Opinion
E068706
10-15-2018
S. EMANUEL LIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF PERRIS et al., Defendants and Respondents. S. EMANUEL LIN Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
S. Emanuel Lin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Aarvig & Associates, Maria K. Aarvig and Diane K. Huntley, for Defendant and Respondent City of Perris. Tyler & Bursch, Jennifer L. Bursch and Nathan R. Klein, for Defendants and Respondents Matthew Johnson and WRSP, LLC. Fidelity National Law Group and Kevin R. Broersma for Defendant and Respondent Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.Nos. RIC1411077 & RIC1500781) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sunshine S. Sykes and Gary B. Tranbarger, Judges. Affirmed. S. Emanuel Lin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Aarvig & Associates, Maria K. Aarvig and Diane K. Huntley, for Defendant and Respondent City of Perris. Tyler & Bursch, Jennifer L. Bursch and Nathan R. Klein, for Defendants and Respondents Matthew Johnson and WRSP, LLC. Fidelity National Law Group and Kevin R. Broersma for Defendant and Respondent Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1979, plaintiff and appellant S. Emanuel Lin has owned a 10-acre property in Perris, California. Lin is insured under a title insurance policy covering the property issued by defendant and respondent Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Commonwealth). Since 2014, defendant and respondent WRSP, LLC (WRSP), which is owned and operated by defendant and respondent Matthew Johnson (collectively, the WRSP defendants), has operated a private gun range on an adjacent property leased from defendant and respondent City of Perris (the City).
Lin, representing himself in propria persona, has brought two separate lawsuits related to his property and the new gun range, the first against the City and the WRSP defendants (Lin v. City of Perris et al., Riverside Superior Court No. RIC1411077 (case No. RIC1411077)), the second against Commonwealth (Lin v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, Riverside Superior Court No. RIC1500781 (case No. RIC1500781)). At a mandatory settlement conference, the parties reached an oral agreement to settle both lawsuits, the terms of which were placed on the record. Nevertheless, the parties were subsequently unable to finalize a written version of their settlement agreement. Eventually, the trial court granted a motion brought by the WRSP defendants to enter judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement as it had been recited on the record, and entered a final judgment in both cases. The trial court denied Lin's subsequent motion to vacate the judgment.
In the present appeal, we consider Lin's claims of error with respect to the trial court's entry of judgment pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement. Also, several times during the litigation, the trial court imposed sanctions against Lin. Specifically, the trial court awarded: (1) $5,760 payable to the WRSP defendants pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, and California Rules of Court, rule 2.30 ; (2) $3,025 payable to the City pursuant to rule 2.30; and (3) $1,050 payable to the WRSP defendants pursuant to section 2025.260. The first of these sanctions awards, in the amount of $5,760 payable to the WRSP defendants, is the subject of a separate appeal (Lin v. Matthew Johnson et al., case No. E067323) and will be addressed in a separate opinion. We consider Lin's challenges to the other two sanctions awards below.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Further undesignated "rule" references are to the California Rules of Court.
We find no error with respect to the trial court's entry of a judgment reflecting the parties' oral settlement agreement. Lin's challenges to the propriety of the sanctions imposed against him are moot because the judgment, in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement, provides that the WRSP defendants and the City both waive the right to collect on those sanctions awards. We therefore affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
Since purchasing his property in 1979, Lin has accessed it via a dirt road called Bellamo Lane that runs along the eastern edge of the property. Lin's property is largely vacant, though it includes "a one-bedroom house and a detached garage on a separately fenced one-acre site at the south west corner." Lin does not reside on the property; he describes himself in briefing as "a layman from Texas," and his address is in Houston.
In February 2013, the City granted Johnson a conditional use permit "to establish a private outdoor shooting and archery range on approximately 14 undeveloped acres" owned by the City, located immediately to the east of Lin's property. The site had previously been used as a police shooting range, but that was discontinued in the early 1990s. In November 2013, WRSP and the City agreed to a lease authorizing WRSP to use the property "for a private outdoor shooting and archery range." Lin contends, among other things, that the WRSP defendants interfered with his property rights by installing, as part of construction of the shooting range, a gate and fence that blocked his "decades-long normal access to his landlocked property" via Bellamo Lane and allowed access only "for the private enjoyment of a for-profit membership-only gun range."
Lin brought suit against the City and the WRSP defendants (case No. RIC1411077) in November 2014. Lin also named as a defendant "WSRP, LLC." The complaint explicitly alleges, however, that WSRP, LLC has "never existed." The lease between WRSP and the City has a repeated typographical error, transposing the middle two letters of WRSP, an abbreviation that apparently derives from "Witt Ranch Sports Complex." There is no registered California entity called "WSRP, LLC." Nevertheless, according to the trial court's register of actions, Lin purported to serve WSRP, LLC, with the complaint, filing a proof of service on December 11, 2014. On February 17, 2015, Lin requested entry of default as to WSRP, LLC. But on February 25, 2015, the trial court ordered that any default proceedings against WSRP be stayed and no entry of default is reflected in the register of actions.
Separately, in January 2015, Lin brought suit against Commonwealth (case No. RIC1500781), alleging several causes of action relating to Commonwealth's denial of his title insurance claim based on his loss of access to his property.
During the course of the litigation, Lin attempted to amend his complaint against the WRSP defendants and the City four times. On November 19, 2015, the trial court denied Lin's first motion for leave to file an amended complaint without prejudice for failing to comply with rule 3.1324. Lin's motion was not accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities at all, let alone one satisfying the content requirements of rule 3.1324.
On April 12, 2016, the trial court denied Lin's second motion to file an amended complaint "due to [his] lack of diligence in discovering the facts that give rise to the new cause of action, as well as his failure to comply with procedural requirements." Again, Lin's motion was not accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities. Moreover, Lin had attempted to modify the proposed new complaint by means of a supplemental filing on April 5, 2016, submitting documents describing additional causes of action not included in his original moving papers.
On October 3, 2016, the trial court denied Lin's third motion to file an amended complaint "due to [his] lack of diligence in discovering the facts that give rise to the new causes of action," as well has his failure to support the motion with a memorandum of points and authorities. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court detailed at length various procedural and substantive failings of Lin's motion and the proposed amended complaint. The trial court cautioned Lin that if he sought a fourth time to amend the complaint and again did so "improperly," the trial court would "likely impose sanctions" if there was a properly noticed request for sanctions by defendants.
On November 17, 2016, the trial court denied Lin's fourth motion to file an amended complaint. Although Lin did include a memorandum of points and authorities, the motion was not timely served. Moreover, the proposed amended complaint was almost identical to the one Lin had previously proposed. The trial court noted that Lin had failed to address the substantive defects in the proposed complaint that had previously been explained to him regarding lack of diligence. Specifically, the court found that "[a]ll of the causes of action are based on allegations that were either known to [Lin] or could have been discovered earlier through diligence. Most of the causes of action are based on public records . . . . Other causes of action are based on improvements to the gun range property that have existed since before the initial complaint was filed." The court further found that Lin's "explanations as to why he did not include the facts earlier demonstrate lack of diligence."
The WRSP defendants and the City both filed noticed motions requesting sanctions based on Lin's fourth motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court granted both motions, ordering that Lin pay $5,760 to the WRSP defendants and $3,025 to the City.
During discovery, the parties were unable to reach an agreement regarding where Lin's deposition would be taken. The WRSP defendants, the City, and Commonwealth sought to take Lin's deposition in Riverside County, California, where the properties at issue are located and where Lin filed his lawsuits. Lin failed to respond to the first three letters sent by defendants attempting to meet and confer on the issue. When Lin eventually expressed that financial constraints meant that he would not be able to pay for lodging when attending a deposition in California, the WRSP defendants offered to pay for Lin's stay at a hotel. Lin did not respond to the offer. The WRSP defendants brought a motion pursuant to section 2025.260, subdivision (a), requesting a court order requiring Lin to attend a deposition in Riverside County and requesting sanctions pursuant to section 2025.260, subdivision (d). On January 11, 2017, the trial court granted the motion and ordered that Lin attend a deposition in Riverside County on January 25, 2017. The trial court ordered that counsel for the WRSP defendants pay for one day of Lin's hotel stay. The trial court further found that Lin had not acted with "substantial justification" in opposing the motion, as that phrase is used in section 2025.260, subdivision (d). It noted in particular that Lin had regularly travelled to California for court appearances and that defendants had expressed willingness to schedule the deposition immediately before or after a hearing and to pay for Lin's hotel accommodations. The trial court also expressed its belief that the issue of the location of the deposition "could have been worked out" without court intervention if Lin had "been more open to meeting and conferring with defense counsel" to make arrangements for the deposition. The trial court imposed sanctions in the amount of $1,050 payable to the WRSP defendants.
On January 12, 2017, the City served, but did not file, a motion for sanctions against Lin pursuant to sections 128.7 and/or 128.5 in the amount of $78,650 "representing the expenses incurred in defending this lawsuit." (See § 128.7, subd. (c)(1) [providing 21-day safe harbor period after service before filing of motion for sanctions].)
In advance of a mandatory settlement conference on January 13, 2017, the WRSP parties submitted to the trial court a brief that included, among other things, their contention with respect to the value of Lin's property, supported by an appraisal report they obtained from an expert valuing the property at $120,000. The trial court had previously ordered the parties to obtain an appraisal of the property jointly, splitting the cost between them. But the parties did not come to an agreement on a neutral appraiser, so the WRSP defendants obtained an appraisal by hiring an expert on their own.
At the mandatory settlement conference, the parties reached a settlement agreement to resolve both lawsuits, the terms of which were agreed to orally on the record by the WRSP defendants, Commonwealth, and Lin. A representative for the City was present, as was outside counsel for the City. The City's counsel represented that the City would agree to the terms placed on the record at the upcoming meeting of the city council. At the City's next council meeting, in February 2017, the City formally approved the settlement agreement.
The parties' agreement, as placed on the record on January 13, 2017, provided for the gate and fence that had obstructed Lin's access to his property to be relocated by the WRSP defendants; for Lin to be paid $30,000 by Commonwealth, an amount equal to the policy limit, extinguishing the policy; and for both the WRSP defendants and the City to waive the right to recover their costs or to collect on the previously imposed sanctions awards. In exchange, Lin would dismiss with prejudice the two lawsuits, along with the already-pending appeal of the $5,760 sanction order (case No. E067323), and Lin would be barred from suing the City for acts taken to effectuate the settlement agreement, such as any necessary changes to the conditional use permit. Lin would "retain the right . . . to sue for any new act that [he] believe[s] has been done which damages [him]."
The parties were unable, however, to come to an agreement regarding a written version of their settlement agreement. In March 2017, the WRSP defendants filed a motion pursuant to section 664.6, which the City and Commonwealth joined, to enter judgment in accordance with the terms that had been orally placed on the record. The trial court granted the motion and ordered the WRSP defendants to file a proposed judgment. On May 12, 2017, after modifying the proposed judgment in some respects, the trial court entered judgment. Subsequently, Lin filed a motion to vacate the judgment. The trial court denied Lin's motion.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Entering Judgment in Accordance with the Parties' Settlement Agreement as Recited on the Record.
Lin raises several claims of error related to the trial court's entry of judgment pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement. Specifically, Lin contends that: (1) the parties' agreement, as placed on the record, was not an adequate "antecedent" to entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6 because the City "did not appear before the court to orally stipulate" to the settlement; (2) the trial court "exceeded its authority under [section] 664.6" because "WSRP, LLC was not a party" to the settlement agreement; (3) entry of judgment with respect to all parties was inappropriate because the motion for entry of judgment was brought only by the WRSP defendants, with the City and Commonwealth joining in the WRSP defendants' motion, rather than each party filing its own request for relief; (4) the judgment entered does not accurately reflect the parties' agreement in certain respects; and (5) he was "coerced" into the settlement by (a) the sanctions that had already been imposed against him (b) the sanctions motion that had been served, but not yet filed, by the City; and (c) the circumstance that the WRSP defendants had obtained and submitted at the mandatory settlement conference an appraisal of his property valuing it at $120,000, an amount he suggests is unreasonably low. We reject each of these arguments.
Section 664.6 provides in relevant part: "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement." "'Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.' [Citation.] The statute recognizes that a settlement may be summarily enforced in either of two situations: where the settlement was made orally before the trial court or where it was made in writing outside the presence of the court." (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1428 (Elyaoudayan).)
"[I]n ruling upon a section 664.6 motion for entry of judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, and in determining whether the parties entered into a binding settlement of all or part of a case, a trial court should consider whether (1) the material terms of the settlement were explicitly defined, (2) the supervising judicial officer questioned the parties regarding their understanding of those terms, and (3) the parties expressly acknowledged their understanding of and agreement to be bound by those terms." (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 911.) We review the trial court's determinations of fact for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) Where a "claim of error 'raises a question of law concerning the construction and application of section 664.6 it requires independent review.'" (Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253 (Critzer).)
In the present case, the trial court's determination that the parties entered into a binding settlement is supported by substantial evidence. The declarations filed in support of the WRSP defendants' section 664.6 motion and the transcript of the January 13, 2017, proceedings establish that the parties engaged in settlement negotiations, reached an agreement, and explicitly defined and placed on the record the material terms of that agreement. The trial court explained each of the terms of the settlement on the record, and Lin repeatedly expressed his understanding. Lin, the WRSP defendants, and Commonwealth personally agreed to the terms orally on the record. For the City to agree to the terms of the settlement required a vote by the city council, so neither its attorney nor the City's representative present on January 13, 2017, could unilaterally agree to bind the City. Nevertheless, the terms of the agreement placed on the record explicitly contemplated that the city council would subsequently vote to approve the settlement. Lin affirmatively agreed to that procedure, and the city council soon voted to approve the settlement. Furthermore, the judgment entered by the trial court precisely tracks the terms of the settlement as defined and placed on the record (we will address Lin's arguments to the contrary below).
Lin cites Critzer, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247, for the proposition that the parties' agreement, as placed on the record, was not an adequate "antecedent" to entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6 because the City "did not appear before the court to orally stipulate" to the settlement. Critzer, however, is distinguishable on its facts. In Critzer, two of five parties were not present when a purported oral settlement agreement was recited on the record, although their attorneys were present. (Critzer, supra, at pp. 1257, 1261.) Those two parties subsequently signed versions of a written settlement agreement, but there were "very real differences between the written agreement and the prior oral Settlement agreed to by three of the parties," and there was no written version of the agreement that all parties signed. (Id. at p. 1259.) Nevertheless, the trial court entered a judgment, finding that one of the written agreements accurately reflected the parties' settlement and declaring that version of the terms binding on all parties. (Id. at p. 1246.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that, because not all of the parties gave their personal consent to the purported oral settlement recited on the record, and the parties had not reached an accord on a written version of a settlement, the trial court was not authorized to enter judgment pursuant to section 664.6. (Critzer, supra, at p. 1262.)
Here, in contrast, all but one of the parties to the settlement agreement gave their personal agreement in open court to the terms recited on the record. Those terms explicitly contemplated that the remaining party, the City, would approve the settlement at the next meeting of its city council, which it did. The applicable authority is not Critzer, but rather Elyaoudayan, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 1421.
In Elyaoudayan, an oral settlement agreement was recited on the record and was personally consented to by some, but not all, of the parties. (Elyaoudayan, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.) The two parties who did not give their consent at the hearing—they were ill and unable to attend personally, but were represented by counsel at the hearing—later submitted written stipulations to the terms as recited on the record. (Id. at pp. 1425-1426.) The Elyaoudayan court held that because "[a]ll parties agreed to the settlement in one form or the other or both," it was immaterial that some of the parties gave their oral consent in court while others submitted their written agreement to the terms as recited on the record at a later time. (Id. at p. 1432.) The dispositive issue is whether all the parties have agreed to the same material terms. (Id. at p. 1432.) Here, all the parties agreed to the same material terms, with Lin, the WRSP parties, and Commonwealth giving their oral consent in court, and the City giving its assent by means of the city council vote approving the settlement agreement.
To be sure, as Lin notes, WSRP, LLC, is "not a party" to the settlement agreement. Lin's complaint explicitly alleges, however, that WSRP, LLC, does not and never has existed, even though he has purported to name it as a defendant. Lin cites no authority supporting the proposition that the trial court's authority to enter judgment pursuant to section 664.6 could be vitiated by the lack of agreement from a purported "party" that does not exist. There is no such authority. Lin's argument in support of that proposition is frivolous, and we will not devote any further discussion to it.
Next, Lin argues that the trial court erred by entering judgment pursuant to section 664.6 because Commonwealth and the City joined in the WRSP defendants' motion, rather than bringing a motion in their own names. The authority Lin cites in support of this proposition, however, deals with motions for summary judgment and special motions to strike under section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motions). Lin offers no reasoned argument as to why this authority should be deemed applicable to a motion requesting entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6. And there does not appear to be any reason to impose such a requirement in the section 664.6 context. The parties either reached a settlement agreement enforceable under section 664.6 or they did not, regardless of which party requests the trial court to consider the issue. (See also Elyaoudayan, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1427, 1432 [affirming grant of section 664.6 motion brought by one party of several that supported entry of judgment pursuant to settlement agreement].)
Lin also contends that the judgment should have reflected a term of the parties' settlement regarding "tree planting for noise abatement to benefit the properties near the subject private gun range . . . ." But no such term was mentioned on the record on January 13, 2017, and Lin raised no objection to its absence, even though the trial court explicitly invited the parties to weigh in on whether any "principal terms" of the settlement had been omitted from its recital of those terms. To the contrary, Lin explicitly agreed to the terms as they had been recited on the record. There is no other evidence in the record that the City, Commonwealth, or the WRSP defendants agreed to any term regarding tree planting. The trial court properly did not include any term regarding tree planting in the judgment.
Additionally, Lin asserts that the judgment should reflect that he retains his right to sue for acts that occur in the future. He cites in support of this contention the trial court's clarification during the January 13, 2017, hearing that under the terms of the settlement Lin "would retain the right . . . to sue for any new act that you believe has been done which damages you." Lin expresses concern that such a future legal action might be necessary, for example, if stray bullets escape the gun range and cause him injury or damages.
Nothing in the judgment, however, precludes Lin from bringing such an action arising from a future wrongful act or omission. The judgment provides that the two lawsuits previously brought by Lin are to be dismissed with prejudice. Lin is "barred from renewing and generally releases all known claims arising out of the allegations made" in the two cases, and he is barred "from initiating legal action against the City for acts undertaken by the City to accommodate the terms of the judgment . . . including modifications to the subject conditional use permit, issuing permits, or certificates of occupancy in order to relocate the fence." But the judgment further provides that Lin "does not waive his rights under California Civil Code section 1542," and there is no language in the judgment that is reasonably read to impinge on Lin's right to sue based on claims that have not yet accrued. Lin therefore fails to demonstrate that the trial court entered a judgment that is in any way inconsistent with the parties' agreement.
Civil Code section 1542 sets forth the default rule for the scope of a general release of claims: "A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor." --------
Lin further contends that he was improperly "coerced into surrendering his will to continue" with the litigation. In essence, Lin asserts a claim of economic duress, claiming to have been "shocked" when sanctions were imposed against him, and because of those previously imposed sanctions to have had "no confidence in the trial court to render a fair ruling" on the City's threatened motion for sanctions. Lin characterizes the appraisal obtained by the WRSP defendants and submitted to the trial court in advance of the mandatory settlement conference as part of a "scheme of fraud and deception" to "'take over'" Lin's property at a price that he apparently believes is unreasonable.
We are not persuaded. The doctrine of economic duress can form a basis for rescission of a settlement agreement. (See Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158-1159.) However, an essential element of a claim of economic duress is a "wrongful act which is sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person faced with no reasonable alternative to succumb to the perpetrator's pressure." (Id. at p. 1158, italics added.) Here, there was nothing wrongful in the defendants' exercise of their legal right to contest Lin's claims, including the right to bring good faith motions for sanctions, where appropriate. There was nothing wrongful in the WRSP defendants' obtaining an appraisal of Lin's property, the value of which was reasonably at issue in assessing the potential damages that could arise from Lin's claims, and submitting evidence of that valuation to the trial court in connection with a mandatory settlement conference. Furthermore, Lin had reasonable alternatives to agreeing to settlement: He could have obtained his own appraisal of the property to contest the one obtained by the WRSP defendants; he could have continued to litigate his claims to a final judgment on their merits; if necessary, he could have appealed any adverse judgment, including any award of sanctions imposed against him.
In sum, Lin has demonstrated no error in the trial court's entry of judgment in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement pursuant to section 664.6.
B. Lin's Challenges to Sanctions Imposed Against Him Are Moot.
Lin contends that the trial court's orders imposing sanctions against him are erroneous in various respects, both substantive and procedural. Nevertheless, pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement and as reflected in the judgment, both the City and the WRSP defendants have waived the right to collect on those sanctions orders. "[A]s a general matter, an issue is moot if 'any ruling by [the] court can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.'" (People v. J.S. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 163, 170, quoting Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880, 888.) Lin has presented no reason why the sanctions orders might have any continuing practical effect for him (say, a professional license requiring reporting of the imposition of sanctions, regardless of whether he must pay the amounts imposed). Lin's claims of error with respect to the sanctions awards are therefore moot, and we decline to reach their merits.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. SLOUGH
J.