Opinion
B317612
11-28-2023
LIGHTHOUSE BROOKS, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AFFINITY HOUSE, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
The Law Offices of Ronald Richards &Associates, Ronald Richards, Morani Stelmach for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Office of Daniel J. Bramzon &Associates, Daniel J. Bramzon, Eric Post for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 21SMCV00021 Mark A. Young, Judge.
The Law Offices of Ronald Richards &Associates, Ronald Richards, Morani Stelmach for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of Daniel J. Bramzon &Associates, Daniel J. Bramzon, Eric Post for Defendant and Respondent.
COLLINS, J.
Landlord Lighthouse Brooks, LLC filed an unlawful detainer complaint in January 2021 against tenant Affinity House, Inc. for nonpayment of rent. Affinity moved for summary judgment, asserting as an affirmative defense that it was protected from eviction during the COVID-19 pandemic under the Los Angeles County COVID-19 Eviction Moratorium (Exec. Order of the Chair of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (March 19, 2020) (LACEM)). As relevant here, the LACEM permitted a tenant to self-certify eligibility for relief if the tenant had nine or fewer employees as of March 4, 2020. For tenants with ten or more employees, the LACEM required written documentation demonstrating financial hardship. The trial court found that Affinity had established its affirmative defense as a matter of law and that Lighthouse failed to raise any triable issues of material fact, and accordingly granted summary judgment.
Lighthouse appeals from the court's summary judgment order. It argues that Affinity failed to proffer sufficient evidence establishing that it had nine or fewer employees as of March 4, 2020. Lighthouse also asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the LACEM is unconstitutionally vague. We find no error in the trial court's finding that the evidence established that Affinity had nine or fewer employees as of March 4, 2020 and that Lighthouse failed to provide evidence to the contrary. Even if Affinity had ten or more employees, as Lighthouse claims, we find that summary judgment was proper because Affinity satisfied the requirements under the LACEM to provide written documentation of its financial hardship due to the pandemic. We do not reach Lighthouse's constitutional argument, as it was not raised before the trial court and we decline to consider it here in the first instance. We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. The LACEM
On March 4, 2020, the governor proclaimed a state of emergency in California due to the threat of COVID-19. (Governor's Exec. Order No. N-28-20 (Mar. 16, 2020).) The same month, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors approved an executive order implementing the LACEM, which imposed a temporary moratorium on evictions for non-payment of rent by tenants impacted by COVID-19. The original moratorium was in effect from March 4 to May 31, 2020; the board approved multiple extensions thereafter. The LACEM originally provided that a residential or commercial property owner could not evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent "if the Tenant demonstrates an inability to pay rent...due to financial impacts related to COVID-19,... and the Tenant has provided notice to the Landlord" within seven days after the rent was due. (LACEM § III(a) (Sept. 1, 2020).)
The LACEM also provided that "commercial tenants with nine (9) employees or fewer," as well as residential tenants, had 12 months to repay the landlord for any unpaid rent, starting from the conclusion of the moratorium period. (LACEM § III(e) (Sept. 1, 2020).) These specified tenants were also allowed to provide, "and Landlords must accept, a self-certification of inability to pay rent." (LACEM § III(f) (Sept. 1, 2020).) Commercial tenants with 10 to 99 employees had to provide "written documentation demonstrating financial hardship" to the landlord along with the notice of inability to pay rent. (Ibid.)
The LACEM stated that tenants could use its provisions as an affirmative defense in an unlawful detainer action brought by a landlord. (LACEM § XVIII (Sept. 1, 2020).) The eviction moratorium expired for residential tenants in September 2020 due to state preemption, but continued unchanged for commercial tenants in the amended LACEM adopted in November 2020. (LACEM § III(a), (e)(i), (f)(i) (Nov. 10, 2020).)
The LACEM ordered the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Affairs (DCBA) to issue guidelines to "aid in the implementation of the Moratorium." (LACEM § III(j) (Sept. 1, 2020).) The DCBA guidelines defined "employee" to "have the same definition as in the California Labor Code." (Eviction Moratorium Guidelines § 4.9 (July 20, 2021) (guidelines).) The guidelines also clarified that commercial tenants could "conclusively establish a financial impact related to COVID-19" by providing the landlord "with a written, signed self-certification" using a form substantially similar to the template attached to the guidelines. (Guidelines § 6.7(C)(1).) The guidelines further provided that the number of employees "shall be calculated as of March 4, 2020," and include "the total number of the Tenant's Employees at any business location...plus the Employees of any subsidiary, parent, or affiliated entities." (Guidelines §§ 7.1, 7.3.)
II. Complaint
Affinity's business is renting shared living space to individuals on a monthly basis. In late 2018, Affinity leased from Lighthouse several adjacent residential buildings in the Venice neighborhood of Los Angeles to use as one of its shared living communities. It is undisputed that Affinity paid only 25 percent of the monthly rent due from September to December 2020.
Lighthouse filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Affinity in January 2021, alleging nonpayment of rent. Lighthouse alleged that on December 5, 2020, it served on Affinity a three-day notice to pay rent or quit; at the time, Affinity owed $102,000 in unpaid rent for September through December 2020. Lighthouse filed a first amended complaint in May 2021 and a second amended complaint (SAC) in July 2021. Affinity filed an answer to the SAC, asserting, as relevant here, an affirmative defense that Affinity's eviction was prohibited under the LACEM.
III. Summary Judgment
A. Motion
Affinity filed a motion for summary judgment in November 2021. It argued that pursuant to the LACEM, Lighthouse was prohibited from evicting Affinity for nonpayment of rent because Affinity's inability to pay was due to financial impacts related to the pandemic. Affinity contended it was a commercial tenant and its tenancy was therefore subject to the LACEM. Affinity further argued that it employed nine or fewer employees, and was therefore entitled under the LACEM to self-certify its inability to pay rent. Finally, Affinity asserted that Lighthouse was required to accept Affinity's timely self-certification as conclusive evidence of financial hardship.
Affinity stated that its business of providing shared living spaces was "decimated by the COVID-19 crisis." Affinity asserted that it met the requirements for relief under the LACEM by sending timely notification to Lighthouse of its inability to pay rent due to the financial impact of the pandemic. Affinity provided evidence that, at the beginning of each month from September through December 2020, Affinity served Lighthouse with a signed notification "of inability to pay rent due to COVID-19 emergency." On the form notification, Affinity checked the boxes indicating that it was affected by the pandemic and had suffered a loss of income due to payment of healthcare expenses related to treating a COVID-19 illness, a COVID-19 related workplace closure, increased childcare expenses due to school closures, and government ordered COVID-19 measures. In addition to the self-certification, Affinity also provided Lighthouse with documentation of its reduced income by attaching its monthly rent rolls to each notification sent to Lighthouse.
The copy of the November 2021 form does not have any boxes checked.
In support of summary judgment, Affinity filed a declaration dated November 19, 2021 from Robert O'Neill, its chief executive officer. O'Neill stated that Affinity suffered "extreme financial hardship" during the pandemic from reduced membership in the shared living community and increased cleaning and maintenance costs to adhere to relevant guidelines related to COVID-19. O'Neill also stated that Affinity "employs less [sic] than 9 persons."
Affinity also requested that the court take judicial notice of the relevant versions of the LACEM and the associated guidelines issued by the DCBA.
B. Opposition
In its opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Lighthouse argued that Affinity was not covered under the LACEM. Specifically, Lighthouse argued that Affinity did not qualify under the LACEM as a "commercial tenant" because it was not a tenant of a commercial property. Lighthouse also argued that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Affinity had nine or fewer employees on March 4, 2020. Without further explanation, Lighthouse contended that "as of May 4, 2020, [Affinity] had at least twelve employees, if not more."
Lighthouse used the date of May 4, 2020, rather than March, several times in its opposition to summary judgment. It is unclear whether this was intentional or a typographical error. The parties agree that the relevant date to establish the number of Affinity's employees was March 4, 2020.
In support of this assertion, Lighthouse attached and cited to the transcript of O'Neill's November 2021 deposition. In his deposition, O'Neill testified that Affinity leased property from Lighthouse in several adjacent buildings in Venice, California. He stated that Affinity had zero net profit from 2020 to the present and that it had last paid the full month's rent to Lighthouse in April 2020. After that, Affinity did not pay the full rent due because of the decline in business and the issuance of pandemic orders allowing tenants to defer rent. Affinity paid 25 percent of the rent from September through December 2020, as proposed by Lighthouse, with the balance due in 12 months.
Lighthouse also filed a request for judicial notice in support of its opposition, including the county land use designation for the property as "single family residential," and sections of the Los Angeles Municipal Code.
O'Neill testified that Affinity was founded in 2018 by three owners-Ariel Chazanas, Benjamin Katz, and O'Neill. Katz left the company in February 2021. As for the number of employees, O'Neill testified that as of November 2021, Affinity had six "nonowners" and the two remaining owners. When asked how many employees Affinity had "from March 2020 until January 2021," O'Neill responded, "I don't know the exact number," but that it was more than six. Lighthouse's counsel then asked O'Neill how many employees Affinity had from January 2021 to the present. Affinity's counsel objected that the question was "vague and ambiguous as to time," and Lighthouse's counsel moved on to a different question without a response from O'Neill. O'Neill also testified that Affinity laid off three employees between March 2020 and November 2021, but did not recall the exact dates.
O'Neill also testified that during the pandemic, Affinity used outside cleaners due to the increased cleaning requirements. He identified these workers as "contractors." Affinity also brought in a nurse and a virologist to give talks related to the pandemic, but he could not recall if they were paid by Affinity.
C. Reply
Affinity filed a reply, arguing that the evidence relied on by Lighthouse in fact established that Affinity had nine employees as of March 4, 2020. Affinity calculated this total using O'Neill's testimony that Affinity had six employees as of the date of his deposition in November 2021, plus three employees whom Affinity laid off between March 2020 and November 2021. Thus, Affinity asserted that Lighthouse failed to establish a disputed issue of fact as to the number of employees and therefore could not defeat summary judgment.
D. Hearing and Ruling
The court held a hearing on the summary judgment motion on November 30, 2021. Following the hearing, the court issued a written order granting the motion. The court rejected Lighthouse's argument that Affinity was not a commercial tenant, finding that Affinity had provided evidence to the contrary and citing to motions in limine filed by Lighthouse in which it asserted that Affinity was a commercial tenant. With respect to the number of employees, the court found that the portions of the O'Neill deposition cited by Lighthouse "do not show that there is a dispute of fact as to whether [Affinity] had more than nine employees." Thus, the court concluded that Affinity had established a complete defense to eviction under the LACEM and was entitled to summary judgment.
No court reporter was present at the hearing.
The court entered judgment in favor of Affinity on December 22, 2021. Lighthouse timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
Summary judgment is appropriately granted when the moving party establishes there is no triable issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) A triable issue of material fact exists only if "the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Ibid.)
A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to establish either that the plaintiff cannot prove one or more elements of his or her causes of action, or that there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2) ; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) If the defendant does so, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to produce admissible evidence demonstrating that there is a triable issue of material fact as to the claim or defense. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The plaintiff "shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists." (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
"On appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been granted, we review the record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained." (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) However, '[a]s with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant's responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore, to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are present by citation to the record and any supporting authority." (Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 379, quoting Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455; see also Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684.)
II. Analysis
A. Number of employees
Lighthouse contends that Affinity failed to provide sufficient evidence of the number of its employees to meet its initial burden on summary judgment. Moreover, Lighthouse argues that even if Affinity did shift the burden, Lighthouse established a disputed issue of fact as to whether Affinity had more than nine employees as of March 4, 2020. We disagree on both points.
Lighthouse first argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Affinity had nine or fewer employees as of March 4, 2020. It notes that in O'Neill's November 2021 declaration, he simply stated that Affinity "employs less [sic] than 9 persons," but did not specify a time period. Lighthouse also cites to O'Neill's deposition testimony, arguing that it was too "vague" to shift the evidentiary burden.
We conclude that this evidence met Affinity's prima facie burden to show that it had no more than nine employees as of March 4, 2020. O'Neill's declaration, while somewhat ambiguous as to time, was bolstered by his deposition testimony that as of the November 2021 deposition, Affinity employed six "nonowners," and had laid off three employees between March 2020 and that date. This evidence supports the inference that Affinity had nine or fewer employees as of the operative date of March 4, 2020 and shifted the burden to Lighthouse to raise a triable issue of fact.
We reject Lighthouse's argument that the deposition testimony was too "vague" to support Affinity's motion. Lighthouse cites to the portion of the deposition where O'Neill was asked how many employees Affinity had "from March 2020 until January 2021" and he responded that he did not know "the exact number." As noted by Affinity's objection during the deposition, Lighthouse's question (as well as the similar one that followed) seeking a specific employee count in response to a broad date range was vague and ambiguous. O'Neill's testimony that he did not know the exact number of employees for a 10-month span did not demonstrate that he lacked personal knowledge to testify in response to more specific questioning, namely the number of employees at the time of the deposition and the number that had left during a specified time period.
We also note that Lighthouse did not object below that O'Neill's deposition testimony was vague, presumably because it was evidence that Lighthouse itself introduced in opposition to summary judgment. As such, Lighthouse cannot raise a belated evidentiary objection for the first time on appeal. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(5) [objections to evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment that are "not made at the hearing shall be deemed waived"]; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 531 [objections to evidence must be made before the trial court].)
Alternatively, Lighthouse contends that if Affinity met its initial burden, Lighthouse produced evidence that Affinity had "at least 12 employees" as of March 4, 2020 and it therefore raised a triable issue of fact. To reach this number, Lighthouse assumes that the "owners" identified by O'Neill should be considered employees, so that Affinity had eight "employees" as of the deposition in November 2021, plus the three "nonowners" and one owner who left between March 2020 and November 2021. But Lighthouse provides no authority for this assumption.
Indeed, in its appellate reply brief, despite Affinity's arguments in opposition, Lighthouse ignored the deposition testimony entirely, simply reasserting that O'Neill's declaration was insufficient to shift the burden.
The only authority cited in passing by Lighthouse is Labor Code section 2810.8, which defines an employee as "any individual who in a particular week performs at least two hours of work for an employer." (Lab. Code, § 2810.8, subd. (a)(5).) We are not persuaded. As an initial matter, Lighthouse did not argue below that individuals Affinity labeled as owners or independent contractors should be considered employees under Labor Code section 2810.8 and the applicable provisions of the LACEM. This argument has therefore been forfeited. (See Bhatt v. State Dept. of Health Services (2015) 133 Cal.App.4th 923, 933 (Bhatt) ["'a party who fails to raise an issue in the trial court has therefore waived the right to do so on appeal'"]; JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178 ["Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider."].)
Lighthouse did cursorily make this argument in its post judgment motion for a new trial. But the trial court's denial of the new trial motion is not raised as a basis for this appeal.
Moreover, Lighthouse fails to explain why this section should apply here, or which individuals should be considered employees as a result. Citing statutory language in passing does not meet Lighthouse's burden to present a developed argument for consideration on appeal. (See, e.g., Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach) [failure to develop claim with reasoned legal argument and supporting authority forfeits the issue]; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 (Paterno) ["An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties."].) Lighthouse therefore forfeited this claim by failing to make any reasoned legal argument supporting its interpretation of the statute.
Additionally, the plain language of the statute does not support Lighthouse's position. Labor Code section 2810.8 requires certain employers to offer newly available jobs to former employees who were laid off as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. (See § 2810.8, subds. (a)(10), (b)(1).) The statute expressly applies to owners of an "enterprise," defined as "a hotel, private club, event center, airport hospitality operation, airport service provider, or the provision of building service to office, retail, or other commercial buildings." (Id., subd. (a)(6)-(7).) We also note that "employer" is defined by the statute as the owner or operator of the relevant business. (Id., subd. (a)(6).) In addition to failing to explain why this statute would apply to Affinity, Lighthouse provides no basis why the three individuals identified by O'Neill as "owners" would qualify as employees rather than employers under this section. As such, Lighthouse has not met its burden to demonstrate a triable issue of fact or that the trial court erred in finding that Affinity had nine or fewer employees as of March 4, 2020.
In its reply on appeal, Lighthouse argues for the first time that Affinity claimed to be a residential tenant in a separate lawsuit, contrary to its assertion in this case that it is a commercial tenant. Lighthouse therefore asserts that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Affinity is a "commercial tenant or a residential tenant." Lighthouse cannot raise a triable issue for the first time in reply on appeal. (See, e.g., Bhatt, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 933.)
In support of this argument, Lighthouse sought judicial notice of documents filed by Affinity's owners in the unrelated matter, after the judgment was entered in this case. We deny the request, as it seeks judicial notice of materials that are irrelevant to the disposition of the appeal. (See Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, partially overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276 (Mancini) [only relevant material may be judicially noticed]; People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 42, fn. 2 [denying request for judicial notice of irrelevant material].)
Even assuming the trial court erred in finding that Affinity had established that it had nine or fewer employees, Lighthouse has not demonstrated that the judgment should be reversed. If Affinity had 10 or more employees as of March 2020, as Lighthouse suggests, it could not rely on self-certification of financial hardship. Instead, Affinity was required under the LACEM to submit "written documentation demonstrating financial hardship" to Lighthouse along with the notice of inability to pay rent. (Sept. 1, 2020 LACEM, § III(f)(i).) Affinity argued in its motion for summary judgment that it satisfied this requirement by submitting monthly rent rolls showing reduced rental income from September to December 2020. Affinity provided evidence that it emailed these rent rolls along with its notice of inability to pay rent to Lighthouse at the beginning of each month.
This evidence satisfied Affinity's prima facie burden to show it was entitled to the affirmative defense under the LACEM as a matter of law. Thus, the burden shifted to Lighthouse to demonstrate a triable issue of fact. In its opposition to summary judgment, Lighthouse addressed this issue in a single paragraph, arguing that Affinity was "not unable to pay its rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic" because it was never "ordered to close by any government agency for reasons related to COVID-19." Lighthouse further asserted that it received documents in discovery confirming its "suspicions" that Affinity "has been abusing the protections afforded to tenants that have been severely impacted" by the pandemic. These arguments contained no factual citations to the record and no legal support. In its opposing separate statement, Lighthouse disputed that the monthly notices submitted by Affinity confirmed "an inability to pay rent due to financial impacts related to COVID-19." Lighthouse cited the entire O'Neill deposition as the basis for its dispute. Lighthouse did not otherwise object to the evidence submitted by Affinity. Lighthouse's citation to the entire O'Neill deposition transcript does not satisfy its burden to identify specific evidence raising a disputed issue of material fact. (See § 437c, subd. (b)(3) [in opposing separate statement, "[e]ach material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence"]; North Coast Business Park. v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 31 ["That the fact [to create a triable issue] could have been found in the filed documents is of no value, because this would have imposed on the trial court the impossible burden of determining both the existence and significance of facts unmentioned by the parties."].) Thus, we conclude that Lighthouse failed to present "competent evidence raising an issue of material fact" as to whether Affinity properly submitted written documentation of financial hardship. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845.)
Although the trial court did not rely on this basis in granting summary judgment, we may affirm on any ground appearing in the record where the opposing party had an adequate opportunity to address the issue. (See Angelica Textile Services, Inc. v. Park (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 495, 508-509; § 437c, subd. (m)(2); see also Conway v. County of Tuolumne (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1020, fn. 5 ["This court, however, reviews only the result, not the trial court's reasoning, which is irrelevant to appellate review following summary judgment."].) Here, Affinity argued in its respondent's brief on appeal that it had properly submitted evidence of financial hardship and therefore qualified under LACEM regardless of the number of employees. Lighthouse did not address the issue in its reply. As such, we find that Lighthouse had an adequate opportunity to address the issue but failed to do so. We may therefore affirm the judgment on this alternative ground.
B. Constitutional Arguments
Lighthouse also argues that the self-certification process under the LACEM is "unconstitutionally vague" and denied it due process. Affinity responds that Lighthouse did not raise a constitutional challenge below in opposition to summary judgment and has therefore forfeited the issue on appeal. Lighthouse did not address the forfeiture issue in its reply. We agree that the issue has been forfeited due to Lighthouse's failure to timely raise it before the trial court. (See People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590, fn. omitted ["'No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,' or a right of any other sort, 'may be forfeited in ... civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.'"]; Geftakys v. State Personnel Board (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 844, 864 [constitutional issue forfeited when not raised "at the earliest opportunity"].)
We also note that, even if we were inclined to consider the issue on the merits, Lighthouse has failed to fully develop its constitutional challenge. Instead, in fewer than three pages, Lighthouse simply quotes from two federal cases, neither of which deal with the versions of the LACEM applicable here, and urges us to conclude that "granting [Affinity's] COVID-19 affirmative defense to the eviction based on the conclusion that [Affinity] timely delivered a self-certification of financial distress is against the law." Because Lighthouse failed to timely raise a constitutional argument supported by legal argument, we need not consider the argument further. (See Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; Paterno, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 106.)
Both parties filed requests for judicial notice on appeal related to Lighthouse's constitutional argument. Lighthouse sought judicial notice of an order from a federal district court case. Affinity asked that we take judicial notice of the January 2022 amendments to the LACEM, arguing that they were relevant to rebut Lighthouse's due process arguments. We deny both requests as irrelevant. (See Mangini, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1063.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Affinity is entitled to its costs on appeal.
We concur: CURREY, P.J., MORI, J.