disabled child to receive a FAPE.
IV Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that attorneys' fees are not available to a prevailing party under § 16-24-1. Thus, the Court denies Defendants' motion as it pertains to attorney's fees. Accordingly, the Court's December 21, 2018 Decision remains in full force and effect as it is not vacated pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Counsel shall submit an appropriate Order for entry.