Lincecum v. Lincecum

7 Citing cases

  1. Hodges v. Hodges

    181 So. 3d 700 (La. 2015)   Cited 25 times
    In Hodges, 181 So.3d at 702, following the institution of divorce proceedings between the parents of a child, the trial court granted the parents joint custody of their child, ordered that the parties share equal physical custody of the child on an alternating weekly basis, and designated both parents as "co-domiciliary parents."

    The appellate courts in Hodges ¸Distefano, and Stewart decided that having more than one domiciliary parent was permissible. See also Smith v. Smith, 07–1163, 2008 WL 588906 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08) (unpublished), 977 So.2d 312 (table) (affirming the trial court's decision maintaining the mother as primary domiciliary custodian, but also naming the father as "co-domiciliary" to facilitate easier access to school records and to allow him to pick up the child from school without prior notice from the mother); Lincecum v. Lincecum, 01–1522 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/02), 812 So.2d 795, 798 (wherein the appellate court equated the failure of the trial court to name a domiciliary parent "to essentially be co-domiciliary parents"); Perkins v. Perkins, 99–1130 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/99), 747 So.2d 785, writ denied as improvidently granted, 00–0269 (La.3/24/00), 758 So.2d 141 (per curiam) (wherein the appellate court reversed a trial court's decision, which changed a prior stipulated designation of "co-domiciliary parents" to name the mother as the sole domiciliary parent and reinstated the prior consent judgment naming the parties "co-domiciliary parents"); Remson v. Remson, 95–1951 (La.App.

  2. Stripe v. Meffert

    229 S.W. 762 (Mo. 1921)   Cited 25 times

    Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 404; Brewer v. Bloucher, 14 Pet. 178; Stones v. Keeling, 5 Call. (Va.) 143; Heckert v. Hile, 90 Va. 391; Leonard v. Braswell, 99 Ky. 528; Wright v. Lore, 12 Ohio St. 619; Harris v. Harris, 85 Ky. 49; Hartwell v. Jackson, 7 Tex. 579. The statute should be construed to carry out its humane purpose. Turnmier v. Mayes, 121 Tenn. 45; In re Jessupp, 81 Cal. 408; Christopher v. Munger, 61 Fla. 513; Lincecum v. Lincecum, 3 Mo. 441; Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo. 80; Buchanan v. Harvey, 35 Mo. 276; Nelson v. Jones, 245 Mo. 597; Evatt v. Miller, 114 Ark. 84; Mund v. Rebanme, 51 Colo. 134; Leonard v. Brasswell, 99 Ky. 533; Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 132; Morris v. Williams, 39 Ohio St. 557; Watts v. Owens, 62 Wis. 512. (3) The verdict marked the end of the trial, as it settled all the issues of fact and left the court no alternative except to enter judgment for plaintiff or grant a new trial; and defendant's failure to file such motion within four days after verdict means that the appeal brings nothing here for review except the record proper, and as to that no error is assigned. R.S. 1909, secs. 1988, 1989, 1990; Green v. Whaley, 271 Mo. 636; DeSoto v. Ins. Co., 102 Mo. App. 1; Hall v. Mullanphy, 16 Mo. App. 454; Cockrell v. McIntyre, 161 Mo. 59; Waddington v. Lane, 220 Mo. 387; Young v. Downey, 150 Mo. 317; City of St. Louis v. Boyce, 129 Mo. App. 443; Brubaker v. Brubaker, 74 Kan. 220, 86 P. 455; Spalding v. Ma

  3. Welch v. All Persons

    85 Mont. 114 (Mont. 1929)   Cited 26 times

    In 1 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, page 313, the author says: "These statutes being remedial are liberally construed." ( Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 359; Lincecum v. Lincecum, 3 Mo. 441; Glass v. Glass, 114 Mass. 563; Hatwell v. Jackson, 7 Tex. 576; Graham v. Bennet, 2 Cal. 503; Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Me. 367, 71 Am. Dec. 555; Earle v. Dawes, 3 Md. Ch. 230; Watts v. Owens, 62 Wis. 512, 22 N.W. 720; Harris v. Harris, 85 Ky. 49, 2 S.W. 549.) Statutes of this nature had their inception in the state of Virginia, in the year 1785, when, at the instance of Thomas Jefferson, a statute very similar to the statute now appearing in our Code was passed by the legislature of Virginia.

  4. Baudin v. Prevost

    986 So. 2d 915 (La. Ct. App. 2008)

    Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La. 1986).Lincecum v. Lincecum, 01-1522, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/02), 812 So.2d 795, 797. However, in instances were the original custody decree is a [stipulated judgment], such as when the parties consent to a custodial arrangement, and no evidence of parental fitness is taken, the heavy burden of proof enunciated in Bergeron is inapplicable. Hensgens, 653 So.2d at 52.

  5. Craig v. Craig

    956 So. 2d 819 (La. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 3 times

    Although La.R.S. 9:335(B)(1) states, "[i]n a decree of joint custody the court shall designate a domiciliary parent except when there is an implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause shown," we need only to address this requirement if we find that a change of circumstances occurred and the best interest of the children requires a different custody agreement. See Lincecum v. Lincecum, 2001-1522 (La.App. 3 Cir. 03/06/02), 812 So.2d 795; Brewer v. Brewer, 39,647 (La.App. 2d Cir.03/02/05), 895 So.2d 745. As mentioned above, we find that there has not been a material change in circumstances to validate a change in the original custody decree which, by voluntary agreement, established the custody, the co-domiciliary status and child support altogether.

  6. Bodie v. Harvey

    943 So. 2d 1256 (La. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 1 times

    Because the parties stipulated to an agreement without the court considering parental fitness, the movant had to prove, in order to modify the existing custody arrangement, that 1) a material change in circumstances had occurred, and 2) that the new custody arrangement would be in the best interest of the child. See Lincecum v. Lincecum, 02-1522 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/02), 812 So.2d 795. EVIDENCE

  7. Taliaferro et al. v. Rogers

    248 S.W.2d 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952)   Cited 2 times

    In other cases such as Carroll v. Carroll, 1858, 20 Tex. 731, it has been said that statutes legitimating the issue of marriages deemed null in law apply to all marriages, whether celebrated before or after the passage of the law, provided the parent died after its passage. "In Lincecum v. Lincecum, 1834, 3 Mo. 441, the opinion was forcefully expressed that the fact that marriage took place before the enactment of a statute having the effect of legitimating the issue thereof did not render such statute inoperative where the issue was living at the time of the invocation of the statutes, they being held retroactive in that respect. "In Virginia in the case of Stones v. Keeling, 1804, 5 Call. (Va.) 143, as in the Tennessee decision just mentioned, much stress was laid upon the fact that the parent died after the statute became operative, in holding the children of a bigamous marriage entitled to inherit from their father.