However, other jurisdictions, including Kansas, have found that an admission that the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment does not preclude an action for both respondeat superior and negligent entrustment or negligent hiring, retention, or supervision. See Kansas State Bank Tr. Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services, Inc., 249 Kan. at 362 (holding that liability under a negligent hiring, retention, or supervision claim results not because of the employer-employee relationship, but because the employer had reason to believe that an undue risk of harm to others would exist as a result of the employment of the alleged tortfeasor); Quinonez on behalf of Quinonez v. Anderson, 144 Ariz. 193, 696 P.2d 1342 (1984); Lim v. Interstate System Steel Div., Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830 (Minn.App. 1989); Clark v. Stewart, 126 Ohio St. 263, 185 N.E. 71 (1933). These cases rest on the proposition that negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are torts distinct from respondeat superior and that liability is not imputed but instead runs directly from the employer to the person injured.

” Id. (quoting Lim v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div., Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989)).

See, e.g., Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1222 (Kan. 1998) ("other jurisdictions, including Kansas, have found that an admission that the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment does not preclude an action for both respondeat superior and negligent entrustment or negligent hiring, retention, or supervision"); Lim. v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div., Inc., 435 N.W. 2d 830, 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("we interpret Minnesota law to permit a plaintiff to proceed under both theories"); Finkle v. Regency CSP Ventures Ltd. P'ship, 27 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1000 (D. S.D. 2014) ("it is probable that the South Dakota Supreme Court would hold that an admission that the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment does not preclude an action for both respondeat superior and negligent training or supervision.).

In the automobile-accident context, "negligent entrustment has been defined as a separate wrongful act when the negligence of the driver is reasonably foreseeable and the entrustor fails in the duty to take steps to prevent operation of the vehicle by the driver." Lim v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div., Inc. , 435 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ; accordBreeding v. Massey , 378 F.2d 171, 177-78 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying Arkansas law).

A minority of jurisdictions have held that an admission by an employer that its employee was acting within the scope of her employment does not preclude an action for both respondeat superior and negligent entrustment, training, hiring, retention, or supervision. See Fairshter v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 322 F.Supp.2d 646, 653–654 (E.D.Va.2004) ; Quinonez on Behalf of Quinonez v. Andersen, 144 Ariz. 193, 696 P.2d 1342 (1984) ; Lim v. Interstate System Steel Div., Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830 (Minn.App.1989) ; Clark v. Stewart, 126 Ohio St. 263, 185 N.E. 71 (1933). These jurisdictions view these torts as being distinct from respondeat superior and do not allow claim of agency to preclude a separate tort claim.

However, other jurisdictions have held that an admission of vicarious liability does not preclude causes of action for negligent entrustment, hiring, retention, or supervision. See, e.g., Marquis v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1224-25 (Kan. 1998); Lim v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div. Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1989); Fairshter v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 322 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (E.D. Va. 2004) (applying Virginia law). These jurisdictions reason that liability under theories of negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, training, and retention the employer's liability is direct and not derivative. These theories do not rest on the employer-employee relationship, but rather involve the employer's own negligence in entrusting, hiring, supervising, training, or retaining an employee with knowledge, either actual or constructive, that the employee posed a risk of harm to others.

However, other jurisdictions have held that an admission of vicarious liability does not preclude causes of action for negligent entrustment, hiring, retention, or supervision. See, e.g., Marquis v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1224-25 (Kan. 1998); Lim v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div. Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1989); Fairshter v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 322 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (E.D. Va. 2004) (applying Virginia law). These jurisdictions reason that liability under theories of negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, training, and retention the employer's liability is direct and not derivative. These theories do not rest on the employer-employee relationship, but rather involve the employer's own negligence in entrusting, hiring, supervising, training, or retaining an employee with knowledge, either actual or constructive, that the employee posed a risk of harm to others.

Other jurisdictions have acknowledged the majority rule but decided that an admission of liability does not preclude an action for both respondeat superior and negligent entrustment, training, hiring, retention, or supervision. See, e.g. Wax, 30 A.L.R. 4th 838, Marquis v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 91 P.2d 1213, 1224-25 (Kan. 1998), Lim v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div. Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. 1989). These jurisdictions reason that liability under theories of negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, training, and retention the employer's liability is direct and not derivative. Marquis, 91 P.2d at 1225.

Id. (citing Kansas State Bank Tr. Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991); Quinonez v. Andersen, 696 P.2d 1342 (Ariz. 1984); Lim v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div., Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830 (Minn.App. 1989); Clark v. Stewart, 185 N.E. 71 (Ohio 1933)). The court ruled that, in Kansas, the torts of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are torts "distinct from respondeat superior," as they are "not derivative of the employee's negligence."

But a sizeable number of other jurisdictions have reached the opposite conclusion and held that plaintiffs may proceed simultaneously on claims under theories of negligent employment and respondeat superior. See, e.g., MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d 324, 336 (Ky. 2014); James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d 329, 330-32 (S.C. 2008) (noting also that a plaintiff is not precluded from maintaining a negligent employment cause of action even "after an employer stipulates that it is vicariously liable for its employee's negligence"); Poplin v. Bestway Express, 286 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1320 (M.D. Ala. 2003); Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1224-25 (Kan. 1998); Lim v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div., Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Quinonez ex rel. Quinonez v. Andersen, 696 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).