Opinion
No. 227245.
September 27, 2002 at 9:00 a.m.
Appeal from Wayne Circuit Court, LC No. 99-924845-NI.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ.
Defendant appeals by leave granted the April 26, 2000 order by the trial court requiring defendant to turn over to plaintiff its incident report and related documents pertaining to a fall suffered by the plaintiff in her room at defendant's hospital. We reverse and remand.
I. Facts
Plaintiff was admitted to defendant hospital on August 21, 1998 with pneumonia in the lower left lung, possible pulmonary embolism, and secondary to deep venous thrombosis. Plaintiff's condition improved and she was given permission to get out of bed to use the bathroom. On August 31, 1998, plaintiff fell while on her way to the bathroom and received a head injury. Plaintiff indicated that she had tripped on a cord. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff's family was informed of her fall and they sought to ascertain how it had occurred.
On August 9, 1999, plaintiff filed this action alleging negligence and breach of contract. Plaintiff alleged that she fell when she tripped on a fan cord and that defendant had breached its duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition and had breached its promise to provide a reasonably safe premises and to protect her from foreseeable injury. Defendant filed for summary disposition arguing that plaintiff's claim was a medical malpractice claim, but had not complied with the pre-suit notice required by MCL 600.2912b. The trial court, however, concluded that the statute was not applicable because the claim was not a medical malpractice claim.
MCL 600.2912b provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced."
On February 25, 2000, the trial court ordered defendant to turn over "any and all investigation reports and/or incident reports involving the trip and fall" of plaintiff for an in camera inspection. Defendant argued that the documents were privileged by statute, but plaintiff argued that the statute only applied to medical malpractice claims. The court concluded that the statutory privilege did not apply because it was negligence case and not a malpractice case. As a result, the court ordered that the documents be turned over and defendant filed an application for leave to appeal, which was granted.
II. Analysis
Review of a trial court's grant of a motion to compel discovery is for an abuse of discretion. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. v Bronson Plating Co., 197 Mich. App. 482, 494; 496 N.W.2d 373 (1992). However, whether production of certain documents is barred by statute is a matter of law and is reviewed de novo. Dye v St. John Hospital Medical Center, 230 Mich. App. 661, 665; 584 N.W.2d 747 (1998).
A. Applicability of the Statute to Negligence Claims
Defendant argues that the materials sought by plaintiff are privileged from disclosure under two sections of the Public Health Code. Plaintiff contends, however, that MCL 333.20175(8) and MCL 333.21515 are not applicable to this situation because this case concerns a negligence claim and not a medical malpractice claim. This issue has not been raised before and is an issue of statutory construction. The rules of statutory construction are well established. The primary goal of the courts in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Brown v Genesee Co. Board of Comm'rs, 464 Mich. 430, 437; 628 N.W.2d 471 (2001). This goal is best accomplished by carefully examining the language of the statute itself. The words of the statute provide the most reliable evidence of its intent. Id. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Tryc v Michigan Vetrans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135; 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). We must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, and only where the statutory language is ambiguous may we look outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent. McCaul v Modern Tile Carpet, Inc., 248 Mich. App. 610, 619-620; 640 N.W.2d 589 (2001).
MCL 333.20175(8) provides: "The records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or committees assigned a professional review function in a healthy facility or agency are confidential, shall be used only for the purposes provided in this article, are not public records, and are not subject to court subpoena." MCL 333.21515 provides: "The records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or committees assigned a review function described in this article are confidential and shall be used only for the purposes provided in this article, shall not be public records, and shall not be available for court subpoena."
The difficulty in plaintiff's argument is that the statutes themselves do not expressly limit their applicability to malpractice claims. In fact, MCL 333.21513(d) states that the statute seeks to "enable an effective review of the professional practices in the hospital for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality and improving the care provided in the hospital for patients." Furthermore, "the review shall include the quality and necessity of the care provided and the preventability of complications and deaths occurring in the hospital." Id. These goals are accomplished through the confidentiality of documents created for these purposes. Therefore, as long as the materials were collected for the purpose of improving patient care/internal review, the statutes would seem to apply, regardless of what type of action is involved. The trial court's ruling on this matter is reversed.
B. Scope of the Privilege
Since the statute does apply in negligence claims, it is therefore important to examine whether the particular documents fall within the privilege. MCL 333.20175(8) and MCL 333.21515, in accord with the Legislature's intent to fully protect quality assurance and peer review records from discovery, provide for confidentiality of records, reports and other information collected or used by peer review committees in the furtherance of their duties. Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hospital, 460 Mich. 26, 40; 594 N.W.2d 455 (1999). The purpose of these statutes is to facilitate the frank exchange of information in the important task of overseeing medical personnel and assuring patient care, Dye, supra, 230 Mich. App. 665, n2, and to encourage and implement productive peer review procedures. Attorney General v Bruce, 422 Mich. 157, 161; 369 N.W.2d 826 (1985). The privilege afforded by the statute may only be invoked for records, data and knowledge collected for or by an individual or committee assigned a review function. Gallagher v Detroit-Macomb Hospital Ass'n, 171 Mich. App. 761, 768; 431 N.W.2d 90 (1988).
In this case, there is some ambiguity in the record as to the purpose for which certain documents were created. From the record, it would appear that the incident report and related documents were, in fact, created as part of an internal review process and thus would fall within the privilege. However, it appears that the court's order required the defendant to turn over various other documents, including various handwritten notes, nurses' beside records, a typed note and a memo. If, as plaintiff contends, these documents were only created because plaintiff's family requested information and not for an internal review process, then they would not fall within the privilege and are discoverable. Since this issue has not researched for the record, the issue will need to be remanded to the trial court for further determination.
Reversed and remanded for determination as to which documents fall within the privilege. We do not retain jurisdiction.