Burns v. Burns, supra, 41 Conn. App. 724. There is no given set of words that must be used to preclude modification; an order is nonmodifiable if the decree distinctly and unambiguously expresses that it is. Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 255, 504 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 516 (1986). In making this determination, we look only at the dissolution decree itself.
In order to determine whether the Dissolution Agreement between the parties is modifiable, this court must first determine whether the Dissolution Agreement of the parties "clearly and unambiguously" forecloses modification of the support order. Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn.App. 253, 255 (1986). "If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will be held to be modifiable."
Calorossi v. Calorossi, 4 Conn. App. 165, 168, 493 A.2d 259 (1985): Bronson v. Bronson, 1 Conn. App. 337, 379, 471 A.2d 977 (1984). If the decree is meant to be nonmodifiable, it must contain language to that effect. Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 222-23, 429 A.2d 474 (1980); Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 256, 504 A.2d 563 (1986). Burns v. Burns, 41 Conn. App. 716, 724 (1996).
However, Connecticut courts have consistently held that language precluding modification is disfavored and that ambiguous agreements must be treated as modifiable. See, e.g., Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 222-23, 429 A.2d 474, 476 (1980); Scoville v. Scoville, 179 Conn. 277, 279, 426 A.2d 271, 273 (1979); Bronson v. Bronson, 1 Conn. App. 337, 338-39, 471 A.2d 977, 979 (1984). See also Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 255, 504 A.2d 563, 565 (1986). We have no doubt that the Kimball decree precluded modification for three years on the basis of any changes in the economic circumstances of either spouse.
Decided May 8, 1986 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 6 Conn. App. 253, is denied. Samuel V. Schoonmaker III, in support of the petition.
Accordingly, we conclude that this case is controlled by Scoville, and that the alimony award is modifiable upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. See id.; see also Burke v. Burke, 94 Conn.App. 416, 422–24, 892 A.2d 964 (2006); Rau v. Rau, supra, 37 Conn.App. at 213, 655 A.2d 800;Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn.App. 253, 255–56, 504 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 516 (1986). The defendant also argues that the reasoning of Scoville is flawed and urges us to overrule it. As an intermediate appellate court, however, we are not at liberty to overrule, reevaluate or reexamine controlling precedent of our Supreme Court.
"In determining whether the alimony award is modifiable or nonmodifiable, only the dissolution decree itself may be used." Id., 212; Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 256, 504 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 516 (1986). Here, when issuing the order dissolving the marriage, the court stated that "the order for unallocated alimony and child support shall terminate upon the earliest to occur of the following events: (1) the death of either of the parties; (2) the remarriage of the plaintiff; or (3) the date when the youngest child shall reach the age of eighteen years."
"If the decree is meant to be nonmodifiable, it must contain language to that effect. Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 222-23, 429 A.2d 474 (1980); Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 256, 504 A.2d 563 (1986)." Neal v. Neal, 7 Conn. App. 624, 625, 510 A.2d 210 (1986).' Lawler v. Lawler, 16 Conn. App. 193, 203, 547 A.2d 89 (1988), appeal dismissed, 212 Conn. 117, 561 A.2d 128 (1989)."
Such a preclusion of modification must be clear and unambiguous. McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 9, 440 A.2d 804 (1981); Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 504 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 216 (1986). If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will be held to be modifiable. Bronson v. Bronson, 1 Conn. App. 337, 339, 471 A.2d 977 (1984), citing Cummock v. Cummock, supra, 180 Conn. 222-23. In determining whether the alimony award is modifiable or nonmodifiable, only the dissolution decree itself may be used. Lilley v. Lilley, supra, 6 Conn. App. 256.
`If the decree is meant to be nonmodifiable, it must contain language to that effect. Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 222-23, 429 A.2d 474 (1980); Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 256, 504 A.2d 563 (1986).' Neal v. Neal, 7 Conn. App. 624, 625, 510 A.2d 210 (1986)." Lawler v. Lawler, 16 Conn. App. 193, 203, 547 A.2d 89 (1988), appeal dismissed, 212 Conn. 117, 561 A.2d 128 (1989).