This Court has "repeatedly cautioned that complaints sounding in negligence generally are not amenable to summary judgment and should be resolved by a fact finding at the trial court * * *." Limoges v. Nalco Company , 157 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Rose v. Brusini , 149 A.3d 135, 141 (R.I. 2016) ). A defendant's conduct in a negligence action should be analyzed in accordance with well-settled common law principles of negligence.
Proximate cause may be resolved as a matter of law, when “a plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of proving that ‘the injury to the plaintiff was a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligent conduct.'” Hebert v. Enos, 806 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting Kent, 771 N.E.2d at 777); see Limonges v. Nalco Co., 157 A.3d 567, 570-71 (R.I. 2017) (issue of negligence may be treated as a matter of law if the facts suggest only one reaonble inference). When (as here) the relationship of the parties is contractual, negligence can arise from the failure to perform the contract in a workmanlike fashion, using reasonable and appropriate care and skill in doing it.
Furthermore, "the function of the trial justice in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is issue finding, not issue determination." Limoges v. Nalco Company , 157 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Goodkin v. DeMaio , 664 A.2d 1119, 1120 (R.I. 1995) (mem.)). "This Court has often instructed that ‘issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.’ "
At the summary-judgment hearing, it was not the moment for the trial justice to weigh the evidence before her or make credibility assessments—that is a function that should be reserved for the factfinder at trial. SeeLimoges v. Nalco Company , 157 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2017). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
I have also joined in opinions of this Court to the effect that only rarely should negligence cases be disposed of by that mechanism. See , e.g. , Limoges v. Nalco Co. , 157 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2017) ; Gliottone v. Ethier , 870 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I. 2005). However, rarely does not mean never.
I have also joined in opinions of this Court to the effect that only rarely should negligence cases be disposed of by that mechanism. See, e.g., Limoges v. Nalco Co., 157 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2017); Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I. 2005). However, rarely does not mean never.
It appears to us that the motion justice impermissibly weighed the evidence in resolving those factual disputes—a function unquestionably reserved to the province of the jury. SeeLimoges v. Nalco Company , 157 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2017) ; Williams v. Alston , 154 A.3d 456, 460 (R.I. 2017). As this Court previously has observed, "[t]he purpose of the summary-judgment procedure is to identify disputed issues of fact necessitating trial, not to resolve such issues."