Opinion
Civil Action No. 06-1979.
June 19, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court are plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 2), defendants' brief in opposition (Doc. No. 10), plaintiffs' reply in support of their motion (Doc. No. 11), and defendants' sur-reply in support of their brief in opposition (Doc. No. 12). For the following reasons, this Court denies plaintiffs' motion.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff Lighthouse Christian Center ("Lighthouse"), a church composed of approximately 300 members, currently operates a place of worship on Franklin Street and Fifth Avenue in West Reading, Pennsylvania. (See Behm Aff., attached as Ex. A to Pl. Br., at ¶¶ 3, 6). Plaintiff Sherwood Behm ("Pastor Behm") is the pastor of Lighthouse. (Id., at ¶ 2). Lighthouse and Pastor Behm ("plaintiffs") currently hold three worship services on Sundays and various group programs during the week, such as Bible study, divorce recovery, and alcohol treatment classes. (Id., at ¶¶ 8-9).
In 2003, plaintiffs attempted to find a new facility for worship to accommodate the growth of Lighthouse's congregation. (Id., at ¶ 10). Plaintiffs performed a nearly three-year search for available property, based upon specific physical and financial specifications. (Id., at ¶¶ 12-15, 18, 25; Skokowski Aff., attached as Ex. B., at ¶¶ 4, 8-10). These specifications included a building in excess of 30,000 square feet, with sufficient parking space, at a cost of less than 1.5 million dollars. (See Transcript of May 31, 2005 Oral Argument ("Tr."), at 17-18, 56). Plaintiffs ultimately identified a property located at 755 Heister Lane in Reading, Pennsylvania (the "property") which met their specifications. (Id.; Behm Aff., at ¶ 18).
Prior to offering a bid on the property, plaintiffs' real estate agent furnished plaintiff with a copy of the zoning ordinance in the City of Reading Zoning Code ("Reading Zoning Code") ostensibly applicable to the property ("MC zoning ordinance"). (See Tr., at 58-61, 73-80). The MC zoning ordinance provided by plaintiffs' real estate agent indicated that the property fell within a district which was zoned for manufacturing-commercial use ("MC zoning district"), but which permitted religious use as a special exception, subject to certain requirements. (See Pre-2000 MC Zoning Ordinance, submitted as P-3 at May 31, 2005 Oral Argument). Unfortunately, the copy of the MC zoning ordinance provided by plaintiffs' real estate agent was outdated; it failed to account for the 2001 amendment to the Reading Zoning Code that removed religious use in the MC zoning district, even as a special exception. (See 2001 Amendments to § 27-811 of the City of Reading Zoning Code, attached as Ex. 4 to Pl. Br.).
According to the copy of the current Reading Zoning Code provided by plaintiffs at the May 31, 2005 hearing, religious use appears to be permitted as a special exception in all other zoning districts, with the exception of preservation zones, heavy manufacturing districts, and commercial-neighborhood districts. (Id.).
On January 25, 2006, based upon the representation of plaintiffs' real estate agent that the MC zoning ordinance permitted religious use as a special exception, Lighthouse entered into an agreement of sale with the owner, Four Square Group ("Four Square"), to purchase the property. (See Agreement of Sale, attached as Ex. 3 to Pl. Br.). The agreement of sale was conditioned upon plaintiffs obtaining the necessary zoning approval to use the property as a church by April 28, 2006. (Id., at ¶ 10).
On January 30, 2005, Lighthouse filed an application with the Zoning Hearing Board of the City of Reading, Pennsylvania ("Zoning Hearing Board") for a use variance to permit Lighthouse to utilize the property for religious worship. (See Tr., at 27, 61-62). Following a hearing, the Zoning Hearing Board denied plaintiffs' application, finding the absence of a hardship, a prerequisite for a variance, in part because "there are many zoning districts which allow religious uses and which contain vacant buildings to house religious uses." (See February 8, 2006 Zoning Hearing Board Decision, at ¶ 13). On April 7, 2006, Lighthouse appealed the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board to the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, Pennsylvania ("Bucks County Court of Common Pleas"). (See Notice of Land Use Appeal). The appeal argues that the denial of the application for a use variance was arbitrary and capricious, and, in the alternative, asserts that the MC zoning ordinance, by limiting the operation of churches to certain restricted areas by special exception, "effectively precludes churches in the City in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA")." (Id., at ¶¶ 6, 10). The appeal is currently pending before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. (See Tr., at 33, 100, 110-113).
On April 12, 2006, Lighthouse and Four Square executed an addendum to the agreement of sale. (See Addendum to Agreement of Sale, submitted as P-2 at May 31, 2005 Hearing). Pursuant to the addendum, the parties agreed to extend the date to obtain the necessary zoning approval until June 28, 2006. (Id.). Failure to obtain zoning approval by this date, at least in the absence of another extension between the parties, voids the agreement of sale. (Id.). The addendum, like the original agreement, nonetheless permits Lighthouse to recover the entirety of its deposit on the purchase price of the property despite non-compliance with the zoning approval date. (Id.).
On May 10, 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the City of Reading, the City of Reading Council, and the Zoning Hearing Board ("defendants"). (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that the MC zoning ordinance on its face and as applied by defendants violates RLUIPA, the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and the free exercise clause, the freedom of speech clause, the freedom of assembly clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Id.). On May 18, 2006, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, asking this Court to enjoin defendants from prohibiting religious use, worship, and assembly in the MC zoning district in accordance with the Reading zoning code. (See Doc. No. 2). The Court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion on May 31, 2006.
II. Discussion
Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction restraining defendants, inter alia, from preventing religious use, worship, and assembly in the MC zoning district. (See Pl. Br., at 3). Although plaintiffs' complaint raises numerous claims, plaintiffs rest their motion on the RLUIPA claim, arguing that the MC zoning ordinance violates the substantial burden and equal terms provisions of RLUIPA. (Id., at 7-15).
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; (2) the existence of irreparable harm if relief is not granted; (3) the granting of injunctive relief will not result in even greater harm to the other party; and (4) the granting of injunctive relief will be in the public's interest. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b); Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx. Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (outlining standard for preliminary injunction); Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (outlining standard for temporary restraining order and noting that standard is identical to that for preliminary injunction).
A. Abstention
Defendants argue that this Court should dismiss plaintiffs' motion due to the pendency of plaintiffs' land use appeal before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. (See Def. Br., at 6-7). Although defendants initially identified the abatement doctrine as the source for this requested relief, it is clear that principles of abstention constitute the appropriate framework for analyzing the merit of defendants' substantive argument against interference with the ongoing state court proceeding. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird,, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10 (1976) (abstention may be raised by court sua sponte); Murphy v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 737 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1999) (district court may raise abstention doctrine sua sponte).
1. Standard
Defendants' sur-reply in opposition to plaintiffs' motion cites the abstention doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), as the legal basis for dismissing plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (See Def. Sur-Reply Br., at 4). In accordance with Third Circuit precedent, the more applicable abstention doctrine to the instant litigation is that of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
In general, the pendency of a state court action does not preclude a federal court from adjudicating a parallel federal court action involving the same, or similar, subject matter.See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). Indeed, federal courts have a "virtually unflagging" obligation to adjudicate claims that fall within their charter of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 4912 U.S. 350, 359 (1989). However, "because federal courts do have discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief, abstention is appropriate in a few carefully defined situations." Gwynedd Prop., Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir. 1992).
The doctrine announced in the Supreme Court decision ofYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), constitutes such a narrowly tailored exception to the general rule commanding adjudication of a federal action with the same factual and legal predicate as a pending state court proceeding. Pursuant to the subsequent importation of the Younger doctrine into the civil context, a federal district court possesses "discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding." Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). Younger abstention is appropriate upon the satisfaction of the following three conditions: (1) the existence of ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Id.
2. Application
The Younger doctrine requires this Court to abstain from deciding plaintiffs' motion. Each of the three elements of Younger abstention is satisfied.
First, it is clear that the parties are involved in an ongoing state judicial proceeding of a similar factual and legal nature as the instant federal action. Lighthouse's land use appeal, which challenges the Zoning Hearing Board's decision to deny plaintiffs' request for a variance to employ the property in the MC zoning district for religious use, is currently pending before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. See Addiction Specialists, Inc., 411 F.3d at 408-409 (state land use appeal before Allegheny Court of Common Pleas constitutes ongoing state court proceeding, despite state court's stay of proceedings, because land use appeal was pending at time plaintiff filed complaint in federal court alleging that township zoning ordinance violated various constitutional and statutory rights);Gwynedd Prop., Inc., 970 F.2d at 1200. The appeal was filed on April 7, 2006, well before plaintiffs' complaint in federal court was filed. Id. Moreover, in its land use proceeding in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, Lighthouse has argued the invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance by virtue of its alleged violation of RLUIPA. (See Land Use Appeal, at ¶ 10).
Second, the ongoing state court proceeding involves questions of zoning and land use, issues of "traditional significance to states." Addiction Specialists, Inc., 411 F.3d at 409; Izzo v. Borough of River Edge, 843 F.2d 765, 769 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Land use policy customarily has been considered a feature of local government and an area in which the tenets of federalism are particularly strong"). In fact, the Third Circuit has expressly declared that the basis for plaintiff's request for injunctive relief in this instant action, the facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance, satisfies the "important state interest" prong of the Younger analysis. See Addiction Specialists, Inc., 411 F.3d at 410. Furthermore, granting plaintiffs' requested relief in the form of an order enjoining defendants from implementing the MC zoning ordinance and from prohibiting religious worship in the MC zoning district would encroach upon the integrity (and autonomy) of the pre-existing state court proceeding, thereby resulting in a meddlesome "de facto review of the township's zoning decisions currently under review in the state courts." Gwynedd Properties, 970 F.2d at 1204.
Although plaintiffs also bring an as-applied challenge to the validity of the implementation of the MC zoning ordinance, it is clear from a thorough review of plaintiffs' submissions and of plaintiffs' oral argument that the basis for the preliminary injunctive relief is the facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance, as compared to the selective and discriminatory implementation of this ordinance. See Addiction Specialists, Inc., 411 F.3d at 410 (drawing distinction in appropriateness of abstention in land use claim between challenge to legality of land use policies and claim for selective and malicious enforcement of otherwise valid policy); Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743, 748 (3d Cir. 1982) (district court must scrutinize facts of land use claim to determine whether essence of claim requires abstention). In fact, plaintiffs' counsel clarified at oral argument that plaintiffs' current action, not just plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, seeks limited judicial relief as a result of the textual invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance; specifically, plaintiffs' requested relief is "in the nature of [a] declaratory judgment, that the city's zoning scheme, which prohibits places of worship in the manufacturing and commercial zoning district violates the Constitution and [RLUIPA]." (See Tr., at 113).
Finally, the Court finds that the basis for the injunctive relief, the failure of the MC zoning ordinance to comport with RLUIFA, could be — and very well may be — litigated in the relevant state proceeding. In contrast to plaintiffs' contentions, the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas possesses the authority to invalidate local zoning ordinances when violative of federal statutory law. See 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 11006-A (court has power in any land use appeal to declare ordinance invalid); Addiction Specialists, Inc., 411 F.3d at 411-412 (finding that Court of Common Pleas' jurisdiction is not necessary restricted by limited subject matter jurisdiction of Zoning Hearing Board and holding that plaintiff may raise constitutional and statutory challenges to land use statutes and ordinances in land use appeals before Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas). Furthermore, the Court notes that Lighthouse raised this exact claim in its land use appeal. (See Land Use Appeal Notice, at ¶ 10).
Plaintiffs asserted at oral argument that the Berks County Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the Reading zoning code violates RLUIPA. (See Tr., at 112).
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, all the elements of Younger abstention are satisfied. Accordingly, in deference to principles of legal comity between federal and state government, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to the Younger doctrine. See, e.g., Gwynedd Prop., Inc., 970 F.2d at 1200 (agreeing that district court could have abstained from hearing plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction on certain claims in land use case pursuant to Younger abstention); Williams v. Red Bank Bd. Of Educ., 662 F.2d 1008, 1022 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that court applying Younger abstention should deny injunctive relief and dismiss action);Thompson v. Dixon, 2005 WL 1773980, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2005).
B. Merits
Assuming arguendo that this Court chose not to abstain from deciding plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, this Court would nonetheless deny plaintiffs' motion for failing to meet the relevant standard for injunctive relief.
1. Likelihood of Success
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on their RLUIPA claim.
a. Substantial Burden
Section 2000cc(a) of RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing or implementing a "land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person . . . unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution: (a) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (b) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest." Id. To meet the threshold requirement for a § 2000cc(a) violation, that the land use regulation imposes a "substantial burden" on a party's "religious exercise," a plaintiff must do more than demonstrate mere inconvenience on the exercise of her religious beliefs. See Midrash Sephradi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining "substantial burden" as "significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly"). Instead, a plaintiff must show "that the burden prevents adherents from conducting their religious beliefs or causes them to forego religious precepts." Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F. Supp. 2d 507, 515 (D.N.J. 2005).
With respect to the alleged violation of § 2000cc(a) of RLUIPA, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of a substantial burden on the exercise of plaintiffs' religious beliefs. Lighthouse will not cease to exist if it and its congregation are unable to relocate from their current place of worship to a larger property in the MC zoning district. (See Tr., at 36-37). Furthermore, the MC zoning ordinance merely precludes plaintiffs from operating a place of worship in that particular district; plaintiffs are free to relocate into one of the other zoning districts that authorizes religious worship as a special exemption, including any district zoned residential, residential/outlet, residential/professional office zone, commercial core, commercial residential, and commercial highway. (See Reading Zoning Code); see, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 515 (requiring plaintiffs to find new location for church outside development zone that prohibits church use does not amount to substantial burden, as suitable alternative venues exist in 90% of rest of city). Nor does the perceived unavailability of alternative space, consistent with plaintiffs' financial and spatial constraints, within these zoning districts constitute a substantial burden within the meaning of RLUIPA, as these difficulties are faced by all land users, not merely churches. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227 n. 11 (zoning plan permitting church to operate in one zoning district (out of eight) does not constitute substantial burden, despite allegation that church will not be able to find land or facility sizeable enough to accommodate congregations in available district); Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, 2003 WL 22048089, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2003). In addition, there is no record of misconduct or bad faith by defendants in passing the 2001 amendment to the MC zoning ordinance and in implementing this zoning ordinance to deny plaintiffs' request for a variance.See Living Water Church of God v. Charter Township of Meridian, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1134 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (noting that denial of special use permit ("SUP") for construction of church and school on plaintiff's property in order to fulfill growing spatial needs of congregation and staff would not qualify as substantial burden on religious exercise but for defendants' past history with plaintiff concerning development of property, including defendants' abandonment of long practice of allowing SUPs on eve of expiration of plaintiff's previously granted SUP). Finally, plaintiffs present no evidence that congregants will be forced to forgo their religious beliefs if they continue to attend religious services as Lighthouse's current location, or, ultimately, if forced to travel to a facility in another zoning district. See, e.g., Williams Island Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Aventura, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215-1216 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
According to defendants' characterization of the Reading Zoning Code, a characterization which plaintiffs do not dispute, religious use is permitted in eleven of thirteen zoning districts in Reading. (See Tr., at 106, 116).
Indeed, most of plaintiffs' congregants are mobile, capable of commuting some distance to attend religious services. (See Tr., at 39).
Quite simply, the MC zoning ordinance inconveniences plaintiffs by forcing them to remain in their current place of worship and to resume the search for a new, more spacious facility; it in no way impermissibly coerces plaintiffs or their congregation into foregoing their religious beliefs or into participating in an ideologically unpalatable form of religious practice. Because plaintiffs are unlikely to establish a prima facie case under § 2000cc(a) of RLUIPA, plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on this claim.
b. Equal Terms
Section 2000cc(b)(1) of RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing or implementing a land use regulation that "treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution." Id. Plaintiffs seeking to prove a violation of § 2000cc(b)(1) "must identify similarly situated nonsecular assemblies which are treated more favorably than secular institutions, and then identify no rational basis for the distinction related to the municipality's goal."Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, 406 F. Supp. 2d 517; see also Ventura County Christian High Sch., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1246-1247 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (in evaluating claim under § 2000cc(b)(1) of RLUIPA, court must "first inquire as to whether defendants have treated plaintiffs in an unequal manner to similarly situated entities").
Although courts have struggled over the appropriate standard to apply to resolve a § 2000cc(b)(1) claim, this Court need not enter the analytical fray at this juncture, as the parties have implicitly agreed in their submissions upon the afore-mentioned standard. (See Pl. Br., at 14).
With respect to the alleged violation of § 2000cc(b)(1) of RLUIPA, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that similarly situated secular assemblies are treated more favorably than religious institutions. Specifically, the Court notes that plaintiffs have failed to create a factual record demonstrating that Lighthouse is similarly situated to non-secular assemblies that are permitted within the zoning district, such as restaurants, bars, or private or public swimming pools. See, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (granting summary judgment to defendant-city because plaintiff-church failed to demonstrate that it was similarly situated to secular assemblies permitted in zoning district). More importantly, other similarly situated secular assemblies, such as non-commercial membership organizations, are also excluded from operating within the MC zoning district. See, e.g., Petra Presbyterian Church, 2003 WL 22048089, at *12 (no likelihood of success on substantial burden component of RLUIPA claim because zoning code treats religious and non-religious membership organizations on equal terms by excluding both from industrial zoning district). Furthermore, the Court notes that plaintiffs fail to identify a similarly situated secular entity that has been treated more favorably under the MC zoning ordinance than Lighthouse. (See Tr., at 80-82).
2. Irreparable Harm
The Court also finds that plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief. For instance, plaintiffs will recoup their entire deposit if they are unable to obtain final zoning approval for religious use of the instant property by June 28, 2006. (See Agreement, at ¶ 10; April 12, 2006 Addendum to Agreement). Furthermore, although plaintiffs contend that they will be unable to expand their pre-existing, religious-based services to the community without a larger facility, plaintiffs can still provide these services to the community from their current location, while continuing their search for a larger facility in a zoning district which permits religious use. In fact, the mayor and other representatives of Reading have offered to aid plaintiffs in their quest for a larger facility. (See Tr., at 29-33, 42). Finally, and perhaps most fatal to plaintiffs' irreparable harm argument, plaintiffs present no evidence, whether in the form of affidavits or oral testimony, from individual members suggesting either that they have left or that they will soon leave plaintiffs' congregation if plaintiffs are unable to find a more spacious place of worship in Reading to conduct their religious and community-based services.
Put simply, while plaintiffs may be inconvenienced if plaintiffs do not receive unappealable zoning approval to use the property as a church prior to June 28, 2006, this level of inconvenience, although certainly significant, does not rise to the level of irreparable harm.
3. Conclusion
Assuming arguendo that this Court chose not to abstain from resolving plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to the Younger doctrine, this Court would nonetheless deny plaintiffs' motion on its merits. In particular, this Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating both a likelihood of success on the merits of their RLUIPA claim and irreparable harm. See, e.g., In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 1982) (failure to demonstrate likelihood of success or irreparable harm "must necessarily result in the denial of a preliminary injunction").
III. Conclusion
The Court dismisses plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to the Younger doctrine. In addition, plaintiffs shall file a brief within seven days from the date of this Order explaining why this Court should not stay or dismiss the instant action in its entirety pursuant to federal abstention doctrine. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of June 2006, upon consideration of plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 2), and all responses and replies thereto (Doc. No. 10-12), it is hereby ORDERED as follows:1. Plaintiffs' motion (Doc. No. 2) is DENIED pursuant to theYounger doctrine.
2. By Monday, June 26, 2006, plaintiffs shall file a brief explaining why this Court should not stay or dismiss the instant action in its entirety pursuant to principles of abstention.
3. By Monday, July 3, 2006, defendants shall file a response to plaintiffs' brief.