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Lilley v. Lilley

6 Conn. App. 253 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986)
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Lilley v. Lilley

27 Citing cases

  1. Sheehan v. Balasic

    46 Conn. App. 327 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 25 times
    In Sheehan, the defendant claimed that, while a nonmodification clause precludes modification of an alimony award pursuant to § 46b-86 (a), such a clause does not preclude a modification pursuant to § 46b-86 (b).

    Burns v. Burns, supra, 41 Conn. App. 724. There is no given set of words that must be used to preclude modification; an order is nonmodifiable if the decree distinctly and unambiguously expresses that it is. Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 255, 504 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 516 (1986). In making this determination, we look only at the dissolution decree itself.

  2. Nardine v. Nardine

    2008 Ct. Sup. 3886 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

    In order to determine whether the Dissolution Agreement between the parties is modifiable, this court must first determine whether the Dissolution Agreement of the parties "clearly and unambiguously" forecloses modification of the support order. Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn.App. 253, 255 (1986). "If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will be held to be modifiable."

  3. Byrne v. Byrne

    1997 Ct. Sup. 12595 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    Calorossi v. Calorossi, 4 Conn. App. 165, 168, 493 A.2d 259 (1985): Bronson v. Bronson, 1 Conn. App. 337, 379, 471 A.2d 977 (1984). If the decree is meant to be nonmodifiable, it must contain language to that effect. Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 222-23, 429 A.2d 474 (1980); Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 256, 504 A.2d 563 (1986). Burns v. Burns, 41 Conn. App. 716, 724 (1996).

  4. Kimball v. C.I.R

    853 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1988)   Cited 1 times

    However, Connecticut courts have consistently held that language precluding modification is disfavored and that ambiguous agreements must be treated as modifiable. See, e.g., Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 222-23, 429 A.2d 474, 476 (1980); Scoville v. Scoville, 179 Conn. 277, 279, 426 A.2d 271, 273 (1979); Bronson v. Bronson, 1 Conn. App. 337, 338-39, 471 A.2d 977, 979 (1984). See also Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 255, 504 A.2d 563, 565 (1986). We have no doubt that the Kimball decree precluded modification for three years on the basis of any changes in the economic circumstances of either spouse.

  5. Lilley v. Lilley

    509 A.2d 517 (Conn. 1986)

    Decided May 8, 1986 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 6 Conn. App. 253, is denied. Samuel V. Schoonmaker III, in support of the petition.

  6. Pite v. Pite

    43 A.3d 229 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 10 times

    Accordingly, we conclude that this case is controlled by Scoville, and that the alimony award is modifiable upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. See id.; see also Burke v. Burke, 94 Conn.App. 416, 422–24, 892 A.2d 964 (2006); Rau v. Rau, supra, 37 Conn.App. at 213, 655 A.2d 800;Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn.App. 253, 255–56, 504 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 516 (1986). The defendant also argues that the reasoning of Scoville is flawed and urges us to overrule it. As an intermediate appellate court, however, we are not at liberty to overrule, reevaluate or reexamine controlling precedent of our Supreme Court.

  7. Burke v. Burke

    94 Conn. App. 416 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 18 times
    In Burke v. Burke, 94 Conn. App. 416, 420-21, 892 A.2d 964 (2006), we declined to review a party's claim regarding the trial court's decision on a motion for articulation where the sole remedy for review was by way of motion for review and where the party already had obtained review via the proper procedure.

    "In determining whether the alimony award is modifiable or nonmodifiable, only the dissolution decree itself may be used." Id., 212; Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 256, 504 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 516 (1986). Here, when issuing the order dissolving the marriage, the court stated that "the order for unallocated alimony and child support shall terminate upon the earliest to occur of the following events: (1) the death of either of the parties; (2) the remarriage of the plaintiff; or (3) the date when the youngest child shall reach the age of eighteen years."

  8. Burns v. Burns

    41 Conn. App. 716 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 41 times
    Upholding order awarding plaintiff 20 percent of defendant's earned income above his salary base

    "If the decree is meant to be nonmodifiable, it must contain language to that effect. Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 222-23, 429 A.2d 474 (1980); Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 256, 504 A.2d 563 (1986)." Neal v. Neal, 7 Conn. App. 624, 625, 510 A.2d 210 (1986).' Lawler v. Lawler, 16 Conn. App. 193, 203, 547 A.2d 89 (1988), appeal dismissed, 212 Conn. 117, 561 A.2d 128 (1989)."

  9. Rau v. Rau

    37 Conn. App. 209 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 35 times
    In Rau v. Rau, CT Page 768 37 Conn. App. 209, 211-212 (1995), the Appellate Court provided a useful review of applicable decisional law on this point.

    Such a preclusion of modification must be clear and unambiguous. McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 9, 440 A.2d 804 (1981); Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 504 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 216 (1986). If a provision purportedly precluding modification is ambiguous, the order will be held to be modifiable. Bronson v. Bronson, 1 Conn. App. 337, 339, 471 A.2d 977 (1984), citing Cummock v. Cummock, supra, 180 Conn. 222-23. In determining whether the alimony award is modifiable or nonmodifiable, only the dissolution decree itself may be used. Lilley v. Lilley, supra, 6 Conn. App. 256.

  10. Vandal v. Vandal

    31 Conn. App. 561 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 36 times
    Upholding award of alimony which did not terminate on wife's remarriage based on finding that husband, due to significant personal debt, was financially unable at time of dissolution to pay alimony in amount to which wife was rightfully entitled

    `If the decree is meant to be nonmodifiable, it must contain language to that effect. Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 222-23, 429 A.2d 474 (1980); Lilley v. Lilley, 6 Conn. App. 253, 256, 504 A.2d 563 (1986).' Neal v. Neal, 7 Conn. App. 624, 625, 510 A.2d 210 (1986)." Lawler v. Lawler, 16 Conn. App. 193, 203, 547 A.2d 89 (1988), appeal dismissed, 212 Conn. 117, 561 A.2d 128 (1989).